Is Blameworthiness Forever?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that "once blameworthy, always blameworthy." They believe that blameworthiness is like diamonds: it is forever. We argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from the distinctive psychological features of the person at the later time. This is because on none of the leading accounts of personal identity does identity require the preservation of any distinctive psychological features, but merely requires some form of continuity. The claim that blameworthiness is forever should therefore be rejected. We then sketch an account of blameworthiness over time, and consider two objections.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KHOIBF-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-05-18
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-05-18

Total views
474 ( #9,000 of 51,565 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #9,981 of 51,565 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.