Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Another Kind of Spinozistic Monism.Samuel Newlands - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):469-502.
    I argue that Spinoza endorses "conceptual dependence monism," the thesis that all forms of metaphysical dependence (such as causation, inherence, and existential dependence) are conceptual in kind. In the course of explaining the view, I further argue that it is actually presupposed in the proof for his more famed substance monism. Conceptual dependence monism also illuminates several of Spinoza’s most striking metaphysical views, including the intensionality of causal contexts, parallelism, metaphysical perfection, and explanatory rationalism. I also argue that this priority (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?Leonardo Moauro & Samuel C. Rickless - 2019 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 1 (1):9.
    Starting in the second edition of the Essay, Locke becomes interested in the phenomenon of akrasia, or weakness of will. As he conceives it, akrasia occurs when we will something contrary to what we acknowledge to be our greater good. This commitment represents an important shift from the first edition of the Essay, where Locke argues that the will is always determined by a judgement of our greater good. But traces of the first-edition view are present even in the second (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Locke on Freedom, Moral Agency, and the Space of Reasons.Valtteri Viljanen - 2024 - Locke Studies 24:1-20.
    This paper argues that what interests Locke most is not whether we are free to suspend desire but the nature of the liberty that suspension grants us, and that Lockean liberty is essentially about deliberation that takes place in what has nowadays come to be called the space of reasons. This allows me to offer a novel and balanced account that carefully designates both causal and rational elements of Locke’s theory of moral agency: after having reached judgment concerning the best (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Person, Substance, Mode and ‘the moral Man’ in Locke’s Philosophy.Antonia Lolordo - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):643-667.
    This paper gives three arguments for why Lockean persons must be modes rather than substances.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • What is B-time?Jonathan Tallant - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):147-156.
    According to B-theorists, B-relations (‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’, see, e.g. Oaklander 2004: 24–25) constitute the reality of time. The B-relations are what distinguish our world from a timeless one. Yet our only awareness of the reality of time comes via our phenomenology of temporal passage. Why is this noteworthy? Our temporal phenomenology is mind-dependent and reflects no feature of reality. Epistemic access to the reality of time is, in fact, simply epistemic access to our own inner phenomenology. It doesn’t (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Locke's Theory of Demonstration and Demonstrative Morality.Patrick J. Connolly - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):435-451.
    Locke famously claimed that morality was capable of demonstration. But he also refused to provide a system of demonstrative morality. This paper addresses the mismatch between Locke’s stated views and his actual philosophical practice. While Locke’s claims about demonstrative morality have received a lot of attention it is rare to see them discussed in the context of his general theory of demonstration and his specific discussions of particular demonstrations. This paper explores Locke’s general remarks about demonstration as well as his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Locke's equivocal category of substance.David Https://Orcidorg Wörner - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):1044-1057.
    John Locke famously claimed that our idea of substance is but a confused idea of “something we know not what.” However, he also thought that the idea of substance is a fundamental part of our ideas of ourselves and the objects surrounding us—of objects we do know. Interpreting this apparently ambivalent stance has long been a major challenge for Locke scholarship. In this article, I argue that the leading interpretations of Locke's conception of substance have failed to resolve this tension (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Locke's Aristotelian theory of quantity.Anat Schechtman - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (2):337-356.
    John Locke’s treatment of quantity in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding is not nearly as extensive or as well-known as his treatment of quality and his distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Yet I contend that a close examination of Locke’s comments on quantity in the Essay reveals that he endorses a general theory of quantity that not only distinguishes quantities from qualities, but also plays several other important roles in his overall philosophy—particularly in his treatments of infinity and demonstrative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Locke on the Motivation to Suspend Desire.Matthew A. Leisinger - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):48-61.
    This paper takes up two questions regarding Locke’s doctrine of suspension. First, what motivates suspension? Second, what are the conditions under which we are motivated to suspend? In response to the first question, I argue that suspension is motivated by the desire to avoid the possible future evils that might result from acting precipitately upon some desire without suspending. In response to the second question, I argue against the common assumption that the desire motivating suspension must be an agent’s most (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Locke on sensitive knowledge as knowledge.Scott Stapleford - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):206-231.
    This article is an extended analysis of the most recent scholarly work on Locke's account of sensitive knowledge. Lex Newman's "dual cognitive relations" model of sensitive knowledge is examined in detail. The author argues that the dual cognitive relations model needs to be revised on both philosophical and historical grounds. While no attempt is made to defend Locke's position, the aim is to show that it is at least consistent, contrary to the received view. The final section provides textual support (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Lowe on Locke's and Frege's Conceptions of Number.A. Arrieta-Urtizberea - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (1):39-52.
    In his last book about Locke’s philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege’s arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative reading of Frege’s arguments throws light on Frege’s and Lowe’s different agendas. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Empiricist Origin of Biopolitics: Freedom and Potentiality in John Locke.Haram Lee - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1583-1600.
    This article examines John Locke’s theory of subjectivity to challenge the recent critical tendency to associate biopolitics and empiricism. Michel Foucault, most notably among modern theorists of biopolitics, proposes that the Lockean man, or an interest-seeking animal, constitutes the paradigm of a person that remains subject to biopower. Such understanding of empiricism by biopolitical theorists is, however, reductive because Locke’s view of human subjectivity is fundamentally equivocal. As I demonstrate by analyzing his discussion of freedom, action, and desire in An (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark