Heart of DARCness

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):136-150 (2019)
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There is a long-standing disagreement in the philosophy of probability and Bayesian decision theory about whether an agent can hold a meaningful credence about an upcoming action, while she deliberates about what to do. Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while she chooses whether to do A? No, say some philosophers, for Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction (DCOP), but others disagree. In this paper, we propose a valid core for DCOP, and identify terminological causes for some of the apparent disputes.

Author Profiles

Yang Liu
Cambridge University
Huw Price
University of Bonn


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