This paper argues against an individualist challenge to the possibility of corporate apologies. According to this challenge, corporations always and only act through their members; thus they are not the sorts of entities that can apologize. Consequently there can be no corporate apologies. Against this challenge, this paper argues that even if corporate acts can be analyzed as acts by individuals within certain relationships, there can still be corporate apologies. This paper offers a noneliminative individualist account of such apologies. The (...) paper also responds to various substantive objections to the possibility of such apologies. (shrink)

This essay discusses the nature of collective responsibility and explores various controversies associated with its possibility and normative value.

Are the state’s obligations to victims of its own wrongdoing greater than to persons who have suffered from bad luck? Many people endorse an affirmative answer to this question. Call this the Difference View. This view can seem arbitrary from the perspective of the victims in question; why should a victim of bad luck, who is just as badly off through no fault of her own, be entitled to less assistance from the state than a victim of state-caused wrongful harm? (...) This paper defends a qualified version of the Difference View, the Threshold Version of the Difference View. According to this view, all disadvantaged persons, no matter what the cause of their disadvantage, must be compensated until they reach a minimum threshold of wellbeing; however, among disadvantaged persons above this threshold, full compensation is owed for those who are victims of state wrongdoing, whereas full compensation is not necessarily owed to those who are disadvantaged due to bad luck. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 19 Collectivities can have obligations beyond the aggregate of pre-existing obligations of their members. Certain such collective obligations _distribute_, i.e., become members’ obligations to do their fair share. In _incremental good_ cases, i.e., those in which a member’s fair share would go part way toward fulfilling the collectivity’s obligation, each member has an unconditional obligation to contribute.States are involuntary collectivities that bear moral obligations. Certain states, _democratic legal states_, are collectivities whose obligations can distribute. Many existing (...) states are democratic legal states, but none satisfies more rigorous requirements of distributive justice. There, citizens who hold assets, in excess of what is just, bear a distributed duty to dedicate that excess toward correcting the injustice. It is an incremental good case not conditioned on the conformity of others who are also wealthier than justice allows, nor on the diligence of the state in meeting its obligations. (shrink)

The article presents critical examination of theories about collective responsibility attempting to cover responsibility for historic injustices. The author will also try to establish the possibility of collective responsibility for the present members of the group to make recompense for the injustices committed by their ancestors depending on two factors expounded in the article.

Most cases of historical injustices that attract public attention are at least partly caused by states. However, there is not yet a universally agreed upon, single version of a normative account that addresses all associated problems. In this paper, I attempt to defend the State Endurance Account as part of a response to the question of how we should account for reparations for state-caused historical injustices. This account supports the view that, in general, it is justified to require a state (...) to fulfill its duties incurred in the past, including reparatory duties. (shrink)

I argue that state apologies face a distinctive normative challenge. The reason for this is that when states apologize for their transgressions, they tend to implicate their citizens as morally responsible. However, because citizens are coerced into supporting state activities through taxation, I argue that their responsibility is mitigated. Citizens do not support state transgressions in the same way that private investors support corporate transgressions. Consequently, state apologies have a distinctive difficulty performing one of the core normative functions of apologies (...) – namely, the admission of moral responsibility on behalf of a morally responsible party (or parties). Because of this, state apologies might be normatively deficient, and we should doubt their ability to provide robust moral repair. (shrink)

The question of who exactly is responsible for an organization’s actions cannot be too carefully considered, as a clear understanding of this point is crucial from ethical, moral, managerial, and public perspectives. This article discusses how to justify a non-participant member’s responsibility for the actions of other group members, establishing collective responsibility. The article develops a novel context-depended framework that solves this problem by supplying good grounds for perceiving organizations as organic entities, which is adequate for establishing collective responsibility. I (...) suggest that to be responsible for the actions of an organization, one has to belong to that organization, even if one has not taken any part at any level in group actions. The more regular concept of causal responsibility is not applicable here since it cannot account for the responsibility of non-participant members. (shrink)

Daniel Butt develops an account of corrective responsibilities borne by beneficiaries of injustice. He defends the consistency model. I criticize the vagueness in this model and present two interpretations of benefit from injustice responsibilities: obligation and natural duty. The obligation model falls prey to the involuntariness objection. I defend a natural duties model, discussing how natural duties can be circumstantially perfected into directed duties and showing how the natural duties model avoids the involuntariness objection. I also address objections from structural (...) injustice and demandingness. (shrink)

Some argue that if an agent intentionally participates in collective wrongdoing, that agent bears responsibility for contributing actions performed by other members of the agent’s collective. Some of these intention-state theorists distribute co-responsibility to group members by appeal to participatory intentions alone, while others require participants to instantiate additional beliefs or perform additional actions. I argue that prominent intention-state theories of co-responsibility fail to provide a compelling rationale for why participation in collective wrongdoing merits responsibility not only for one’s own (...) actions but the contributing actions of others as well. I propose that authorization agreements provide us with a suitable rationale. Authorization may be expressly given, as when one person signs a document authorizing another to advance her aims. Or, authorization may be tacitly or implicitly given by participating in and sufficiently contributing to a common plan. If a person authorizes an agent to act, it is right to blame the authorizer for what the agent does on the authorizer’s behalf. An authorization theory justifies the distribution of co-responsibility by appeal to the morally transformative power of agreement, thereby providing a compelling rationale for why a person may be to blame for contributing actions performed by other agents. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 19 Collectivities can have obligations beyond the aggregate of pre-existing obligations of their members. Certain such collective obligations _distribute_, i.e., become members’ obligations to do their fair share. In _incremental good_ cases, i.e., those in which a member’s fair share would go part way toward fulfilling the collectivity’s obligation, each member has an unconditional obligation to contribute.States are involuntary collectivities that bear moral obligations. Certain states, _democratic legal states_, are collectivities whose obligations can distribute. Many existing (...) states are democratic legal states, but none satisfies more rigorous requirements of distributive justice. There, citizens who hold assets, in excess of what is just, bear a distributed duty to dedicate that excess toward correcting the injustice. It is an incremental good case not conditioned on the conformity of others who are also wealthier than justice allows, nor on the diligence of the state in meeting its obligations. (shrink)

Racial injustice in employment demands the attention of business organizations because it profoundly shapes our life prospects. While comparing the ideal of perfectly equal opportunity with its invariably imperfect alternatives can impede reform, the true challenge lies in addressing persistent inequities as we strive for equality. This article introduces “shared inequity” as a frame of reference for assessing workplace racial disparities and emphasizing a collective responsibility to remedy systemic issues. In critiquing an exaggerated notion of meritocracy, I emphasize that structural (...) racism, rather than just individual acts, facilitates collective advantages, especially for White males. Hence, it is morally fitting to frame racial justice in employment, not only in terms of perfect equality, but also in terms of justly sharing an imbalance that cannot be corrected without counterbalance. The “shared inequity” lens offers a more realistic and just approach to pursuing racial justice in the workplace. (shrink)