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Review: Illusions about Uncertainty [Book Review]

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331 - 340 (1985)

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How the conjunction fallacy is tied to probabilistic confirmation: Some remarks on Schupbach (2009).Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):3-12.details Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of view if (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations
Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (1):1-38.details This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 19 citations
The conjunction fallacy and the many meanings of and.Ralph Hertwig, Björn Benz & Stefan Krauss - 2008 - Cognition 108 (3):740-753.details Download Export citation Bookmark 13 citations
Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.details The aim of this paper is to study interpretation, specifically, to work toward an account of interpretation that seems descriptively and explanatorily correct. No account of interpretation can be philosophically helpful, I submit, if it is incompatible with a correct account of what people actually do when they interpret others. My question, then, is: how does the (naive) interpreter arrive at his/her judgments about the mental attitudes of others? Philosophers who have addressed this question have not, in my view, been (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 365 citations
Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details This paper is about guessing: how people respond to a question when they aren’t certain of the answer. Guesses show surprising and systematic patterns that the most obvious theories don’t explain. We argue that these patterns reveal that people aim to optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity when forming their guess. After spelling out our theory, we use it to argue that guessing plays a central role in our cognitive lives. In particular, our account of guessing yields new theories (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 21 citations

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