The reason Descartes cites for invoking the demon argument in addition to the dream argument is that the demon argument is intended to broaden the scope of Descartes’ scepticism, to subsume additional beliefs under it. I present an additional, unfamiliar reason. There is, I argue, an important difference between the two sceptical arguments. It pertains not to their scope, but to their “depth”, to the kind of scepticism they are capable of inducing.

This journal article has been superseded by a revised version, published in the collection _Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Rene Descartes_, ed. by Stephen Voss (Oxford University Press, 1993), 259–287.

Despite Glouberman—s paper, I adhere to the terms I used earlier to describe the contest between Descartes and Gassendi (and their followers—which was the major part of my argument, unexamined by Glouberman). His attribution to me of a positivist conception of philosophical activity, I claim, better characterizes his own attitude toward evidence, truth, and the cognitive significance of metaphysical claims. Part of what was at stake between Descartes and Gassendi was a communal model of knowledge; within this context, I raise (...) questions about standards of scholarship and their significance. (shrink)