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  1. Phenomenology of the Locked-In Syndrome: an Overview and Some Suggestions.Fernando Vidal - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):119-143.
    There is no systematic knowledge about how individuals with Locked-in Syndrome experience their situation. A phenomenology of LIS, in the sense of a description of subjective experience as lived by the ill persons themselves, does not yet exist as an organized endeavor. The present article takes a step in that direction by reviewing various materials and making some suggestions. First-person narratives provide the most important sources, but very few have been discussed. LIS barely appears in bioethics and neuroethics. Research on (...)
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  • Diagnosing Consciousness: Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State.Carl E. Fisher & Paul S. Appelbaum - 2010 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (2):374-385.
    Recent studies indicate that patients who are diagnosed with vegetative states may retain more awareness than their clinical assessments suggest. Disorders of consciousness traditionally have been diagnosed on the basis of outwardly observable behaviors alone, but new functional imaging studies have shown surprising levels of brain activity in some patients, indicating that even higher-level cognitive functions like language processing and visual imagery may be preserved. For example, one recently developed method purports to detect voluntary mental imagery solely on the basis (...)
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  • Diagnosing Consciousness: Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State.Carl E. Fisher & Paul S. Appelbaum - 2010 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (2):374-385.
    In this paper, we review recent neuroimaging investigations of disorders of consciousness and different disciplines' understanding of consciousness itself. We consider potential tests of consciousness, their legal significance, and how they map onto broader themes in U.S. statutory law pertaining to advance directives and surrogate decision-making. In the process, we outline a taxonomy of themes to illustrate and clarify the variance in state-law definitions of consciousness. Finally, we discuss broader scientific, ethical, and legal issues associated with the advent of neuroimaging (...)
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  • Persistence Without Personhood: A New Model.Joseph Gottlieb - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    I am a person. But am I fundamentally and essentially a person? The animalist says no. So must the phenomenal continuity theorist, or so I will argue. Even if, contra animalism, we cannot survive zombification, being a subject of experience is not sufficient for being a person, and phenomenal continuity is not sufficient for our survival as the same person over time. These observations point the way to a positive account of personhood, and provide further insight into the conditions under (...)
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  • The Value of Consciousness in Medicine.Diane O'Leary - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Volume 1. Oxford, UK: pp. 65-85.
    We generally accept that medicine’s conceptual and ethical foundations are grounded in recognition of personhood. With patients in vegetative state, however, we’ve understood that the ethical implications of phenomenal consciousness are distinct from those of personhood. This suggests a need to reconsider medicine’s foundations. What is the role for recognition of consciousness (rather than personhood) in grounding the moral value of medicine and the specific demands of clinical ethics? I suggest that, according to holism, the moral value of medicine is (...)
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  • Residual Cognitive Capacities in Patients With Cognitive Motor Dissociation, and Their Implications for Well-Being.Mackenzie Graham - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (6):729-757.
    Patients with severe disorders of consciousness are thought to be unaware of themselves or their environment. However, research suggests that a minority of patients diagnosed as having a disorder of consciousness remain aware. These patients, designated as having “cognitive motor dissociation”, can demonstrate awareness by imagining specific tasks, which generates brain activity detectable via functional neuroimaging. The discovery of consciousness in these patients raises difficult questions about their well-being, and it has been argued that it would be better for these (...)
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  • Is Consciousness Intrinsically Valuable?Andrew Y. Lee - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):1–17.
    Is consciousness intrinsically valuable? Some theorists favor the positive view, according to which consciousness itself accrues intrinsic value, independent of the particular kind of experience instantiated. In contrast, I favor the neutral view, according to which consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. The primary purpose of this paper is to clarify what is at stake when we ask whether consciousness is intrinsically valuable, to carve out the theoretical space, and to evaluate the question rigorously. Along the way, I also (...)
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  • Can They Feel? The Capacity for Pain and Pleasure in Patients with Cognitive Motor Dissociation.Mackenzie Graham - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (2):153-169.
    Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome is a disorder of consciousness wherein a patient is awake, but completely non-responsive at the bedside. However, research has shown that a minority of these patients remain aware, and can demonstrate their awareness via functional neuroimaging; these patients are referred to as having ‘cognitive motor dissociation’. Unfortunately, we have little insight into the subjective experiences of these patients, making it difficult to determine how best to promote their well-being. In this paper, I argue that the capacity to (...)
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  • Should We Treat Vegetative and Minimally Conscious Patients as Persons?Matthew Braddock - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (2):267-280.
    How should we treat patients diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) or minimally conscious state (MCS)? More specifically, should we treat them as having the full moral status of persons? Yes, or so we argue. First, we introduce the medical conditions of PVS, MCS, and the related conditions of Locked-in Syndrome and covert awareness. Second, we characterize the main argument for thinking diagnosed PVS patients are not persons. Third, we contend that this argument is defeated by mounting (...)
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  • The Value of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):503-520.
    Recent work within such disparate research areas as the epistemology of perception, theories of well-being, animal and medical ethics, the philosophy of consciousness, and theories of understanding in philosophy of science and epistemology has featured disconnected discussions of what is arguably a single underlying question: What is the value of consciousness? The purpose of this paper is to review some of this work and place it within a unified theoretical framework that makes contributions (and contributors) from these disparate areas more (...)
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  • Mapping the Ethical Issues of Brain Organoid Research and Application.Tsutomu Sawai, Yoshiyuki Hayashi, Takuya Niikawa, Joshua Shepherd, Elizabeth Thomas, Tsung-Ling Lee, Alexandre Erler, Momoko Watanabe & Hideya Sakaguchi - forthcoming - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience:1-14.
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  • Emerging Moral Status Issues. [REVIEW]Christopher Gyngell & Julian J. Koplin - 2020 - Monash Bioethics Review 38 (2):95-104.
    Many controversies in bioethics turn on questions of moral status. Some moral status issues have received extensive bioethical attention, including those raised by abortion, embryo experimentation, and animal research. Beyond these established debates lie a less familiar set of moral status issues, many of which are tied to recent scientific breakthroughs. This review article surveys some key developments that raise moral status issues, including the development of in vitro brains, part-human animals, “synthetic” embryos, and artificial womb technologies. It introduces the (...)
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  • Clashes of Consensus: On the Problem of Both Justifying Abortion of Fetuses with Down Syndrome and Rejecting Infanticide.Henrik Friberg-Fernros - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (3):195-212.
    Although the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome has become commonplace, infanticide is still widely rejected. Generally, there are three ways of justifying the differentiation between abortion and infanticide: by referring to the differences between the moral status of the fetus versus the infant, by referring to the differences of the moral status of the act of abortion versus the act of infanticide, or by separating the way the permissibility of abortion is justified from the way the impermissibility of infanticide (...)
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  • Persistent Vegetative State, Akinetic Mutism and Consciousness.Will Davies & Neil Levy - 2016 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Finding Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law of Severe Brain Damage. Oxford University Press. pp. 122-136.
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  • Introduction: Reconsidering Disorders of Consciousness in Light of Neuroscientific Evidence.Ralf J. Jox & Katja Kuehlmeyer - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (1):1-3.
    Disorders of consciousness pose a substantial ethical challenge to clinical decision making, especially regarding the use of life-sustaining medical treatment. For these decisions it is paramount to know whether the patient is aware or not. Recent brain research has been striving to assess awareness by using mainly functional magnetic resonance imaging. We review the neuroscientific evidence and summarize the potential and problems of the different approaches to prove awareness. Finally, we formulate the crucial ethical questions and outline the different articles (...)
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  • Rola świadomości w decyzjach dotyczących zaprzestania podtrzymywania funkcji życiowych.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2011 - Rocznik Kognitywistyczny 5:191-198.
    Badania przy użyciu rezonansu magnetycznego sugerują, że przynajmniej niektórzy pacjenci w tzw. stanie wegetatywnym mogą być bardziej „świadomi”, niż to się do tej pory wydawało. W artykule zamierzam omówić te badania; następnie rozważę, o jakie rozumienie pojęcia świadomości może w nich chodzić; a wreszcie zastanowię się nad etycznymi implikacjami tych odkryć. Zamierzam też rozważyć, czy posiadanie wyższych form świadomości zawsze ma być dodatkową racją przemawiającą przeciwko zaprzestaniu podtrzymywaniu funkcji życiowych. Tym samym, w artykule chciałbym wskazać istotność badań z zakresu kognitywistyki (...)
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  • Naturalizing Responsibility.Silvia Zullo - 2016 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25 (4):700-711.
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