Ad hoc concepts feature prominently in lexical pragmatics. A speaker can use a word or phrase to communicate an ad hoc concept that is different from the lexically encoded concept and the hearer can construct the intended ad hoc concept pragmatically during utterance comprehension. I argue that some philosophical concepts have origins as ad hoc concepts, and such concepts pose a challenge for experimental philosophy regarding these concepts. To illustrate this, I consider philosophers’ ‘what-it’s-like’-concepts and experimental philosophy of consciousness.

According to some formulations of the thesis of revelation, knowledge about the essences of phenomenal properties is available through introspection. But this claim may seem doubtful given relevant limits of introspection. This paper articulates the worry and sketches responses to address it.

The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we believe that there is a hard problem of consciousness. A solution to the former promises to take us one step closer to solving the latter. While many hope for a physicalist realist solution to the meta-problem, I argue that the two prominent physicalist realist positions in the literature, orthodox Russellian and type-B physicalism, cannot deliver a solution. I then introduce a posteriori Russellian physicalism, a Russellian version of the phenomenal (...) concept strategy, and show that it can overcome the difficulties of traditional Russellian and type-B physicalism. If successful, the paper shows that physicalists need not turn to illusionism because the prospects for a physicalist realist answer to the meta-problem are bright. (shrink)

According to some formulations of the thesis of revelation, knowledge about the essences of phenomenal properties is available through introspection. But this claim may seem doubtful given relevant limits of introspection. This paper articulates the worry and sketches responses to address it.

According to some formulations of the thesis of revelation, knowledge about the essences of phenomenal properties is available through introspection. But this claim may seem doubtful given relevant limits of introspection. This paper articulates the worry and sketches responses to address it.