The dualism of emic and etic plays a crucial role in the emergence of three culturally informed approaches of psychology: cross-cultural psychology , cultural psychology and indigenous psychologies , a distinction largely accepted nowadays. Similarities and/or differences between these positions are usually discussed either on the level of phenomena or theory. In this paper, however, the discussion takes place on a meta-theoretical or epistemological level, which is also emerging elsewhere. In following several earlier papers of the author, first, four perspectives (...) are distinguished that underlie present day psychology. Second, these are used as a framework for linking them to the three “camps”. This analysis will show that these perspectives are characterized by different underlying worldviews, interests as well as methodical preferences. Third, it is claimed that this level of discussion is quite fruitful for the ongoing discourse on the three camps, but also helps one to understand, why the duality between emic and etic approaches is—implicitly or explicitly—at the core of these discussions, because their relevance turns out to differ in the three camps. In that sense, the emic/etic duality is used here as a “litmus test” to exemplify these deeper differences between the camps, thereby highlighting them. Fourth, in order to overcome not only the dilemma between the unique and general in psychology, but also to clarify the relation between the individual and culture it is proposed that psychology should take human action as its unit of analysis, thereby connecting historically to the early beginnings of psychology at the end of the 19th century. It will be argued that a culture inclusive action theory may overcome this tension and may help to integrate western and other indigenous psychologies, and hence it could be advantageous to integrate CP and IPs as well. This is possible because the proposed theory hopefully provides a universal framework for psychological concepts, yet allows for their culture specific expression. (shrink)

MEDIEVAL LOGICNORMAN KRETZMANN, Infinity and continuity in ancient and medieval thought. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982. 367 pp. $36.lO/£20.75.A. MAIERÙ, English logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries. Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. Rome 10-14 November 1980. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1982. 388 pp. 60,000 lire.PHENOMENOLOGY AND LOGICBARRY SMITH, Parts and moments. Studies in logic and formal ontology.Miinchen, Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1982. 564 pp. 198 DM.R. SCHMIT, Husserls Philosophie der Mathematik. Platonistische und (...) konstruktivistische Momente in Husserls Mathematikbegriff. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1981. 159 pp. No price stated.K. LEWIN, Werkausgabe, vol. I, Wissenschaftstheorie I. Edited by Alexandre Metraux. Bern: Huber; Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta; 1981. 400 pp. $32.50.A. SCHUTZ, Life forms and meaning structure. Translated, introduced and annotated by H.R.Wagner. London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. v + 217 pp. £11.95.INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC>L.E.J. BROUWER, Brouwer's Cambridge lectures on intuitionism. Edited by D. van Dalen. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1981. xii + 109 pp. £9.95.A.S. TROELSTRA, Choice sequences. A chapter of intuitionistic mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. vi + 170 pp. £6.00.LOGIC AND LANGUAGEH. BURKHARDT, Logik und Semiotik in der Philosophie von Leibniz. Munchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1980. 487 S. 178 DM.HANS AARSLEFF, From Locke to Saussure. Essays on the study of language and intellectual history. London: Athlone Press, 1982. ix + 422 pp. £18.00.JAMES D. MCCAWLEY, Everything that linguists have always wanted to know about logic* *but were ashamed to ask. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. xv + 508 pp. £15.00.PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCEJACK W. MEILAND and MICHAEL KRAUSZ, Relativism-cognitive and moral.Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. x + 260 pp. £14.00 /£6.95.KARL R. POPPER, Die beiden Grundproblem der Erkenntnistheorie. Edited by Troels Eggers Hansen. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1979. xxxv + 476 pp. 49 DM.KARL R. POPPER, Quantum theory and the schism in physics. Edited by W.W.Bartley, 111. London: Hutchinson, 1982. xviii + 229 pp. £15.00.KARL R. POPPER, The open universe. An argument for indeterminism. Edited by W.W. Bartley, 111. London: Hutchinson, 1982. xxii + 185 pp. £15.00.E. MORSCHER, 0. NEUMAIER and G. ZECHA, Philosophie als Wissenschaft/Essays in scientific philosophy. Dedicated to Paul Weingartner. Bad Reichenhall: Comes Verlag, 1981. 470 pp. ASch 495/DM 68/$32.00.MISCELLANEOUSPAUL THOM, The syllogism. Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1981. 312 pp.,128 DM.BERNARD BOLZANO, Philosophische Tagebiicher. Edited by Jan Berg. Stuttgart–Bad Cannstadt: F. Frommann, 1979-1981. 246, 172, 182 pp. No price stated. (shrink)

Ludwik Fleck is a pioneer of the contemporary social constructionist trend in scientific theory, where his central concept of thinking style has become standard fare. Yet the concept is too often misunderstood and simplified with serious consequences not only for Fleck studies. My essay situates Fleck’s concept of thinking style in the historical context of the 1920s and ‘30s, when the notion of style was first applied to the natural sciences, in order to illustrate the uniqueness of Fleck’s concept among (...) the uses of style by his contemporaries and, finally, to examine the epistemological, methodological, and political consequences of this distinction. (shrink)

I give a revision (“reload”) of an earlier paper on logico-empiricism’s philosophy of biology by checking its central theses against the background of the international conferences of Prague (1934), Paris (1935), and Copenhagen (1936), so important for the development of logical empiricism and its spread in the western world. My theses are that logical empiricism did not contribute in the same way to the development of philosophy of biology, as it did e.g. to the development of philosophy of mathematics or (...) physics. The reasons for this failure were: (1) logical empiricists were unexperienced in biological science. (2) They concentrated on an unproductive ('ideological') framework (anti-vitalism, reduction) that they took to be philosophy of biology. (3) This prevented them from dealing with actual problems of biological science. Between the various sections of the paper, I insert “intermezzos” that present several conference participants in a wider historical context (Great War, persecution, language). (shrink)

In this introductory article, we provide a historical and philosophical framework for studying crisis discussions in psychology. We first trace the various meanings of crisis talk outside and inside of the sciences. We then turn to Kuhn’s concept of crisis, which is mainly an analyst’s category referring to severe clashes between theory and data. His view has also dominated many discussions on the status of psychology: Can it be considered a “mature” science, or are we dealing here with a pre- (...) or multi-paradigmatic discipline? Against these Kuhnian perspectives, we point out that especially, but not only in psychology distinctive crisis declarations and debates have taken place since at least the late 19th century. In these, quite different usages of crisis talk have emerged, which can be determined by looking at (a) the content and (b) the dimensions of the declarations, as well as (c) the functions these declarations had for their authors. Thus, in psychology at least, ‘crisis’ has been a vigorous actor’s category, occasionally having actual effects on the future course of research. While such crisis declarations need not be taken at face value, they nevertheless help to break the spell of Kuhnian analyses of psychology’s history. They should inform ways in which the history and philosophy of psychology is studied further. (shrink)

Summary Daniel N. Stern’s research on the first years of life offers the view of an active newborn, developing in a continuous dialogue with the Other. The mother places the infant feelings at the center of her attention. The infant gets in tune with the mother, and learns that she welcomes and understands his inner states. Such attunement is a primary holistic experience, taking place because of the infant innate ability to perceive the “interpersonal happenings” as a unitary Gestalt, emerging (...) “from the theoretically separate experiences of movement, force, time, space and intention”. Large convergence exists between Daniel Stern’s developmental psychology and Gestalt theory: both view the infant development occurring within an inter-subjective matrix, not as a process with phases or stages, but rather as a progressive organization of structures. (shrink)

The Diversity of Science in Carnap's, Lewin's and Fleck's Philosophy: Toward a Pluralistic Point of View. In the 1920s and 1930s three different but simultaneous approaches of philosophy of science can be distinguished: the logical approach of the physicist Rudolf Carnap, the logico-historical approach of the psychologist Kurt Lewin and the socio-historical approach of the medical scientist Ludwik Fleck. While the philosophies of Lewin and Fleck can be characterized as contextual appraisals which account for the interactions between particular sciences and (...) their historical, socio-cultural or intellectual environments, Carnap's philosophy is narrowed to an internal methodology centered on scientific propositions and logical structures in general. In addition to these differences in aim and practice of methodological analysis the estimation of the real disunity and diversity of the special branches of science differs. Instead of Carnap's ideal of a unified science from the new pluralistic point of view the evaluation of the empirical multiplicity of particular sciences obtains philosophical acceptance. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Dieser Aufsatz widmet sich Riehls Auseinandersetzung mit empirischen Sozial- und Humanwissenschaften. Der Neukantianer Riehl wurde in diesem Zusammenhang bisher kaum berücksichtigt. Ein großes Interesse verdient er sich aufgrund seiner Ablehnung des Ansatzes der Südwestdeutschen Schule des Neukantianismus, die sich aus seiner erkenntnistheoretischen Position ergibt. Er sprach sich gegen einen Methodendualismus zwischen Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften und für eine wertfreie Geschichtswissenschaft aus. Ähnlich wie Karl Lamprecht fordert er eine strikte Trennung zwischen Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung und die Implementierung einer kausal-genetischen Betrachtungsweise. Aus (...) diesem Grund trat er in den späten 1880er Jahren als wichtiger Förderer und Wegbereiter der Ethnologie in Freiburg in Erscheinung, förderte in Berlin Anfang der 1900er Jahre die Wissenschaftstheorie wesentlich und erwarb sich schließlich auch als ein Förderer der experimentellen Psychologie Verdienste. (shrink)