My aim in this paper is to consider whether, by thinking of our ethical relation to one another in terms of vulnerability, we can better resolve the problem of overdemandingness – namely, that cert...

Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ?all the way down?. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ?all the way down?

Current research on second-person relations has often overlooked that this is not a new topic. Addressed mostly under the heading of the “I–thou relation,” second-person relations were discussed by central figures of the phenomenological tradition, including Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, but also quite extensively by much lesser-known authors, such as Karl Löwith, Ludwig Binswanger, and Semyon L. Frank, whose work has been undeservedly neglected in current research. This paper starts off by arguing that, in spite of the rightly acknowledged (...) differences between the Husserlian and the Heideggerian approaches to the investigation of the social world, both approaches converge in the claim that the I–thou relation is founded on more basic forms of sociality. In a second step, against the background of Frank’s and Binswanger’s challenges to that claim, I argue that Löwith’s proposal that the I–thou relation is a primordial form of sociality can be vindicated by conceptualizing I–thou relations as close personal relationships (paradigmatically exemplified by companion friendships and romantic partnerships). After assessing how Löwith’s approach to the I–thou relation stands vis-à-vis Heidegger’s and Husserl’s views, I conclude by suggesting how Löwith’s approach can contribute to current research on second-person relations. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to argue, contra Axel Honneth, that ‘the summons’ ( Aufforderung), the central pillar of Fichte’s transcendentalist account of recognition, is best made sense of not as an ‘invitation’, but rather as a second-personal demand, whose illocutionary content draws attention to the demandingness of responsibilities towards vulnerable agents. Because of this, the summons has good explanatory force in terms of disclosing the phenomenological dynamics of psychosocially and politically significant reactive attitudes. Under my reading, then, Fichte’s (...) position, contra Honneth’s ‘negative’ treatment of it, is anything but an empty formalism that ‘fails to refer to subjects of flesh and blood’. (shrink)

A prominent trend in moral philosophy today is the interest in the rich textures of actual human practices and lives. This has prompted engagements with other disciplines, such as anthropology, history, literature, law and empirical science, which have produced various forms of contextual ethics. These engagements motivate reflections on why and how context is important ethically, and such metaethical reflection is what this article undertakes. Inspired by the work of the later Wittgenstein and the Danish theologian K.E. Løgstrup, I first (...) describe one of the ways in which context plays a central role with regard to ethical meaning and normativity. I then examine how ‘context’ is to be defined, and finally I discuss some of the questions which arise when giving context prominence in ethics – namely, how to delimit the scope of relevant context, the relevant traits of a particular context and what ‘the ethical’ is. (shrink)

Journalists depend on two vectors of trust: the trust invested in them by their sources, and the trust invested in them by their end-users. For many years, trust has become a key issue in the articulation of the journalistic profession. This paper distinguishes between two traditional approaches to earn public trust: either through an emphasis on the ideal of objectivity, or by a sort of showing one’s cards: an explicit declaration of one’s subjectivity. Through a reading of Løgstrup, Derrida, and (...) Deleuze, we argue that both positions are inadequate solutions to the problem of trust. In as much as subjectivity is continuously negotiated in interaction with the unknown and the uncontrollable, the poles of objectivity and subjectivity cannot define the narrative event without each supplementing the other. To escape from this impasse, we suggest a third approach: a hospitable journalism characterized by a hospitable attitude towards the uncontrollable and the strange, or unknown, which operates to make the individual more aware of herself and her place in the world. This invitation happens through a silencing of the self. (shrink)

Since the publication of Annette Baier’s agenda-setting article entitled ‘Trust and Antitrust’, trust has become an increasingly popular topic, not only in moral philosophy and epistemology but als...

This paper serves two purposes: first, the proposition of an ethical fiduciary theory that substantiates the often-cited assertion that the patient–physician relationship is fiduciary in nature; and second, the application of this theory to the case of informed consent. Patients’ decision-making preferences vary significantly. While some seek fully autonomous decision-making, others prefer to delegate parts of their decision. Therefore, we propose an ethical fiduciary theory that allows physician and patient to jointly determine the physician’s role on a spectrum from fiduciary (...) as advisor to fiduciary as agent. Drawing on legal concepts of the fiduciary relationship and on phenomenological accounts of obligation by Lévinas and Løgstrup, our theory relies on the key attributes of trust, vulnerability and otherness. Finally, practical implications of this theory for the informed consent process are developed: we propose a preassessment of patients’ risk and value profiles as well as a restructuring of the oral consent interview and the written consent materials. (shrink)

A prominent trend in moral philosophy today is the interest in the rich textures of actual human practices and lives. This has prompted engagements with other disciplines, such as anthropology, history, literature, law and empirical science, which have produced various forms ofcontextual ethics. These engagements motivate reflections on why and how context is important ethically, and such metaethical reflection is what this article undertakes. Inspired by the work of the later Wittgenstein and the Danish theologian K.E. Løgstrup, I first describe (...) one of the ways in which context plays a central role with regard to ethical meaning and normativity. I then examine how ‘context’ is to be defined, and finally I discuss some of the questions which arise when giving context prominence in ethics – namely, how to delimit the scope of relevant context, the relevant traits of a particular context and what ‘the ethical’ is. (shrink)

Public health nursing is grounded in public health ideologies and fundamental nursing values. Researchers have argued that ethical responsibility from the perspective of the nurse is an understudied phenomenon. This meta-ethnography provides in-depth knowledge of how public health nurses (PHNs) experience ethical responsibility when working to prevent injury and disease, and promote health and well-being in children, young people and their families. There are reciprocal findings across the 10 included studies. The findings reveal that these nurses often feel alone, have (...) worries and uncertainties and are afraid of doing wrong. They describe unclear boundaries in their work, creating a heightened sense of responsibility. PHNs fight lonely battles. Yet they show courage and commitment and are ready to stand up and fight for children and families who do not receive adequate care. A line of argument is developed and the metaphorical phrase Chivalrous knights in moral armour is used to express the authors’ overall interpretations of the findings. Reflection on the findings shows how the different dimensions of ethical responsibility are interconnected. The nurses’ ethical sensitivity enables them to feel compassion for others and they show indignation when vulnerable others are not treated with dignity and respect. Indignation and compassion are interrelated, and when human life and dignity are threatened, the ethical demand to respond emerges. Indignation is a precursor to moral courage, and the nurses’ moral sensitivity and respect for their clients emboldens them to stand up for vulnerable others. The findings also illustrate the paradoxical nature of freedom. Freedom of choice due to unclear boundaries heightens the nurses' sense of responsibility. This research is an important step in theory development and has implications for further research, education and practice. (shrink)

Background Among the myriad voices advocating diverging ideas of what general practice ought to be, none seem to adequately capture its ethical core. There is a paucity of attempts to integrate moral theory with empirical accounts of the embodied moral knowledge of GPs in order to inform a general normative theory of good general practice. In this article, we present an empirically grounded model of the professional morality of GPs, and discuss its implications in relation to ethical theories to see (...) whether it might be sustainable as a general practice ethic. Methods We observed and interviewed sixteen GPs and GP residents working in health care centres in four Swedish regions between 2015–2017. In keeping with Straussian Grounded Theory, sampling was initially purposeful and later theoretically guided, and data generation, analysis and theoretical integration proceeded in parallel. The focal concept of this article was refined through multidimensional property supplementation. Results The voice of the profession is one of four concepts in our emerging theory that attempt to capture various motives that affect GPs’ everyday moral decisionmaking. It reflects how GPs appreciate the situation by passing three professional–moral judgments: Shall I see what is before me, or take a bird’s-eye view? Shall I intervene, or stay my hand? And do I need to speak up, or should I rather shut up? By thus framing the problem, the GP narrows down the range of considerations, allowing them to focus on its morally most pertinent aspects. This process is best understood as a way of heeding Løgstrup’s ethical demand. Refracted through the lens of the GP’s professional understanding of life, the ethical demand gives rise to specific moral imperatives that may stand in opposition to the express wishes of the other, social norms, or the GP’s self-interest. Conclusions The voice of the profession makes sense of how GPs frame problematic situations in moral terms. It is coherent enough to be sustainable as a general practice ethic, and might be helpful in explaining why ethical decisions that GPs intuitively understand as justified, but for which social support is lacking, can nevertheless be legitimate. (shrink)

Background Migrant live-in care workers are a main pillar of long-term care in many countries, including Germany. Several studies examining their working and living conditions reveal serious problems. However, a key element of live-in arrangements, namely the relationship between the individuals involved, has not yet been systematically investigated from an ethical perspective. Aim Building on previous socioempirical work that explored and set out the meaning of “care networks”, we start from the premise that live-ins are embedded in a network of (...) relationships which are essential for their employment and living situation. Methods The theoretical analysis draws on a network approach that takes care–ethical considerations into account. Using Joan Tronto’s four care–ethical phases, existing dependencies are described and reflected upon using the corresponding four care–ethical dimensions. The central questions are how dependencies in the live-in arrangement can be characterised based on the existing body of empirical studies and with a focus on the elements of power, dependency and trust in the ethical reflection on care. Results Based on this analysis, it becomes apparent that the ambivalence resulting from the simultaneity of different forms of asymmetry and mutual dependence is omnipresent in live-in arrangements and gives rise to seemingly contradictory forms of relationships and emotions. Responsibilities are vague and are constantly renegotiated on the basis of implicit assumptions and problematic role expectations and are also assigned without negotiation. Conclusions In the future, it will not only be necessary to better understand and clarify responsibilities at the micro level of the individual care arrangement from the various positions and roles and with a view to the changing processes of caring for another, but also to address the pressing ethical questions and problems in live-in arrangements at the meso and macro levels—enriched by care–ethical perspectives. (shrink)