BackgroundPalliative sedation and analgesia are employed in patients with refractory and intractable symptoms at the end of life to reduce their suffering by lowering their level of consciousness. The doctrine of double effect, a philosophical principle that justifies doing a “good action” with a potentially “bad effect,” is frequently employed to provide an ethical justification for this practice. Main textWe argue that palliative sedation and analgesia do not fulfill the conditions required to apply the doctrine of double effect, and therefore (...) its use in this domain is inappropriate. Furthermore, we argue that the frequent application of the doctrine of double effect to palliative sedation and analgesia reflects physicians’ discomfort with the complex moral, intentional, and causal aspects of end-of-life care. ConclusionsWe are concerned that this misapplication of the doctrine of double effect can consequently impair physicians’ ethical reasoning and relationships with patients at the end of life. (shrink)

After a review of terminology, I identify—in addition to Margaret Battin’s list of five primary arguments for and against aid-in-dying—the argument from functional equivalence as another primary argument. I introduce a novel way to approach this argument based on Bernard Lonergan’s generalized empirical method. Then I proceed on the basis of GEM to distinguish palliative sedation, palliative sedation to unconsciousness when prognosis is less than two weeks, and foregoing life-sustaining treatment from aid-in-dying. I conclude that aid-in-dying must be justified on (...) its own merits and not on the basis of these well-established palliative care practices; and that societies must decide, in weighing the merits of aid-in-dying, whether or not to make the judgment that no life is better than life-like-this part of their operative value structure. (shrink)

In Australian end-of-life care, practicing euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide is illegal. Despite this, death hastening practices are common across medical settings. Practices can be clandestine or overt but in many instances physicians are forced to seek protection behind ambiguous medico-legal imperatives such as the Principle of Double Effect. Moreover, the way they conceptualise and experience such practices is inconsistent. To complement the available statistical data, the purpose of this study was to understand the reasoning behind how and why physicians in (...) Australia will hasten death. (shrink)

Recently both whole brain death (WBD) and higher brain death (HBD) have come under attack. These attacks, we argue, are successful, leaving supporters of both views without a firm foundation. This state of affairs has been described as “the death of brain death.” Returning to a cardiopulmonary definition presents problems we also find unacceptable. Instead, we attempt to revive brain death by offering a novel and more coherent standard of death based on the permanent cessation of mental processing. This approach (...) works, we claim, by being functionalist instead of being based in biology, consciousness, or personhood. We begin by explaining why an objective biological determination of death fails. We continue by similarly rejecting current arguments offered in support of HBD, which rely on consciousness and/or personhood. In the final section, we explain and defend our functionalist view of death. Our definition centers on mental processing, both conscious and preconscious or unconscious. This view provides the philosophical basis of a functional definition that most accurately reflects the original spirit of brain death when first proposed in the Harvard criteria of 1968. (shrink)

Palliative care names as one of its central aims to prevent and relieve suffering. Following the concept of “total pain”, which was first introduced by Cicely Saunders, PC not only focuses on the physical dimension of pain but also addresses the patient’s psychological, social, and spiritual suffering. However, the goal to relieve suffering can paradoxically lead to a taboo of suffering and imply adverse consequences. Two scenarios are presented: First, PC providers sometimes might fail their own ambitions. If all other (...) means prove ineffective terminal sedation can still be applied as a last resort, though. However, it may be asked whether sedating a dying patient comes close to eliminating suffering by eliminating the sufferer and hereby resembles physician-assisted suicide, or euthanasia. As an alternative, PC providers could continue treatment, even if it so far prove unsuccessful. In that case, either futility results or the patient might even suffer from the perpetuated, albeit fruitless interventions. Second, some patients possibly prefer to endure suffering instead of being relieved from it. Hence, they want to forgo the various bio-psycho-socio-spiritual interventions. PC providers’ efforts then lead to paradoxical consequences: Feeling harassed by PC, patients could suffer even more and not less. In both scenarios, suffering is placed under a taboo and is thereby conceptualised as not being tolerable in general. However, to consider suffering essentially unbearable might promote assisted dying not only on an individual but also on a societal level insofar as unbearable suffering is considered a criterion for euthanasia or PAS. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Palliative Sedierung als therapeutische Handlungsoption in anderweitig refraktären Behandlungssituationen wird in der Öffentlichkeit und in Fachkreisen in ihrer klinischen Wertigkeit grundsätzlich akzeptiert und weitgehend positiv konnotiert. Im Widerspruch dazu fallen sowohl die Quantität der empirischen Forschung als auch die Intensität der ethischen und klinischen Diskussion ins Auge, mit der konzeptuelle als auch durchführungsbezogene Aspekte der Palliativen Sedierung beschrieben und kontrovers erörtert werden. Anstatt eines distinkten Behandlungskonzeptes stellt sich hier eher ein komplexes Spektrum verschiedener Vorgehensweisen dar. Die folgende Übersichtsarbeit fasst (...) anhand der aktuellen Literatur zusammen, welche Aspekte im Kontext der Palliativen Sedierung als problematisch bewertet werden. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) and palliative sedation (PS) are both legal options in Canada that may be considered by patients experiencing intolerable and unmanageable suffering. A contentious, lively debate has been ongoing in the literature regarding the similarities and differences between MAiD and PS. The aim of this paper is to explore the propositions that MAiD and PS are essentially similar and conversely that MAiD and PS are distinctly different. The relevance of such a debate is apparent for clinicians (...) and patients alike. Understanding the complex and multi‐faceted nuances between PS and MAiD allows patients and caregivers to make more informed decisions pertaining to end‐of‐life care. It is hoped that this paper will also serve to foster further debate and consideration of the issues associated with PS and MAiD with a view to improve patient care and the quality of both living and dying in Canada. (shrink)

The basic question concerning the compatibility of donation after circulatory death protocols with the dead donor rule is whether such protocols can guarantee that the loss of relevant biological functions is truly irreversible. Which functions are the relevant ones? I argue that the answer to this question can be derived neither from a proper understanding of the meaning of the term “death” nor from a proper understanding of the nature of death as a biological phenomenon. The concept of death can (...) be made fully determinate only by stipulation. I propose to focus on the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness and the capacity for spontaneous breathing. Having accepted that proposal, the meaning of “irreversibility” need not be twisted in order to claim that DCD protocols can guarantee that the loss of these functions is irreversible. And this guarantee does not mean that reversing that loss is either conceptually impossible or known to be impossible with absolute certainty. (shrink)

The basic question concerning the compatibility of donation after circulatory death (DCD) protocols with the dead donor rule is whether such protocols can guarantee that the loss of relevant biological functions is truly irreversible. Which functions are the relevant ones? I argue that the answer to this question can be derived neither from a proper understanding of the meaning of the term “death” nor from a proper understanding of the nature of death as a biological phenomenon. The concept of death (...) can be made fully determinate only by stipulation. I propose to focus on the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness and the capacity for spontaneous breathing. Having accepted that proposal, the meaning of “irreversibility” need not be twisted in order to claim that DCD protocols can guarantee that the loss of these functions is irreversible. And this guarantee does not mean that reversing that loss is either conceptually impossible or known to be impossible with absolute certainty. (shrink)

Patients who are imminently dying sometimes experience symptoms refractory to traditional palliative interventions, and in rare cases, continuous sedation is offered. Samuel H. LiPuma, in a recent article in this Journal, argues that continuous sedation until death is equivalent to physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia based on a higher brain neocortical definition of death. We contest his position that continuous sedation involves killing and offer four objections to the equivalency thesis. First, sedation practices are proportional in a way that physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia is not. (...) Second, continuous sedation may not entirely abolish consciousness. Third, LiPuma’s particular version of higher brain neocortical death relies on an implausibly weak construal of irreversibility—a position that is especially problematic in the case of continuous sedation. Finally, we explain why continuous sedation until death is not functionally equivalent to neocortical death and, hence, physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia. Concluding remarks review the differences between these two end-of-life practices. (shrink)

The application of continuous deep sedation in the treatment of intractable suffering at the end of life continues to be tied to a number of concerns that have negated its use in palliative care. Part of the resistance towards use of this treatment option of last resort has been the continued association of CDS with physician-associated suicide and/or euthanasia, which is compounded by a lack clinical guidelines and a failure to cite this treatment under the aegis of a palliative care (...) approach. I argue that reinstituting a palliative care-inspired approach that includes a holistic review of the patient’s situation and the engagement of a multidisciplinary team guided by clearly defined practice requirements that have been lacking amongst many prevailing guidelines will overcome prevailing objections to this practice and allow for the legitimization of this process. (shrink)

Society and social structures play an important role in the formation and evaluation of concepts and practices in clinical ethics. This is evident in the ways the authors in this issue explore a wide range of arguments and concepts in clinical ethics including moral distress and conscience based practice, phenomenological interview techniques and gender dysphoria, continuous deep sedation (CDS) at the end of life, the notion of patient expertise, ethically permissible medical billing practices, the notion of selfhood and patient centered (...) care in dementia patients, and the definition of minimal risk as used in research regulations. (shrink)

When a severely suffering dying patient is deeply sedated, and this sedated condition is meant to continue until his death, the doctor involved often decides to abstain from artificially administering fluids. For this dual procedure almost all guidelines require that the patient should not have a life expectancy beyond a stipulated maximum of days (4–14). The reason obviously is that in case of a longer life-expectancy the patient may die from dehydration rather than from his lethal illness. But no guideline (...) tells us how we should describe the dual procedure in case of a longer life-expectancy. Many arguments have been advanced why we should not consider it to be a form of homicide, that is, ending the life of the patient (with or without his request). I argue that none of these arguments, taken separately or jointly, is persuasive. When a commission, even one that is not itself life-shortening, foreseeably renders a person unable to undo the life-shortening effects of another, simultaneous omission, the commission and the omission together should be acknowledged to kill her. I discuss the legal and ethical implications of this conclusion. (shrink)