Regulations implemented by World Athletics (WA) require female athletes with differences of sexual development to suppress their blood testosterone levels in order to participate in certain women’s sporting competitions. These regulations have been justified by reference to fairness. In this paper, we reconstruct WA’s understanding of fairness, which requires a “level playing field” where no athlete should have a significant performance advantage based on factors other than talent, dedication, and hard work over an average athlete in their category. We demonstrate (...) that by placing regulations only on testosterone levels, while ignoring physical as well as socioeconomic advantages, WA consistently fails to meet its own definition of fairness. We then discuss several ways in which this definition could be met. Our analysis shows that a categorical system, in which athletes are divided into categories based on properties leading to significant performance advantages, is best suited for meeting WA’s definition of fairness. (shrink)

Sport categorization is often justified by benefits such as increased fairness or inclusion. Taking inspiration from John Rawls, Sigmund Loland’s fair equality of opportunity principle in sport (FEOPs) is a tool for determining whether the existence of an inequality ethically justifies the institution of a new category in any given sport. It is an elegant ethical normative framework, but since FEOPs does not account explicitly for athlete safety (i.e. athlete physical and mental wellbeing), we are left in an ethically dubious (...) situation where the risk of harm associated with a categorization regime might in fact prove to be greater than the risk of harm present within the sport before its introduction. To address this critical gap, I propose the ‘scales of ignorance’ ethical normative framework to weigh the relative risk of harm within a sport, crucially inserting athlete safety into the discourse surrounding ethical justification for categorization in sport. The current paper is the first explicit formulation of assessment and ethical justification of risk of harm in the familiar logic of FEOPs. The scales of ignorance framework can also be used independently of Loland’s approach. Two new concepts are also proposed: ‘insidious risk of harm’ and ‘pernicious risk of harm’. (shrink)

Despite the reality of intersex individuals whose biological markers do not necessarily all point towards a traditional binary understanding of either male or female, the vast majority of sports divide competition into categories based on a binary notion of biological sex and develop policies and regulations to police the divide. In so doing, sports governing bodies (SGBs) adopt an imperfect model of biological sex in order to serve their particular purposes, which, typically, will include protecting the fundamental sporting value of (...) fair competition. Yet, one potential consequence of enforcing such an approach would seem to be the exclusion or marginalization of individuals whose biological development does not fit within the binary model, whether due to genetics or through a choice to undergo medical intervention to better represent a chosen gender identity. Any such exclusion or marginalization will inevitably tend to undermine another fundamental value of sport, that of inclusivity. In the context of those with differences of sex development, SGBs appear to be faced with a difficult problem: dealing with a conflict between two fundamental values of sport. Different approaches to this problem have been suggested, with some academics proposing that sports organisations, in general, ought to prioritise fairness above, while others suggest the need to ‘balance’ competing values or even to prioritise inclusion over fairness. However, it is argued that any of these approaches are, in principle, justifiable as any sport should be free to prioritise or balance its own values. What seems more important for any SGB is the need for a rational and transparent justification of regulations that pursue fair competition at the expense of inclusivity. Furthermore, where fair competition and inclusivity are fundamental values, any such justification would seem to demand adherence to some basic norms. First, the regulations should be built on (and articulate) a consistent and principled basis of what ‘fair competition’ means in a particular sport. Second, any regulations should only exclude or restrict participation to the minimum degree necessary to achieve the sense of fair competition so articulated. Third, SGBs should be transparent about what their values are and where their priorities lie so that participants and other stakeholders are able to make an informed choice as to whether they wish to participate in, support, or be associated with a particular sport. With reference to the adoption of the Eligibility Regulations for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (the ‘DSD Regulations’) by the International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF), this article seeks to evaluate whether the approach of the IAAF satisfied these basic requirements. (shrink)

In his latest paper, Loland1 tackles the question of whether athletes with differences of sexual development may compete in the women’s division. The topic is one of the most complex in sport and, as such, is fraught with debate. On one hand, the higher testosterone levels of athletes with DSD means they have an unfair performance advantage over their female competitors. On the other hand, it is argued that women with DSD should be able to compete in the gender division (...) with which they identify, especially as many will have been raised with a clear gender identity. Loland uses the Rawlsian notion of ‘fair equality of opportunity’ in which individuals with similar talents and ambitions should have roughly equivalent prospects for competitive success. For example, in most situations in society, one’s age, biological sex, ethnic and religious background, colour of skin, or sexual orientation are irrelevant to whether an individual should be given a job or is eligible for social welfare. In addition to being irrelevant, these factors are also stable—they are inequalities that ‘individuals cannot control or impact in any significant way’.1 However, Loland recognises that some stable inequalities, such as biological sex and body size, are relevant to FEO in sport. For example, a featherweight boxer may have similar talents and …. (shrink)

Caster Semenya is done with track and field. At 29, her hopes for a continued career as a professional middle-distance runner are dashed. After her case against International Association for Athletics Federation 1 was dismissed by the Court for Arbitration of Sport on 1 May 2019, she has switched to football later in the year.1 Semenya’s case may have come to its legal conclusion, however it has generated an aporia regarding the binary classification in athletics, which has yet to be (...) solved.2 It is time the implications of the fair equality of opportunity principle as a normative basis for the construction of categories in sport are taken seriously to move forward the debate on unfair advantages in sport. Loland conditionally justifies restricting the women’s category to athletes with testosterone levels below a certain threshold, on the basis of the FEO principle, and of a distinction between stable and dynamic inequalities between athletes. …. (shrink)

Competitive sport is not governed by luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism is intended to minimise or prevent all inequalities that arise from luck, as these inequalities are judged to be unjust. Sigmund Loland1 correctly notes that there are elements of luck egalitarian practice in sports: competitors must run the same distances, use the same equipment and so on. However, these measures of standardisation do not level the playing field, because competitors are at liberty to use as much money as they can (...) to further their own chances of success. They may buy the best equipment they or their sponsors can afford; they may spend money to access world-class training facilities; they may employ the most expensive coaches, physiotherapists and nutritionists; they may use personal wealth to minimise the need to earn money and maximise training time. Differences in wealth lead to enormous inequalities between competitors, and these differences largely come down to the luck of their position in various socioeconomic hierarchies. Every sportsperson is affected by socioeconomic luck. Luck plays a role in other ways, too: an archer’s shot is affected by a gust of wind; an athlete’s hopes are dashed by injury; a team’s path through a tournament depends on the initial draw. For a luck egalitarian, …. (shrink)

The 2018 eligibility regulation for female competitors with differences of sexual development (DSD) issued by World Athletics requires competitors with DSD with blood testosterone levels at or above 5 nmol/L and sufficient androgen sensitivity to be excluded from competition in certain events unless they reduce the level of testosterone in their blood. This paper formalises and then critically assesses the fairness-based argument offered in support of this regulation by the federation. It argues that it is unclear how the biological advantage (...) singled out by the regulation as an appropriate target for diminishment, is relevantly different from other biological advantages that athletes may enjoy, and specifically that Sigmund Loland’s recent attempt to drive a wedge between heightened levels of blood testosterone and other biological advantages fails. The paper also suggests that even if heightened blood testosterone levels do differ relevantly from other types of biological advantage, the regulation is further challenged by studies indicating that athletes with blood testosterone at the high end of the normal range have a competitive advantage over athletes with blood testosterone levels at the low end of it. Finally, the paper contends that the premises of the fairness-based argument do not unequivocally support the conclusion that DSD athletes with heightened levels of testosterone should diminish those levels, since, just as powerfully, they support allowing athletes with normal levels of testosterone to use performance-enhancing drugs in the name of fairness. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine how different types of sports rules place unique demands upon athletes with regard to their weight and how these demands condition different strategies of weight management. We categorized sports rules into three main categories according to their relationship to weight: 1) sports with weight-prescribing rules; 2) sports rules that advantage lean light bodied athletes; and 3) sports rules that advantage lean robust muscular athletes. This enabled us to provide a more complex view (...) than has been presented by authors in sports sciences, whose emphasis is usually on researching athletes’ body composition, sometimes establishing the ‘desired body’, or addressing the problematic aspects of athletes’ weight-controlling practices within ‘weight-sensitive sports’. We advocate a change of focus from ‘weight-sensitive sports’ to risk groups, since not all athletes in a sport are equally affected by weight issues raised by the sporting test. Thus, this approach offers an athlete-centred approach to weight management in sport, rather than an emphasis on certain types of sports. (shrink)

Jennings and Braun’s (2024) article “Beyond Suppressing Testosterone: A Categorical System to Achieve a ‘Level Playing Field’ in Sport” is a valuable contribution to the academic debate over the DS...

In his paper, Loland1 offers conditional support for 2019 World Athletics ‘differences of sex development’ regulations,2 upheld that year by the Court of Arbitration for Sport 3 in the case of Caster Semenya. He states this is conditional due to the ‘systemic and psycho-somatic’ impact of hormonal treatment. Loland also calls for ‘further analysis of the nature of athlete classification’ and identifies some welcome options for reducing the significance of sex classifications in sport. While Loland identifies ‘essentialist and reductionist definitions (...) of gender’ as problematic, he finds this inescapable, affirming the case as a ‘dilemma of rights’ where excluding Semenya is ‘protecting the integrity of women’s sport’.1 The idea that Semenya’s participation presents a dilemma necessarily presumes that she is not a woman. Loland’s conclusions support a convenience-based approach to classification of sex where choices about the status of people with intersex variations are made by others according to their interests at that time, inter alia, a woman in situation A if no-one complains, a woman in situation B when subjected to medical intervention, a man in situation C and non-binary in D. While a majority decision by CAS adjudicators denied consideration of the ‘wider impact’ of their decision outside sport, …. (shrink)