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  1. Phenomenology of the Locked-In Syndrome: an Overview and Some Suggestions.Fernando Vidal - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):119-143.
    There is no systematic knowledge about how individuals with Locked-in Syndrome experience their situation. A phenomenology of LIS, in the sense of a description of subjective experience as lived by the ill persons themselves, does not yet exist as an organized endeavor. The present article takes a step in that direction by reviewing various materials and making some suggestions. First-person narratives provide the most important sources, but very few have been discussed. LIS barely appears in bioethics and neuroethics. Research on (...)
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  • Is Consciousness Intrinsically Valuable?Andrew Y. Lee - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):1–17.
    Is consciousness intrinsically valuable? Some theorists favor the positive view, according to which consciousness itself accrues intrinsic value, independent of the particular kind of experience instantiated. In contrast, I favor the neutral view, according to which consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. The primary purpose of this paper is to clarify what is at stake when we ask whether consciousness is intrinsically valuable, to carve out the theoretical space, and to evaluate the question rigorously. Along the way, I also (...)
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  • The Value of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):503-520.
    Recent work within such disparate research areas as the epistemology of perception, theories of well-being, animal and medical ethics, the philosophy of consciousness, and theories of understanding in philosophy of science and epistemology has featured disconnected discussions of what is arguably a single underlying question: What is the value of consciousness? The purpose of this paper is to review some of this work and place it within a unified theoretical framework that makes contributions (and contributors) from these disparate areas more (...)
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  • Clashes of Consensus: On the Problem of Both Justifying Abortion of Fetuses with Down Syndrome and Rejecting Infanticide.Henrik Friberg-Fernros - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (3):195-212.
    Although the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome has become commonplace, infanticide is still widely rejected. Generally, there are three ways of justifying the differentiation between abortion and infanticide: by referring to the differences between the moral status of the fetus versus the infant, by referring to the differences of the moral status of the act of abortion versus the act of infanticide, or by separating the way the permissibility of abortion is justified from the way the impermissibility of infanticide (...)
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  • Can They Feel? The Capacity for Pain and Pleasure in Patients with Cognitive Motor Dissociation.Mackenzie Graham - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (2):153-169.
    Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome is a disorder of consciousness wherein a patient is awake, but completely non-responsive at the bedside. However, research has shown that a minority of these patients remain aware, and can demonstrate their awareness via functional neuroimaging; these patients are referred to as having ‘cognitive motor dissociation’. Unfortunately, we have little insight into the subjective experiences of these patients, making it difficult to determine how best to promote their well-being. In this paper, I argue that the capacity to (...)
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  • Persistent Vegetative State, Akinetic Mutism and Consciousness.Will Davies & Neil Levy - 2016 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Finding Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law of Severe Brain Damage. Oxford University Press. pp. 122-136.
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  • Introduction: Reconsidering Disorders of Consciousness in Light of Neuroscientific Evidence.Ralf J. Jox & Katja Kuehlmeyer - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (1):1-3.
    Disorders of consciousness pose a substantial ethical challenge to clinical decision making, especially regarding the use of life-sustaining medical treatment. For these decisions it is paramount to know whether the patient is aware or not. Recent brain research has been striving to assess awareness by using mainly functional magnetic resonance imaging. We review the neuroscientific evidence and summarize the potential and problems of the different approaches to prove awareness. Finally, we formulate the crucial ethical questions and outline the different articles (...)
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  • Rola świadomości w decyzjach dotyczących zaprzestania podtrzymywania funkcji życiowych.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2011 - Rocznik Kognitywistyczny 5:191-198.
    Badania przy użyciu rezonansu magnetycznego sugerują, że przynajmniej niektórzy pacjenci w tzw. stanie wegetatywnym mogą być bardziej „świadomi”, niż to się do tej pory wydawało. W artykule zamierzam omówić te badania; następnie rozważę, o jakie rozumienie pojęcia świadomości może w nich chodzić; a wreszcie zastanowię się nad etycznymi implikacjami tych odkryć. Zamierzam też rozważyć, czy posiadanie wyższych form świadomości zawsze ma być dodatkową racją przemawiającą przeciwko zaprzestaniu podtrzymywaniu funkcji życiowych. Tym samym, w artykule chciałbym wskazać istotność badań z zakresu kognitywistyki (...)
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  • Naturalizing Responsibility.Silvia Zullo - 2016 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25 (4):700-711.
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  • Should We Treat Vegetative and Minimally Conscious Patients as Persons?Matthew Braddock - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (2):267-280.
    How should we treat patients diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) or minimally conscious state (MCS)? More specifically, should we treat them as having the full moral status of persons? Yes, or so we argue. First, we introduce the medical conditions of PVS, MCS, and the related conditions of Locked-in Syndrome and covert awareness. Second, we characterize the main argument for thinking diagnosed PVS patients are not persons. Third, we contend that this argument is defeated by mounting (...)
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  • Diagnosing Consciousness: Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State.Carl E. Fisher & Paul S. Appelbaum - 2010 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (2):374-385.
    In this paper, we review recent neuroimaging investigations of disorders of consciousness and different disciplines' understanding of consciousness itself. We consider potential tests of consciousness, their legal significance, and how they map onto broader themes in U.S. statutory law pertaining to advance directives and surrogate decision-making. In the process, we outline a taxonomy of themes to illustrate and clarify the variance in state-law definitions of consciousness. Finally, we discuss broader scientific, ethical, and legal issues associated with the advent of neuroimaging (...)
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  • Diagnosing Consciousness: Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State.Carl E. Fisher & Paul S. Appelbaum - 2010 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (2):374-385.
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