This essay aims to shed new light on the relations between physiology and psychology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by focusing on the use of unicellular organisms as research objects during that period. Within the frameworks of evolutionism and monism advocated by Ernst Haeckel, protozoa were perceived as objects situated at the borders between organism and cell and individual and society. Scholars such as Max Verworn, Alfred Binet, and Herbert Spencer Jennings were provoked by these organisms to (...) undertake experimental investigations situated between general physiology and psychology that differed from the physiological psychology advocated by Wilhelm Wundt. Some of these investigations sought to locate psychological properties in the molecular structure of protoplasm; others stressed the existence of organic and psychological individuality in protozoa. In the following decades, leading philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Henri Bergson, as well as psychological researchers like Sigmund Freud, integrated the results of these investigations into their reflections on such problems as the nature of the will, the structure of the ego, and the holistic nature of the reactions of organisms to their environment. (shrink)

This special issue of Biological Theory is focused on development; it raises the problem of the temporal and spatial boundaries of development. From a temporal point of view, when does development start and stop? From a spatial point of view, what is it exactly that "develops", and is it possible to delineate clearly the developing entity? This issue explores the possible answers to these questions, and thus sheds light on the definition of development itself.

In a 2020 paper, 37 authors, all researchers and students in aging biology, pointed out a general lack of consensus in their field, “even on the most fundamental questions”. They evoked a “problem”, for which a solution has yet to be found. But what exactly does this lack of consensus specifically refer to and why should it be inherently problematic? Here, I would like to explore three distinct philosophical reactions when dealing with this issue. First, I will assess the extent (...) to which this lack of consensus can be taken as evidence that science, in a sense, needs philosophy. Then, I will examine how it may be related to the particular nature of the aging phenomenon, which both science and philosophy can help describe and understand. Finally, I will show that this lack of consensus could also be considered, not as a problem, but as an opportunity to question the role of pluralism and the importance of ambiguity in science in general, and in aging biology in particular. (shrink)

Heralded as revolutionary in their potential to improve efficiency, transparency, and sustainability, blockchain technologies promise new forms of large-scale coordination between actors that do not necessarily trust each other. This paper examines blockchain imaginaries and associated metaphors. Our analysis focuses on bitcoin and ethereum, today’s most prominent blockchains that use the proof-of-work consensus mechanism. We identify three principles that organise blockchain imaginaries: substantial, morphological, and structural. These principles position blockchain as an enabler of economic, political and epistemological practices, respectively. Blockchain (...) infrastructure and protocols rely on substantial metaphors (e.g. gold, gas) to govern resource allocation, morphological metaphors (e.g. work, trust) to generate consensus and structural metaphors (e.g. chain, transaction) to establish shared knowledge. Those imaginaries rely on metaphorical displacements of meaning that make blockchain technology relevant and intelligible while simultaneously shaping the direction of technological development and positing these technologies as new forms of economic, political and epistemological organisation. They are not merely descriptive but performative. We conclude by showing how these principles partially overlap with three symbolically generalized media: money, power and truth. Money organises scarcity within the economic system, power organises consensus within the political system, and truth organises knowledge within the science system. (shrink)

We develop a new metaphor account where metaphors become surrogate variables for different but related phenomena. As we will argue, subrogation is the result of the interplay between the things inspired by the metaphor and the empirical dynamics that result from such inspiration. In particular, we focus on adaptive radiation, a major concept of evolutionary biology. Our study suggests that there is no distinct phenomenon, process, or pattern in nature than can be identified as adaptive radiation. What we have instead (...) is a grouping variable that has surrogated different evolutionary phenomena into one expansive label. We believe this analysis of metaphors helps better understand the value of metaphors for science not only as a provider of epistemic and cognitive virtues but most importantly, as a crucial research tool that can both help and divert scientific experimentation. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a fresh historical perspective on the debates on vitalism and holism in Germany by analyzing the work of the zoologist Hans Spemann (1869–1941) in the interwar period. Following up previous historical studies, it takes the controversial question about Spemann’s affinity to vitalistic approaches as a starting point. The focus is on Spemann’s holistic research style, and on the shifting meanings of Spemann’s concept of an organizer. It is argued that the organizer concept unfolded multiple layers (...) of meanings (biological, philosophical, and popular) during the 1920s and early 1930s. A detailed analysis of the metaphorical dynamics in Spemann’s writings sheds light on the subtle vitalistic connotations of his experimental work. How Spemann’s work was received by contemporary scientists and philosophers is analyzed briefly, and Spemann’s holism is explored in the broader historical context of the various issues about reductionism and holism and related methodological questions that were so prominently discussed not only in Germany in the 1920s. (shrink)

The language of self and nonself has had a prominent place inimmunology. This paper examines Frank Macfarlane Burnet's introductionof the language of selfhood into the science. The distinction betweenself and nonself was an integral part of Burnet's biological outlook– of his interest in the living organism in its totality, itsactivities, and interactions. We show the empirical and conceptualwork of the language of selfhood in the science. The relation betweenself and nonself tied into Burnet's ecological vision of host-parasiteinteraction. The idiom of (...) selfhood also enabled Burnet to organizeand unify a diversity of immune phenomena. Rather than approach thelanguage of self and nonself as a bluntly imposed metaphor, we focuson its endogenous origins and immanent uses in immunology. (shrink)

Representations of the active brain have served to establish a particular domain of competence for brain mappers and to distinguish brain mapping’s particular contributions to mind/brain research. At the heart of the claims about the emerging contributions of functional brain mapping is a paradox: functional imagers seem to reject representations while also using them at multiple points in their work. This article therefore considers a love-hate relationship between scientists and their object: the case of the iconoclastic imager. This paradoxical stance (...) is the result of the formation of an interdisciplinary approach that brings together a number of scientific traditions and their particular standards of what constitutes scientific evidence. By examining the various ways in which images are deployed and rejected, the origins of these conflicting tendencies can be traced to the technological, methodological, and institutional elements in the work of functional imagers. This approach provides insight into the current demarcation of imaging and reflects on features of visual knowledge. (shrink)

An allergy is commonly understood to be an overreaction of the immune system to harmless substances that are misrecognised as foreign. This concept of allergy as an abnormal, misdirected immune response—a biological fault—stems from the idea that the immune system is an inherently defensive operation designed to protect the individual through an innate capacity to discriminate between the benign and toxic, or self and nonself. However, this definition of allergy represents a radical departure from its original formulation. Literally meaning ‘altered (...) reactivity’, the term was coined in 1906 by Austrian paediatrician Clemens von Pirquet, to describe the fundamentally mutable nature of the immune response.This paper argues that the conventional interpretation of allergy-as-pathology derives from specific concepts of ‘organism’, ‘response’, and ‘normal’ immune function that have—for over a century—governed the perception and study of immune phenomena within immunology. Through an examination of Louis Pasteur’s conceptualisation of the host body/microorganism relationship, I argue that immunology is founded on a view of the organism as a discrete, autonomous entity, and on a concomitant notion of the immune response as essentially reactive. Revisiting the concept of ‘altered reactivity’, this paper points to the fact that allergy was initially posited as a general theory of immune responsiveness and, importantly, one that poses a significant challenge to orthodox notions of immunopathology. It suggests that Pirquet’s unique view of immune responsiveness presents an account of organismic or biological identity that encapsulates, rather than reduces, its ecological complexity. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of social interactions in the search for blood stem cells, in a recent episode of biomedical research. Linked to mid-20th century cell biology, genetics and radiation research, the search for blood stem cells coalesced in the 1960s and took a developmental turn in the late 1980s, with significant ramifications for immunology, stem cell and cancer biology. Like much contemporary biomedical research, this line of inquiry exhibits a complex social structure and includes several prominent scientific successes, (...) recognized as such by participating researchers. I use personal interviews and the published record to trace the social interactions crucial for scientific success in this episode. All recognized successes in this episode have two aspects: improved models of blood cell development, and new interfaces with other lines of research. The narrative of the search for blood stem cells thus yields a robust account of scientific success in practice, which generalizes to other scientific episodes and lends itself to expansion to include wider social contexts. (shrink)

By what mechanisms of organizational and institutional change do different specialties succeed in accommodating and working with one another? How do these mechanisms function over time to support and retard the emergence and stability of new knowledge? This paper considers two such mechanisms, metawork and common knowledge. These mechanisms integrate specialties by making the activities of multiple specialties dependent upon one another, and by segmenting the common effort from the parent specialties. Integration of specialties can lead to the development of (...) new specialties.Integration is facilitated and impeded by the anchoring of specialties in the system of institutions that participate in research. Host organizations, degree programs, sponsors, associations, regulators, and other organizations provide resources and impose demands that shape research. Some of these impacts are obvious and direct; others are indirect and more subtle.The research specialties form a network in which connections constantly form and reform, and in which the influence of different anchoring institutions are constantly waxing and waning. The complexity of connections and their pattern of change are especially obvious in the life sciences, which are an especially good place to study problems of integration. (shrink)

This paper seeks to inquire into the constructionist knowledge practices by further exploring the interchange outlined by philosopher Gaston Bachelard between the naive realist's conjuration of reality as a precious good in her possession and the miser's complex of savings the pennies. In fact, this elective affinity holds true not just for naive realism, but also for its very critiques, most of which remaining passionately attached to a little something that is prior to any socio-historical process. This realistic little something (...) is better understood as a double negation, namely as a not-nothing, in that it precisely survives the critique of a pre-existing reality out there as is the case for the discourse of social construction. I will suggest here that this not-nothing proceeds from knowledge practices that enact "epistemic covetousness" as their critical gesture. (shrink)

In the 1930s, the Otomi people living north of Mexico City became a model population for addressing the problems of poverty and "backwardness" of the Indian population. Mexican physiologists working in the capital chose the Otomies not least because they lived in easy reach of their laboratories. A collecting trip could be managed in a day and samples safely handled and promptly transferred to laboratory conditions. Following the Mexican teams that were funded by the newly created Autonomous Department of Indigenous (...) Affairs, French researchers descended on the Otomies to study their metabolism, using the networks and infrastructures put in place by their local colleagues. Their investigations, aimed at establishing... (shrink)

Rationalities of Knowledge Production: On Transformations of Objects, Technologies and Information in Biomedicine and the Life Sciences. Since decades, scientific change has been interpreted in the light of of paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions. The Kuhnian interpretation of scientific change however is now more and more confronted with non‐disciplinary thinking in both, science and studies on science. This paper explores how research in biomedicine and the life sciences can be characterized by different rationalities, sometimes converging, sometimes contradictory, all present at (...) the same time with varying ways of influence, impact, and visibility. In general, the rationality of objects is generated by fitting new objects and findings into a new experimental context. The rationality of hypotheses is a move towards the construction of novel explanatory tools and models. This is often inseparable meshing with the third, the technological rationaliy, in which a technology‐driven, self‐supporting and sometimes self‐referential refinement of methods and technologies comes along with an extension into other fields. During the second and the third phase, the new and emerging fields tend to expand their explanatory reach not only across disciplinary boundaries but also into the social sphere, creating what has been characterized as “exceptionalism” (e.g. genetic exceptionalism or neuro‐exceptionalism). Finally, recent biomedicine and life‐sciences reach a level in which experimental work becomes more and more data‐driven because the technologically constructed experimental systems generate a plethora of findings (data) which at some point start to blur the original hypotheses. For the rationality of information the materiality of research practices becomes secondary and research objects are more and more getting out of sight. Finally, the credibility of science as a practice becomes more and more dependent on consensus about the applicability and relevance of its results. The rationality of interest (and accountability) has become more and more characteristic for a research process which is no longer primarily determined by the desire for knowledge but by the desire for relevance. This paper explores in which ways object‐driven and hypotheses‐driven experimental life‐sciences transformed into domains of experimental research evolving in a technologically constructed, data‐driven environment in which they are subjected to constant morphing due to the forces of different rationalities. (shrink)

How does one testify and, moreover, testify philosophically to the experience of receiving an organ transplant? What kinds of survival or forms of living are being fostered by newly emerging conjunctions between philosophy and biomedicine? Focusing on transplantation and immunology, we are going to reflect on some of the ways and styles in which motifs drawn from these biomedical fields have come to occupy an increasingly prominent place in recent philosophy expressing and formulating different concerns and paradigms. Spurred on by (...) Francisco J. Varela and Jean-Luc Nancy's autobiographical reflections on transplantation, we are going to consider distinct moments and preoccupations at work in the motifs of immunity, autoimmunity, the pharmakon and the graft in the thought of Jacques Derrida, Roberto Esposito and Bernard Stiegler. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss a key question in the history and philosophy of medicine, namely how scholars should treat the practices and experimental hypotheses of modern life science laboratories. The paper seeks to introduce some prominent historiographical methods and theoretical approaches associated with biomedical research. Although medical scientists need no convincing that experimentation has a significant function in their laboratory work, historians, philosophers, and sociologists long neglected its importance when examining changes in medical theories or progress (...) in scientific knowledge. The reason appears to have been the academic influence of the then dominant tradition in the history of ideas, but was also due to a misconception of what could usefully be termed the view on “historical ontology.” During the last two decades, there have been many books and research articles that have turned towards the subject, so that the study of experimental practice has become a major trend in the contemporary history and philosophy of medicine. A closer look at the issue of laboratory research shows that concepts in medicine and the life sciences cannot be understood as historically constant, free-standing ideas, but have to be regarded as dependent on local research settings. They often carry particular “social memories” with them and thus acquire important ethical implications. (shrink)

Regulatory Knowledge and Regulatory Concepts. The article argues for a historical understanding of a specific form of knowledge which is attached to the practices of regulatory science: regulatory knowledge. By definition, regulatory science deals with problems that are thought of not belonging to the normal spectrum of scientific work, i. e., they are ‘trans‐scientific’. In order to bridge science and other social spheres, regulatory science and regulatory knowledge carry certain features deemed to fulfil this task. Using Foucault's concept of governmentality (...) and newer attempts of the sociology of knowledge, the article proposes the study of regulatory concepts as an avenue to explore the history of regulatory knowledge. As a case, the regulation by boundary values of chemicals at the work place in the Federal Republic of Germany is presented. The main advantage of boundary values as a regulatory concept is, arguably, their capacity to carry the necessary ambiguity for connecting different social spheres and for fulfilling specific functions in each social system, respectively. In this respect, the notion of regulatory concept is borrowed from the uses of boundary concepts and boundary objects in science studies. (shrink)