Residents with dementia in long-term care facilities (LTCFs) often receive antipsychotic (AP) medications without clear clinical indications. One non-clinical factor influencing the use of APs in LTCFs is low staff levels. Often, using APs is viewed and rationalised by healthcare professionals in LTCFs as a lesser evil option to manage low staff levels. This paper investigates the ethical plausibility of using APs as a lesser of two evils in resource-constrained LTCFs. I examine the practice vis-à-vis the three frequently invoked conditions (...) of lesser evil justifications as specified in the wider philosophical literature. These conditions include (1) the necessity condition, (2) the condition of sensitivity to both deontic (ie, constraint-based) and non-deontic (ie, outcome-based) considerations and (3) the commensurability condition. I argue that there are considerable difficulties in demonstrating that the practice in question satisfies the conditions of lesser evil justifications. In particular, there are major difficulties in satisfying the condition of sensitivity to deontic and outcome-based considerations, and the commensurability condition. I also argue that the current philosophical debate on lesser-evil justifications is not straightforwardly applicable to the practice of using APs for non-clinical purposes in LTCFs. I contend that caregivers are not so-called ‘generic’ agents, and the assumed rarity of lesser evil cases is questionable. I conclude that until further work is done to resolve these issues, the lesser evil reasoning cannot be, at least routinely, used to formulate robust moral justifications for the practice in question. (shrink)

We provide a new wrinkle to the Argument from Unfair Advantage, a rather popular one in the ethics of doping in sports discussions. But we add a new argument that we believe places the moral burden on those who favor doping in sports. We also defend our position against some important concerns that might be raised against it. In the end, we argue that for the time being, doping in sports ought to be banned until it can be demonstrated that (...) our concerns can be satisfied. (shrink)

Elite athletes are characterized by their high level of performance in sport. Since the very beginnings of sport, it has been understood that physical and physiological abilities influence the performance of athletes. Advances in scientific knowledge, especially sport psychology and neuroscience, seem to confirm this intuition and consequently it is possible to characterize elite athletes as having an extraordinary combination of physical and mental abilities. Techniques and substances that contribute to enhancing physical characteristics of athletes have also been well known (...) for ages. But it is now possible to make use of other techniques and substances that not only enhance physical abilities but also cognitive capabilities, which seem to require greater consideration given their direct impact on the athlete’s brain. In this article, we examine two such techniques, cognitive enhancers and transcranial stimulators, and highlight the potential advantages and drawbacks that applying each one may have on sport. Given the relative novelty of these enhancement techniques and substances and the absence of conclusive evidence regarding their short- and long-term effects, we deem that their use ought to be strictly governed by cautionary principles. But due to that same lack of evidence, we believe that the possibility of examining the feasibility of applying these techniques to sport should not be denied. (shrink)

One of the claims sometimes advanced in favour of anti-doping is that allowing doping would lead to a uniform increase in performance in comparison to no doping. The idea is that if all athletes wo...

A brief review and classification of technology in general begins the paper, followed by an application of the classification to two specific marathon case studies: the 2018 Boston marathon and the 2017 Nike Breaking2 Project marathon. Then concepts from an array of sport philosophers are discussed to suggest an explanation for why each of the case studies strikes us as problematic. The conclusion provides a reasonable explanation for our misgivings, as well as an indication of how we might evaluate sporting (...) endeavors in the face of increasing technological innovation. (shrink)

We provide a new wrinkle to the Argument from Unfair Advantage, a rather popular one in the ethics of doping in sports discussions. But we add a new argument that we believe places the moral burden on those who favor doping in sports. We also defend our position against some important concerns that might be raised against it. In the end, we argue that for the time being, doping in sports ought to be banned until it can be demonstrated that (...) our concerns can be satisfied. (shrink)

I denne artikkelen drøfter jeg bruk av biomedisinsk teknologi i prestasjonsfremmende hensikt i konkurranseidrett. Mer presist utforsker jeg mulighetene for å skille mellom etisk akseptabel og etisk uakseptabel bruk. Jeg kritiserer WADAs normative grunnlag for å forby visse biomedisinske midler og metoder, og argumenterer for at eventuelle forbud må bygge på tydeligere verdisyn på idrett. Jeg undersøker to idealtypiske syn og deres teknologiske implikasjoner. Det smale synet er liberalt og avviser begrensninger i bruk av biomedisinske midler og metoder blant voksne (...) idrettsutøvere som dårlig begrunnet paternalisme. Det brede synet innebærer en mer restriktiv holdning og aksepterer en viss regulering av trening og prestasjonsutvikling også utenfor konkurransene. I en avsluttende del veier jeg det smale og det brede synet mot hverandre og reflekterer over hvilket syn som vil dominere framtidens idrett.Nøkkelord: etikk, idrett, biomedisinsk teknologi, dopingEnglish summary: The use of biomedical technology in sport: Are there any limits?In the article I examine the use of biomedical technology to enhance performance in competitive sport. More specifically I examine the possibilities for distinguishing between ethically acceptable and ethically unacceptable use of such technology. I criticize the World Antidoping Agency's normative criterion for banning certain technologies as it is vague and unclear. I argue that any ban by WADA has to build on a clear and operational normative view of sport. Two relevant ideal-typical views are examined together with their technological implications. The narrow view is liberal and rejects restrictions on the use of biomedical technology among professional athletes as unjustifiable paternalism. The wider view implies a more restrictive approach and accepts certain regulations of performance-enhancing means and methods outside of competitions. In the conclusion, I compare the narrow and the wider views and reflect upon their possible status in competitive sport in the future. (shrink)