This article offers an overview of the risks related to some representations of epigenetics in the process of making social and medical recommendations. After exploring different representations of epigenetics in popular literature and media discourses, I identify some of the premature conclusions that could emerge from such discourses, stressing issues related to parental responsibility—especially as they relate to women—regarding the transmission of epigenetic marks. I then propose some epistemological considerations regarding developmental biology in order to draw a more nuanced picture (...) of epigenetic responsibility. I argue that such considerations are important to clarify our general understanding of epigenetic research as well as its potential translation outside the scientific area. (shrink)

The term “genetic load” first emerged in a paper written in 1950 by the geneticist H. Muller. It is a mathematical model based on biological, social, political and ethical arguments describing the dramatic accumulation of disadvantageous mutations in human populations that will occur in modern societies if eugenic measures are not taken. The model describes how the combined actions of medical and social progress will supposedly impede natural selection and make genes of inferior quality likely to spread across populations – (...) a process which in fine loads their progress. Genetic load is based on optimal fitness and emerges from a “typological view” of evolution. This model of evolution had previously, however, been invalidated by Robert Wright and Theodosius Dobzhansky who, as early as 1946, showed that polymorphism was the rule in natural populations. The blooming and persistence of the concept of genetic load, after its theoretical basis had already expired, are a historical puzzle. This persistence reveals the intricacy of science and policy-making in eugenic matters. The Canguilhemian concept of ‘scientific ideology’ is used along with the concept of ‘immutable mobile’ and compared with the concept of ‘co-production’, to provide complementary perspectives on this complex phenomenon. (shrink)

In criminal proceedings, offenders are sentenced based on doctrines of culpability and punishment that theorize why they are guilty and why they should be punished. Throughout human history, these doctrines have largely been grounded in legal-policy constructions around retribution, safety, deterrence, and closure, mostly derived from folk psychology, natural philosophy, sociocultural expectations, public-order narratives, and common sense. On these premises, justice systems have long been designed to account for crimes and their underlying intent, with experience and probabilistic assumptions shaping theoretical (...) discourses on the nature of crimes and offenders’ punishability. As scientific discoveries, inventions, and methodologies progressively developed to refine such doctrines and displace long-held assumptions, criminal courtrooms have increasingly witnessed counsels and judges relying on scientific evidence to submit, dispute, or validate claims. For instance, over the last century, criminal courtrooms have selectively admitted neuroscientific models, exams, and insights claiming to revolutionize our understanding of who is culpable and deserving of punishment. Most recently, advancements in epigenetics have promised even more profound challenges to long-standing criminal law doctrines. This article examines the reasons reversibility and inheritability of epigenetic markers might warrant revising culpability and punishment and concludes that epigenetic findings are not yet robust enough to justify such revisions. (shrink)

Recent findings in epigenetics have been attracting much attention from social scientists and bioethicists because they reveal the molecular mechanisms by which exposure to socioenvironmental factors, such as pollutants and social adversity, can influence the expression of genes throughout life. Most surprisingly, some epigenetic modifications may also be heritable via germ cells across generations. Epigenetics may be the missing molecular evidence of the importance of using preventive strategies at the policy level to reduce the incidence and prevalence of common diseases. (...) But while this “policy translation” of epigenetics introduces new arguments in favor of public health strategies and policy-making, a more “clinical translation” of epigenetics is also emerging. It focuses on the biochemical mechanisms and epigenetic variants at the origin of disease, leading to novel biomedical means of assessing epigenetic susceptibility and reversing detrimental epigenetic variants. In this paper, we argue that the impetus to create new biomedical interventions to manipulate and reverse epigenetic variants is likely to garner more attention than effective social and public health interventions and therefore also to garner a greater share of limited public resources. This is likely to happen because of the current biopolitical context in which scientific findings are translated. This contemporary neoliberal “regime of truth,” to use a term from Michel Foucault, greatly influences the ways in which knowledge is being interpreted and implemented. Building on sociologist Thomas Lemke's Foucauldian “analytics of biopolitics” and on literature from the field of science and technology studies, we present two sociological trends that may impede the policy translation of epigenetics: molecularization and biomedicalization. These trends, we argue, are likely to favor the clinical translation of epigenetics—in other words, the development of new clinical tools fostering what has been called “personalized” or “precision” medicine. In addition, we argue that an overemphasized clinical translation of epigenetics may further reinforce this biopolitical landscape through four processes closely related to neoliberal pathways of thinking: the internalization and isolation of socioenvironmental determinants of health and increased opportunities for commodification and technologicalization of health care interventions. (shrink)

Recently, ethicists have posited that consideration of epigenetic mechanisms presents novel challenges to concepts of justice and equality of opportunity, such as elevating the importance of environments in bioethics and providing a counterpoint to gross genetic determinism. We argue that new findings in epigenetic sciences, including those regarding intergenerational health effects, do not necessitate reconceptualization of theories of justice or the environment. To the contrary, such claims reflect a flawed understanding of epigenetics and its relation to genetics that may unintentionally (...) undermine appeals to social justice. We provide a brief summary of epigenetic sciences, focusing on phenomena central to the current ethical discourse. We identify three fallacious modes of reasoning arising from the emergent literature on the ethical and policy implications of epigenetics, including mischaracterization, undue extrapolation, and exceptionalism. We end by discussing how these issues may work against mobilizing health equity policies and present a more modest claim regarding the value of new epigenetic knowledge to health justice by setting this discourse within the context of known themes in biomedical ethics and health policy. (shrink)

What do we mean when we talk about epigenetic harm? This paper presents a multidimensional view of epigenetic harm. It is a plea to take a step back from discussions of epigenetic responsibility distributions prevalent in ELSA literature on epigenetics. Instead, it urges researchers to take a closer look at the normative role played by the concept of epigenetic harm. It starts out by showing that the ways in which the object of epigenetic responsibility has already been conceptualized are all (...) related to ‘epigenetic harm’: something negative that happens in which epigenetic mechanisms play a role, or rather something that needs to be avoided. Epigenetic harm is then characterized as a bridging concept between relatively neutral findings on epigenetics on the one side, and potential ethical and societal implications of those findings, primarily in terms of responsibility ascriptions and distributions, on the other. The paper proposes that a sufficiently nuanced account of epigenetic harm should include at least three dimensions. The dimension of causation alone leads to an overly narrow understanding of harm, and a wrong understanding of this dimension might prompt researchers to support an excessively simplistic epigenetic determinism. It is argued that a multidimensional analysis of epigenetic harm is less vulnerable to this threat and more reflective of the various kinds of harm that may be experienced by the subjects of epigenetic alterations. The paper applies insights from disability studies and feminist philosophy to draw attention to two other dimensions of epigenetic harm, namely lived experiences and relationality. The paper concludes by exploring what a shift towards a multidimensional approach to epigenetic harm might mean for epigenetic research and responsibility ascriptions by formulating some concrete implications. (shrink)

Epigenetics reveals the biological mechanisms underlying the reproduction and even the transmission of social inequalities in health. It also emphasizes the complexity of factors involved in the development of some diseases. This complexity raises new difficulties for theories of justice. Is the equal opportunities theory the most appropriate to solve these difficulties? I demonstrate that epigenetics requires a multifactor model of justice—one that is grounded on principles of fairness, impartiality, and environmental and intergenerational justice. Depending on the point of view (...) assumed (i.e., individual, population-based, or intergenerational), the relevant principle of justice is different. (shrink)

Despite numerous initiatives and significant resource investment, violence remains a pervasive threat to public health. The burgeoning field of epigenetics may offer an exciting new possibility for violence prevention efforts by illuminating the mechanisms of gene-environment interactions. In particular, it may improve our ability to design more effective primary interventions, facilitate improved intervention tailoring, and better position communities to be active agents in their well-being. However, without attention to the distinction between awareness, self-efficacy, and agency, it risks encouraging a false (...) sense of individual accountability for violence, a perception that may perpetuate or increase existing inequities. Thus, embracing epigenetic insights in public health raises new opportunities but also new concerns. Ultimately, I argue public health should embrace epigenetics’ potential, but only with an equal commitment to state responsibility and systemic justice. (shrink)