This paper reviews arguments concerning the relation between relativism and tolerance, both whether tolerance entails relativism, and whether relativism entails tolerance. Two new arguments are offered to support the contention that there is no necessary relation between relativism and tolerance. In particular, building on the classic argument by Geoffrey Harrison, this paper argues that even if there is no strict dichotomy between facts and values, as Harrison had assumed, relativism still does not entail tolerance for every relativized perspective.

This study aims to present that the most visible and drastic changes in the life of modern humans are caused by the ability human to be a person that is equal to be tolerant. From a historical point of view, the manifestation of tolerance towards people has always been problematic – for some it is in short supply, and for others it has been in surplus. In the first case, it has caused conflicts and wars to win it, in the (...) second, sanctions and repressions. The tolerance has been and is the subject of many analyzes, philosophical concepts, ethical schemes, and socio-political mechanisms that construct societies. This article is explored John Locke and Immanuel Kant’s position on the tolerance described in their scientific papers A Letter Concerning Toleration and Perpetual Peace. In the introduction is said that the tolerance has many dimensions. In its essence, it is always pluralistic, implied consent, freedom, continuity, understanding, equality, etc. It is a segment of achieving interpersonal, group, intergroup, inter-community and international relations. The first subtopic is about tolerance in historical contextual links. The second is about Locke and his Letter – Locke’s letter of the tolerance from 1689, which supports the idea of the need for religious tolerance, it is not only a recommendation, but also a condition for a peaceful and just cohabitation of citizens in a society – this is the century, when England sets up its own church, which strives to distinguish both from the Roman Catholic and the Protestant – creating a Protestant church – the Anglican church. Before Locke published a Letter of Tolerance, after his return to England in 1689, after his immigration to the Netherlands, he published two other fundamental works: Two Tracts on Government and An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The third sub-topic is about Kant and his concept of the possible perpetual peace – the theory of “perpetual peace” was created by Kant at the end of the 18th century. According to him, as relations within a state can be regulated wisely in order to maintain internal peace, and relations between people from different countries could be wisely regulated in order to achieve external peace. Kant thinks that moral-practical reason obliges us to exclude wars, otherwise it would mean that we have to give up our mind and be equated with the animals. In the conclusion is noted the great contribution of ideas from the works of Locke and Kant is the basis of the American Constitution and the Declaration of Independence and how much tolerance we need today in a globalized world. (shrink)

In Beyond Neutrality, George Sher criticises the idea that state neutrality between competing conceptions of the good helps protect society from oppression. While he is correct that some governments are non-neutral without being oppressive, I argue that those governments may be neutral at the core of their foundations. The possibility of non-neutrality leading to oppression is further explored; some conceptions of the good would favour oppression while others would not. While it is possible that a non-neutral state may avoid oppression, (...) it is argued that the risks are so great that it is better to bet on government being neutral, thereby minimizing the possibility of oppression. (shrink)

Cultural diversity is an increasingly important phenomenon that affects not only social and political harmony but also the cohesion and efficiency of organisations. The problems that firms have with regard to managing cultural diversity have been abundantly studied in recent decades from the perspectives of management theory and moral philosophy, but there are still open questions that require deeper reflection and broader empirical analysis. Managing cultural diversity in organisations is of prime importance because it involves harmonising different values, beliefs, credos (...) and customs, and, in essence, human identity. Taking into consideration these cultural differences and harmonising them is a human rights issue and a central dimension of corporate social responsibility. Here we are going to focus on theoretical reflection about the ideas that lie behind corporate policies and organisational initiatives that deal with cultural diversity. The aim of our paper is twofold: to present a critical reflection on the ideology of tolerance, and propose an ideology of respect for dealing with cultural diversity. We start by presenting the plurality of interpretations of the concept of ideology, and justify its applicability to the field of cultural diversity. We then reflect on the differences between “tolerance” and “respect” and identifying the practical implications for managing cultural diversity. And finally, we propose a culture of respect that goes beyond tolerance and complements and legitimizes the “business case” perspective for managing cultural diversity in companies. The ideology of respect is based on the Kantian tradition and on the discursive approach where rational dialogue and argumentation are considered the legitimate process for creating a culture of intercultural respect. From this theoretical discussion of the key philosophical concepts we can suggest some general principles for managing cultural diversity in organisations. (shrink)

People sometimes try to call others’ beliefs into question by pointing out the contingent causal origins of those beliefs. The significance of such ‘Etiological Challenges’ is a topic that has started attracting attention in epistemology. Current work on this topic aims to show that Etiological Challenges are, at most, only indirectly epistemically significant, insofar as they bring other generic epistemic considerations to the agent’s attention. Against this approach, we argue that Etiological Challenges are epistemically significant in a more direct and (...) more distinctive way. An Etiological Challenge prompts the agent to assess whether her beliefs result from practices of indoctrination, and whether she should reduce confidence in those beliefs, given the anti-reliability of indoctrination as a method of belief-acquisition. Our analysis also draws attention to some of the ways in which epistemic concerns interact with political issues—e.g. relating to epistemic injustice, identity-based discrimination, and segregation—when we’re thinking about the contingent causal origins of our beliefs. (shrink)

I argue that there is a mutually illuminating parallel between the concept of obedience and the concept of believing a person. Just as both believing what a person says and believing what a person says for the reason that the person says it are insufficient for believing the person, so acting as a person demands and acting as a person demands for the reason that the person demands it are insufficient for obeying the person. Unlike the concept of believing a (...) person, however, the concept of obedience has two distinct senses, one applying to coerced action and one applying to non-coerced action based on authoritative directives. While the former sense of obedience has no theoretical analogue, the latter sense of obedience can be understood as the practical analogue of the theoretical case of believing a person, making room for a deep parallel between believing and acting on authority. (shrink)

One of the pressing challenges we face today—in a post-Westphalian order and post-Bretton Woods world —is how to design the right kind of MAS that can take full advantage of the socio-economic and political progress made so far, while dealing successfully with the new global challenges that are undermining the best legacy of that very progress. This is the topic of the article. In it, I argue that in order to design the right kind of MAS, we need to design (...) the right kind of norms that constitute them; in order to design the right kind of constitutive norms, we need to identify and adopt the right kind of principles of normative design; toleration is one of those principles; unfortunately, its role as a foundation for the design of norms has been undermined by the “paradox of toleration”; however, the paradox can be solved; so toleration can be re-instated as the right kind of foundational principle for the design of the right kind of norms that can constitute the right kind of MAS that can operate across cultures, societies and states, to help us to tackle the new global challenges facing us. (shrink)

The article focuses on examining the distinct nature of persecution. In the article I argue that on the grounds of common historical cases of persecution an account of the core components of the concept may be established. The core comprises three central elements: asymmetrical and systemic threat, severe and sustained harm, and unjust discriminatory targeting. I will conclude the paper by suggesting that none of the components alone make persecution anything distinct. However, the simultaneous occurrence of the components may be (...) argued to amount to a separable class of harms that are among the worst-case scenarios for those having to endure them. (shrink)

The eighteenth‐century controversy among Moses Mendelssohn, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, and Immanuel Kant undermines the tendency to equate liberalism with the Enlightenment. While the defender of the Enlightenment, Mendelssohn, championed defended such traditional liberal values as religious toleration, his arguments were often illiberal. In contrast, many of the views of his anti‐ Establishment opponent, Jacobi, are remarkably liberal. Kant's essays from the mid‐i78os advanced a liberal conception of politics but a view of Enlightenment that was quite distant from those of both (...) Mendelssohn and Jacobi. (shrink)

The recent global movement for women's human rights has achieved considerable re-thinking of human rights as previously understood. Since many of women's rights violations occur in the private sphere of family life, and are justified by appeals to cultural or religious norms, both families and cultures (including their religious aspects) have come under critical scrutiny.

After a brief sketch of the history of philosophical pragmatism generally, and of legal pragmatism specifically (section 1), this paper develops a new, neo-classical legal pragmatism: a theory of law drawing in part on Holmes, but also on ideas from the classical pragmatist tradition in philosophy. Main themes are the "pluralistic universe" of law (section 2); the evolution of legal systems (section 3); the place of logic in the law (section 4); and the relation of law and morality (section 5).

The article proves that modern political philosophy is based on the concept of "individual" and on the abstract principle of "equality of individuals". But this abstract principle does not provide for "content expansion" in all possible directions without exception. Therefore, inattention to gender equality or cultural equality does not prevent, for example, Locke from recognizing the natural equality of all people. This circumstance can be considered an ideological source of the "modern paradox": the recognition of the natural equality of all (...) people does not guarantee the automatic granting of political rights to women or providing them equal opportunities for professional and career growth with men. (shrink)

This paper considers the philosophical foundations of the law relating to migration. It examines the kinds of reasons that might justify the restriction of liberty as people move about on the face of the earth—something humans have done since time immemorial. The paper also examines the various interests that might be at stake in moral calculations regarding migration: economic interests, cultural interests, religious interests, or just sheer preferences. Drawing on the work of Locke, Kant, and Sidgwick, it considers conceptions like (...) common ownership of the earth, the right of hospitality, and the difference between defending property and restricting access to economic interaction. The paper also considers the ambiguity of the commonly heard slogan that states by definition have a right to control their borders. (shrink)

Hobbes believed that the state of nature would be a war of all against all. Locke denied this, but acknowledged that in the absence of government, peace is insecure. In this paper, I analyse both accounts of the state of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games. My analysis suggests that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but (...) rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality. (shrink)

In her Remarks Upon Some Writers (1743), Catharine Trotter Cockburn takes a seemingly radical stance by asserting that it is possible for atheists to be virtuous. In this paper, I examine whether or not Cockburn’s views concerning atheism commit her to a naturalistic ethics and a so-called radical enlightenment position on the independence of morality and religion. First, I examine her response to William Warburton’s critique of Pierre Bayle’s arguments concerning the possibility of a society of virtuous atheists. I argue (...) that this response shows Cockburn vacillating between a moral naturalism, on the one hand, and a theistic morality, on the other. Second, I draw on Cockburn’s letters to her niece Ann Arbuthnot, and her opinions concerning mystical ideas about “the will of God” in north-east Scotland in the mid-eighteenth century. I maintain that these letters give us a fuller appreciation of Cockburn’s naturalistic position. My conclusion is that Cockburn’s ideas concerning atheism prompt us to consider the close interplay between secular and religious principles in so-called radical ideas of the period. (shrink)

This paper considers a particular instance in which a liberal state –Germany -makes a claim for the limitation of tolerance of religious expression on the grounds of harm. I examine this claim with reference to three basic positions: Firstly,I examine Denise Meyerson’s argument that the domain of religion constitutes an area of intractable dispute and that the state is not entitled to limit liberty in this domain because it cannot justify limitations in a neutrally acceptable way. I argue that Ludin (...) is entitled to wear the Kopftuch on grounds of her right to religious freedom and that the attempt to deny her this entitlement constitutes a breach of individual rights. Meyerson’s arguments rest on the acceptability of Rawls’s idea of public reason. I therefore, secondly, examine Jeremy Waldron’s objections to the use of the deliberative discipline of public reason in cultural disputes as well as his objections to the use of the politics of identity which, he claims, distort our ability to engage in reasoned public debate. I argue that bracketing identity claims eliminates what is peculiar about Ludin’s case.This I bring out, thirdly, by drawing on the views of Melissa Williams, who advances the idea of sensitivity to others’ reasons as reasons, which defines a position midway between Meyerson and Waldron. It is apparent that Ludin’s dilemma is twofold: her status as ‘metic’-as member of a minority at the margins of mainstream German culture, and her status as ‘Muslimin’-as one believed to be suffering sexual discrimination in her own culture, form a double-bind of oppression. They are connected in a way that challenges the integration policies of the German state. (shrink)

Current philosophical and legal bioethical reflection on reprogenetics provides little more than a rationalization of the interests of science. There are two reasons for this. First, bioethicists attempt to address ethical issues in a “language of precision” that characterizes science, and this works against analogical and narratological modes of discourse that have traditionally provided guidance for understanding human nature and purpose. Second, the current ethical and legal debate is framed by a public/private distinction that banishes robust norms to the private (...) realm, and leaves a minimalist public discourse of harm avoidance that is insufficient for regulating the science. In this essay, I argue that Mark Hanson's account of anxiety provides a valuable starting point for addressing deficiencies in the current philosophical and legal debate, and it highlights the need for a theological discourse on genetic enhancements. Through an assessment of Joel Shumann's criticism of the public/private distinction, I show how the needed theological discourse should be situated in the context of robust communities, and how such a communitarian inter-ethic is compatible with a variant of liberalism. Finally, I critically assess James Keenan's account of virtue and perfection, in order to outline what a sufficient discourse on reproductive and genetic enhancements requires. (shrink)

In light of technology that may reveal the content of a person’s innermost thoughts, I address the question of whether there is a right to ‘brain privacy’—a right not to have one’s inner thoughts revealed to others–even if exposing these thoughts might be beneficial to society. I draw on a conception of privacy as the ability to control who has access to information about oneself and to an account that connects one’s interest in privacy to one’s interests in autonomy and (...) associated reputational interests, and preserving one’s dignity. Focusing on the controversial case of Gilberto Valle, known as the ‘cannibal cop’, who faced legal punishment and moral reproach for deeply disturbing thoughts of doing violence to women, thoughts he claimed were mere fantasies, I argue that Valle has a right to brain privacy if he has a legitimate privacy interest that is not outweighed by competing societal interests in avoiding harm. Our weighing of competing privacy and societal interests will depend on the magnitude of the privacy interests in autonomy and dignity, and on how reliable the technology used to expose inner thoughts is in predicting future harmful behavior and identifying true threats. (shrink)

Recently, scholars have disputed whether Locke's political theory should be read as the groundwork of secular liberalism or as a Protestant political theology. Focusing on Locke's mature theory of toleration, the article raises a central question: What if these two readings are compatible? That is, what would be the consequences if Locke's political philosophy has theological foundations, but has also given shape to secular liberalism? Examining Locke's theory in the Letter Concerning Toleration, the article argues that this is indeed the (...) case. The liberal model of toleration is a secularization of the theology of Christian liberty and its division of society into a temporal political kingdom and the spiritual kingdom of Christ. Therefore, when liberal toleration travels beyond the boundaries of the Christian West or when western societies become multicultural, it threatens to lose its intelligibility. (shrink)

Toleration is one of the fundamental principles that inform the design of a democratic and liberal society. Unfortunately, its adoption seems inconsistent with the adoption of paternalistically benevolent policies, which represent a valuable mechanism to improve individuals’ well-being. In this paper, I refer to this tension as the dilemma of toleration. The dilemma is not new. It arises when an agent A would like to be tolerant and respectful towards another agent B’s choices but, at the same time, A is (...) altruistically concerned that a particular course of action would harm, or at least not improve, B’s well-being, so A would also like to be helpful and seeks to ensure that B does not pursue such course of action, for B’s sake and even against B’s consent. In the article, I clarify the specific nature of the dilemma and show that several forms of paternalism, including those based on ethics by design and structural nudging, may not be suitable to resolve it. I then argue that one form of paternalism, based on pro-ethical design, can be compatible with toleration and hence with the respect for B’s choices, by operating only at the informational and not at the structural level of a choice architecture. This provides a successful resolution of the dilemma, showing that tolerant paternalism is not an oxymoron but a viable approach to the design of a democratic and liberal society. (shrink)

Recently, scholars have disputed whether Locke's political theory should be read as the groundwork of secular liberalism or as a Protestant political theology. Focusing on Locke's mature theory of toleration, the article raises a central question: What if these two readings are compatible? That is, what would be the consequences if Locke's political philosophy has theological foundations, but has also given shape to secular liberalism? Examining Locke's theory in the Letter Concerning Toleration , the article argues that this is indeed (...) the case. The liberal model of toleration is a secularization of the theology of Christian liberty and its division of society into a temporal political kingdom and the spiritual kingdom of Christ. Therefore, when liberal toleration travels beyond the boundaries of the Christian West or when western societies become multicultural, it threatens to lose its intelligibility. (shrink)

Democratic theorists are usually dismissive about the idea that citizens act “through” their representatives and often hold persons to exercise true political agency only at intervals in elections. Yet, if we want to understand representative government as a proper form of democracy and not just a periodical selection of elites, continuous popular agency must be a feature of representation. This article explores the Kantian attempt to justify that people can act “through” representatives. I call this the “exercise view” of representation (...) and defend its superiority to the “opportunity view,” which I attribute to Locke. It is superior because it has a robust conception of rationality and collective action, allowing us to understand how representation can mediate public reason. (shrink)

Two normative principles of toleration are offered, one individual-regarding, the other group-regarding. The first is John Stuart Mill’s harm principle; the other is “Principle T,” meant to be the harm principle writ large. It is argued that the state should tolerate autonomous sacrifices of autonomy, including instances where an individual rationally chooses to be enslaved, lobotomized, or killed. Consistent with that, it is argued that the state should tolerate internal restrictions within minority groups even where these prevent autonomy promotion of (...) members of the group. Finally, it is argued that toleration excludes external protections of minority groups. (shrink)

The philosophical tradition of liberal political thought has come to see tolerance as a crucial element of a liberal political order. However, while much has been made of the value of toleration, little work has been done on individual-level motivations for tolerant behavior. In this article, we seek to develop an account of the rational motivations for toleration and of where the limits of toleration lie. We first present a very simple model of rational motivations for toleration. Key to this (...) model is an application of David Ricardo’s model of trade to thinking about toleration. This model supports the claim that we always have reasons to be as tolerant as possible. We then explore why we do not always see tolerant attitudes in the actual world, and point to some potential preconditions for toleration that the initial model does not capture. Subsequently, we examine a more detailed model that allows us to investigate more carefully the conditions under which tolerant behavior can be rewarded. We conclude by arguing that a consideration of self-interested motivations for toleration is essential to the success of a robust theory of toleration for a diverse society, but that even this approach has its limitations. (shrink)

Climate change presents an unprecedented and existential threat. Proposals addressing this threat are criticized as impractical, costly, and/or beyond the legitimate scope of government power. We engage the latter critique by turning to John Locke's writings. Locke is both a proponent of limited government and profoundly influential on liberal democracies. He argues that government exists solely to enforce the natural law, and in doing so, protects life, liberty, and property. While Locke presents the Earth's resources as existing to be exploited, (...) he limits property acquisition, arguing that natural law prohibits spoilage and requires that we leave ample, quality resources for others to utilize. We argue that since these caveats are part of the natural law, government is obligated to take comprehensive action addressing climate change. (shrink)

John Locke is acknowledged to be one of the theoretical founders of the separation of church and state, a distinguishing feature of modern liberal democracies. Though Locke’s arguments for the merits of such separation have been subject to extensive investigation, his argument for its feasibility has remained relatively unexamined. This article argues that Locke was confident that separation of church and state can successfully be implemented in all times and places because of his epistemological and psychological insights that human beings (...) are moved to act by unease and that separating church and state removes the unease that causes religiously based political instability. We conclude by noting that Locke’s understanding of unease is foundational for his larger ambition to secure political liberty. (shrink)

The so-called liberal-communitarian debate in the 1980s was one of the most remarkable debates in Anglo-American political philosophy. While John Rawls was the most well-known thinker from the liberal camp, it can be said that Michael J. Sandel best represented the communitarian critique of Rawls' political theory. Nevertheless, for many scholars, especially liberal political theorists, Sandel's criticism of Rawls is misleading in many aspects due to his misunderstanding of Rawls' theory. This paper wants to reexamine this allegation against Sandel by (...) dealing with three objections against Sandel's criticism of Rawls claiming that Sandel misreads and misunderstands Rawls. The sociology objection interprets Sandel as saying that Rawls' conception of the person reflects a sociological account of humans. The metaphysics objection interprets Sandel as saying that Rawls' conception of the person explains a metaphysical account of humans. The private morality objection interprets Sandel as saying that Rawls' conception of the person reflects a moral ideal of humans. This paper offer a careful rereading of Sandel, and argues that he does not misread or misunderstand Rawls as his critics claim. Therefore, these three objections are misleading. (shrink)

The transition away from the highly intolerant and persecutory regimes of late-medieval and early-modern Europe was facilitated by four important developments. First, Europeans learned that social order and cohesion are threatened less by diversity than by intolerance of it. Second, the traditionally paternalist vision of the state’s role was called into question by a new valuation of the individual conscience and consequently of individual liberties. Third, the assumption that the meaning of symbols is objectively determined was replaced by the recognition (...) that symbols are intersubjectively determined by convention. Fourth, Europeans began to distinguish two senses of publicity: visibility and representativeness. The tenacious hold of these four assumptions is illustrated by laws of laïcité, which harken back to the medieval mindset on all four counts. (shrink)

This article investigates the question why even the existence of “moral conscience” became regarded with serious doubts among radical eighteenth-century French philosophes La Mettrie, d’Holbach, Diderot, and Voltaire, from the vantage point of conceptual history. The philosophes’ stance of regarding moral conscience only as a name for certain acquired prejudices both fails to engage with the conception of moral conscience upheld by their theistic opponents and stands in a sharp contrast to the moral thought of Protestant reformation, which – less (...) than two centuries earlier – had elevated moral conscience to a position of an infallible moral authority. The article argues, however, that, in spite of the opposition between these two conceptions of conscience, they might be connected, and that the former might have even been a consequence of the latter. It will be shown that the pre-Reformation conception of moral conscience, crystallized in Aquinas, presents it being based on our natural attraction to “the human good”. However, as this conception was not created by medieval theologians, but was inherited from non-theistic ancient philosophy, in principle it would have been as compatible with the deistic and atheistic worldviews of the philosophes as the other ancient philosophical concepts, such as “the human good” and “human nature”, that the philosophes continued using in their original, teleological senses. Having presented a brief overview of the history of moral conscience, the article proceeds to show how the Protestant reformers removed the attraction to the human good from moral conscience while making its normative guidance infallible. The article will suggest that, due to the prevalence of this, exclusively theological, conception of moral conscience in the intellectual environment shaped by Protestantism, several British thinkers of the seventeenth century, including Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, who could not endorse the theological aspects of moral conscience, gradually reduced it into a mere acquired “sentiment”. As their philosophy was a major influence on the philosophes, the article concludes that the loss of a rational justification for moral conscience in the works of the British philosophers could have also been what motivated the philosophes to question moral conscience. (shrink)

Jacobs and Arora (2015) argue convincingly for the permissibility of ritual male infant circumcision in general, but they allow for the state to prohibit the practice if it violates local norms. They say that such a ban would be permissible unless it amounts to unethical discrimination. In other words, if male infant circumcision is outlawed, then, as they say, “the same state should protect all children from all unnecessary procedures and practices that are equally uncomfortable and unsafe.” While such an (...) approach has its merits, a more just approach will involve accommodating male circumcision regardless of local norms and customs. (shrink)

The article lays down the broad strokes of an interpretive approach to social criticism. In developing this approach, the author stresses the importance of both a pluralistic notion of social justice and a rich ideal of personal growth. While objecting to one-dimensional conceptions of social justice centering on legal equality, the author develops the idea of there being multiple "spheres of justice", including the spheres of "care" and "merit". Each of these spheres, he argues, is subject to historical interpretation. He (...) furthers this view by arguing that the social basis for these different spheres is best understood against the canvas of an ideal of self-fulfillment and individuality. Based on the elaboration of these two sets of premises—a pluralistic conception of social justice and a collective ideal of personal self-fulfillment—the article outlines the basis for and challenges inherent to the practice of interpretive social criticism. (shrink)

A philosophical genealogy of the development of liberal 'arts of government' through the work of John Locke and Michel Foucault.

In Two Faces of Liberalism, John Gray pursues the dual agenda of condemning familiar liberal theories for perpetuating the failed “Enlightenment project,” and promoting his own version of anti‐Enlightenment liberalism, which he calls “modus vivendi.” However, Gray's critical apparatus is insufficient to capture accurately the highly influential “political” liberalism of John Rawls. Moreover, Gray's modus vivendi faces serious challenges raised by Rawls concerning stability. In order to respond to the Rawlsian objections, Gray would have to reinstate the aspirations and principles (...) characteristic of Enlightenment theories of liberalism. (shrink)

When Herbert Marcuse's essay entitled “Repressive tolerance” was published in the mid-1960s it was trenchantly criticised because it was anti-democratic and defied the academic canon of value neutrality. Yet his argument is attracting renewed interest in the 21st century, particularly when, post 9/11, the thresholds or limits of tolerance are being contested. This article argues that Marcuse's original essay was concerned to problematise the dominant social understandings of tolerance at the time, which were more about insisting that individual citizens tolerate (...) government policy than governments encourage debate and dissent. The article shows how Marcuse attempted to demonstrate the social production of knowledge about tolerance, and how he diagnosed the social function performed by “impartiality” and “relativism”, and by “neutrality” and “objectivity”, which contributed to tolerance being repressive. In the sense that he was concerned about what counted socially as tolerance, and how it was socially defended and justified, his article can helpfully be conceived as an exercise in social epistemology. (shrink)

The proper role, if any, for religion-based arguments is a live and sometimes heated issue within the field of bioethics. The issue attracts heat primarily because bioethical analyses influence the outcomes of controversial court cases and help shape legislation in sensitive biopolicy areas. A problem for religious bioethicists who seek to influence biopolicy is that there is now widespread academic and public acceptance, at least within liberal democracies, that the state should not base its policies on any particular religion’s metaphysical (...) claims or esoteric moral system. In response, bioethicists motivated by religious concerns have adopted two identifiable strategies. Sometimes they rely on slippery-slope arguments that, sometimes at least, have empirically testable premises. A more questionable response is the manipulation and misuse of secular-sounding moral language, such as references to “human dignity,” and the plights of groups of people labeled “vulnerable.”. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to consider the prospects of a liberal conception of religious freedom in some Muslim-majority states. Part I offers a brief sketch of three approaches to religious freedom that inform my view. Part II then presents a liberal framework for religious toleration that draws ideas from Rainer Forst’s Toleration in Conflict, as well as some perennial themes in classical liberal thought. I briefly examine three case studies in Part III: the Turkish Republic; the Arab Spring (...) states; and the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. This is followed by a short conclusion. (shrink)

This paper argues that political civility is actually an illusionistic ideal and that, as such, realism counsels that we acknowledge both its promise and peril. Political civility is, I will argue, a tension-filled ideal. We have good normative reasons to strive for and encourage more civil political interactions, as they model our acknowledgement of others as equal citizens and facilitate high-quality democratic problem-solving. But we must simultaneously be attuned to civility’s limitations, its possible pernicious side-effects, and its potential for strategic (...) manipulation and oppressive abuse, particularly in contemporary, pluralistic and heterogeneous societies. (shrink)

Abstract:The central problems of political philosophy (e.g., legitimate authority, distributive justice) mirror the central problems of business ethics. The question naturally arises: should political theories be applied to problems in business ethics? If a version of egalitarianism is the correct theory of justice for states, for example, does it follow that it is the correct theory of justice for businesses? If states should be democratically governed by their citizens, should businesses be democratically managed by their employees? Most theorists who have (...) considered these questions, including John Rawls inPolitical Liberalism, and Robert Phillips and Joshua Margolis in a 1999 article, have said “no.” They claim that states and businesses are different kinds of entities, and hence require different theories of justice. I challenge this claim. While businesses differ from states, the difference is one of degree, not one of kind. Business ethics has much to learn from political philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Few denials of tolerance are more severe than rejection of the moral worth of another’s way of life. In the U.S. today, many traditional religious believers, especially fundamentalist Christians, and many LGBQT+ persons see each other’s ways of life as deeply evil in important respects. These gulfs probably cannot be bridged; but public policies can and should seek to accommodate all claims of conscience as far as this can be done without denying anyone meaningful possession of basic rights. By (...) placing religious and moral consciences equally in a constitutionally “preferred position,” governments can foster a wider sense that citizens are engaged in a shared enterprise of helping everyone to pursue their distinctive forms of happiness. (shrink)

The new coronavirus pandemic, COVID-19, has resurrected a number of historical and sociological problems associated with naming and blaming collectives for the origin or transmission of infectious disease. The default example of the false accusation in 2020 has been the case of the charge of well poisoning against the Jews of Western Europe causing the pandemic of the Black Death during the fourteenth century. Equally apparent is the wide-spread accusation that Asians are collectively responsible for the spread of the present (...) pandemic. Yet querying group actions in times of pandemics is not solely one of rebutting false attributions. What happens when a collective is at fault, and how does the collective respond to the simultaneous burden of both false, stereotypical accusations and appropriate charges of culpability? The case studies here are of Ultra-Orthodox Jewish (Haredi) communities and the PRC during the 2020 outbreak of COVID-19. (shrink)

As the product of liberalism's first encounter with the theoretical problems posed by legal discrimination and unequal treatment of minority groups, Locke's argument for religious toleration foreshadowed contemporary democratic theory's emphasis on non-coercive discussion of diverse rights claims and broadly inclusive public deliberations. This study tries to illuminate the democratic dimension of Locke's toleration theory by focusing on his crucial account of the church as a voluntary association. Here Locke presented discursive possibilities for the articulation of diverse beliefs and interests (...) that he believed would not only benefit both society as a whole and the minority religious groups contained in it, but also weave principles of contestation and deliberation into the very fabric of the liberal polity. (shrink)

How can we make moral sense of the international humanitarian law doctrine of combatant immunity? The doctrine is morally shocking to many: It holds soldiers on both sides of a war immune from criminal prosecution for their otherwise criminal acts of killing, maiming, destroying property, etc., carried out as part of their country's war effort. That is, soldiers who kill as part of an attack benefit from the immunity just as much as those defending their country. Traditionally, just war theorists (...) have tried to provide situation‐specific arguments to show that soldiers on both sides had a good moral justification for their actions. Recently, self‐styled “revisionist just war theorists” have suggested that the doctrine of combatant immunity is just a convention designed to minimize harm. In this article, I suggest that the moral foundation of the doctrine lies in the status of soldiers as public officials in the service of their country. The reason why we hold them immune from prosecution for their war‐making acts is that such acts are properly thought of as acts of a state, rather than as acts of a particular individual. And the reason why states are immune from prosecution for their acts is one of moral standing: No other state has the moral standing to tell another how to carry out the matters that define its jurisdiction. So as long as a country deems (however implausibly) that it must use force to defend itself from aggression, then it may do what is required to defend itself. No other state has the standing to prohibit such acts or to punish those who carry them out. This argument is rooted in an understanding of how individuals may interact as free and equal under law. It does not aim at the perfection of human action, but it does serve to eliminate the worst forms of tyranny. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Liberal theory has failed to provide theocrats who are aggrieved by the sinful practices widespread in liberal societies good reasons to tolerate these sins. Moreover, liberal theory has faltered in identifying grounds on which to impose regulations that violate theocrats? religious doctrines. These challenges must be met if liberalism is to temper religious discord and to maintain its own relevance in a world replete with theocratic conceptions of the good.