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  1. Pascalian Expectations and Explorations.Alan Hajek & Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Roger Ariew & Yuval Avnur (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Pascal. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Pascal’s Wager involves expected utilities. In this chapter, we examine the Wager in light of two main features of expected utility theory: utilities and probabilities. We discuss infinite and finite utilities, and zero, infinitesimal, extremely low, imprecise, and undefined probabilities. These have all come up in recent literature regarding Pascal’s Wager. We consider the problems each creates and suggest prospects for the Wager in light of these problems.
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  • 24 Reflections on Infinite Utility and Deliberation in Pascal’s Wager.Alan Hájek - 2024 - In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Divinity. De Gruyter. pp. 493-510.
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  • Sometimes It Is Better to Do Nothing: A New Argument for Causal Decision Theory.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
    It is often thought that the main significant difference between evidential decision theory and causal decision theory is that they recommend different acts in Newcomb-style examples (broadly construed) where acts and states are correlated in peculiar ways. However, this paper presents a class of non-Newcombian examples that evidential decision theory cannot adequately model whereas causal decision theory can. Briefly, the examples involve situations where it is clearly best to perform an act that will not influence the desired outcome. On evidential (...)
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  • Ontology of Divinity.Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.) - 2024 - De Gruyter.
    This volume announces a new era in the philosophy of God. Many of its contributions work to create stronger links between the philosophy of God, on the one hand, and mathematics or metamathematics, on the other hand. It is about not only the possibilities of applying mathematics or metamathematics to questions about God, but also the reverse question: Does the philosophy of God have anything to offer mathematics or metamathematics? The remaining contributions tackle stereotypes in the philosophy of religion. The (...)
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  • Agency and Evidence.Berislav Marusic & John Schwenkler - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 244-252.
    How does evidence figure into the reasoning of an agent? This is an intricate philosophical problem but also one we all encounter in our daily lives. In this chapter, we identify the problem and outline a possible solution to it. The problem arises, because the fact that it is up to us whether we do something makes a difference to how we should think of the evidence concerning whether we will actually do it. Otherwise we regard something that is up (...)
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  • Two Tales of Epistemic Models.Yang Liu - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):291-302.
    This short paper has two parts. First,we prove a generalisation of Aumann’s surprising impossibility result in the context of rational decision making. We then move, in the second part, to discuss the interpretational meaning of some formal setups of epistemic models, and we do so by means of presenting an interesting puzzle in epistemic logic. The aim is to highlight certain problematic aspects of these epistemic systems concerning first/third-person asymmetry which underlies both parts of the story. This asymmetry, we argue, (...)
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  • Ramsey and Joyce on Deliberation and Prediction.Yang Liu & Huw Price - 2020 - Synthese 197:4365-4386.
    Can an agent deliberating about an action A hold a meaningful credence that she will do A? 'No', say some authors, for 'Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction' (DCOP). Others disagree, but we argue here that such disagreements are often terminological. We explain why DCOP holds in a Ramseyian operationalist model of credence, but show that it is trivial to extend this model so that DCOP fails. We then discuss a model due to Joyce, and show that Joyce's rejection of DCOP rests (...)
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  • Self‐prediction in practical reasoning: Its role and limits.Stephen J. White - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):825-841.
    Are predictions about how one will freely and intentionally behave in the future ever relevant to how one ought to behave? There is good reason to think they are. As imperfect agents, we have responsibilities of self-management, which seem to require that we take account of the predictable ways we're liable to go wrong. I defend this conclusion against certain objections to the effect that incorporating predictions concerning one's voluntary conduct into one's practical reasoning amounts to evading responsibility for that (...)
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