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  1. «Social» in Social Epistemology.А. А Шевченко - 2022 - Siberian Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):10-18.
    The paper analyzes the main social contexts constituting social epistemology. It describes external so­cio-political contexts which define the framework and required procedures for open research, scientif­ic consensus and epistemic justice. However, the article argues for special importance of internal social contexts – those of knowledge production in research groups. The treatment of knowledge as a collective enterprise requires, in turn, discussion of a new set of problems: the ways and mechanisms of creating the collective subject of knowledge, ways of overcoming (...)
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  • We Have No Satisfactory Social Epistemology of AI-Based Science.Inkeri Koskinen - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    In the social epistemology of scientific knowledge, it is largely accepted that relationships of trust, not just reliance, are necessary in contemporary collaborative science characterised by relationships of opaque epistemic dependence. Such relationships of trust are taken to be possible only between agents who can be held accountable for their actions. But today, knowledge production in many fields makes use of AI applications that are epistemically opaque in an essential manner. This creates a problem for the social epistemology of scientific (...)
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  • Machine Learning, Misinformation, and Citizen Science.Adrian K. Yee - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (56):1-24.
    Current methods of operationalizing concepts of misinformation in machine learning are often problematic given idiosyncrasies in their success conditions compared to other models employed in the natural and social sciences. The intrinsic value-ladenness of misinformation and the dynamic relationship between citizens' and social scientists' concepts of misinformation jointly suggest that both the construct legitimacy and the construct validity of these models needs to be assessed via more democratic criteria than has previously been recognized.
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  • Persistent evidential discordance.Samuli Reijula & Sofia Blanco Sequeiros - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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  • Towards a Critical Social Epistemology of Social Media.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    What are the proper epistemic aims of social media sites? A great deal of social media critique presupposes an exceptionalist attitude, according to which social media is either uniquely good, or uniquely bad for our collective knowledge-generating practices. Exceptionalism about social media is troublesome, both because it leads to oversimplistic narratives, and because it prevents us making relevant comparisons to other epistemic systems. The goal of this chapter is to offer an anti-exceptionalist account of the epistemic aims of social media. (...)
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  • How Philosophy of Science Can Unlock New Methods in Bioethics.Mark Fedyk - 2022 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (12):51-53.
    Blumenthal-Barby and colleagues (2022) argue that philosophy continues to be relevant to bioethics. To support their argument, they offer several examples of how—not philosophy, exactly—but normati...
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  • On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leeds
    This thesis is an investigation into the nature of epistemic justification. It brings together themes from traditional, individual-centred epistemology, and collective, group-centred epistemology. The first half of the thesis is concerned with the question of whether rationality is epistemically permissive; that is, whether one body of evidence can rationalise more than one doxastic attitude. In chapter 1, I argue that permissive cases are best understood as epistemic standard conflicts. Doing so provides us with a novel understanding of the arbitrariness objection (...)
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