Heart of DARCness
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):136-150 (2019)
Abstract
There is a long-standing disagreement in the philosophy of probability and Bayesian decision theory about whether an agent can hold a meaningful credence about an upcoming action, while she deliberates about what to do. Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while she chooses whether to do A? No, say some philosophers, for Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction (DCOP), but others disagree. In this paper, we propose a valid core for DCOP, and identify terminological causes for some of the apparent disputes.
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2018-01-11
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2018-01-11
Total views
189 ( #28,018 of 58,454 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #28,366 of 58,454 )
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