Let’s call the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” the Question. There’s no consensus, of course, regarding which proposed answer to the Question, if any, is correct, but occasionally there’s also controversy regarding the meaning of the Question itself. In this paper I argue that such controversy persists because there just isn’t one unique interpretation of the Question. Rather, the puzzlement expressed by the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” varies depending on the ontology implicitly or (...) explicitly endorsed by the speaker. In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that other proposals according to which the Question has one uniquely adequate interpretation are false. Second, I give several examples of the way in which the meaning of the Question can vary depending on the ontology to which it is coupled. Third, I explore the implications of my thesis for the manner in which we should approach future attempts to answer the Question. (shrink)

We argue that genuine modal realism can be extended, rather than modified, so as to allow for the possibility of nothing concrete, a possibility we term ‘metaphysical nihilism’. The issue should be important to the genuine modal realist because, not only is metaphysical nihilism itself intuitively plausible, but also it is supported by an argument with pre-theoretically credible premises, namely, the subtraction argument. Given the soundness of the subtraction argument, we show that there are two ways that the genuine modal (...) realist can accommodate metaphysical nihilism: (i) by allowing for worlds containing only spatiotemporal points and (ii) by allowing for a world containing nothing but the null individual. On methodological grounds, we argue that the genuine modal realist should reject the former way but embrace the latter way. (shrink)

Timothy O’Connor presents a novel and powerful version of the cosmological argument from contingency. What distinguishes his argument is that it does not depend on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This version thus avoids powerful objections facing the Principle. We present and develop the argument, strengthening it in various ways. We fill in big gaps in the argument and answer criticisms. These include the criticisms that O’Connor considers as well as new criticisms. We explain how his replies to a Kantian (...) criticism and to the demand for contrastive explanation fail, and properly answer the criticism and the demand. We develop two new criticisms, the objection from opaqueness and the objection from constitution, and explain how these objections can be answered. (shrink)

Philosophy of mystery -- Do we create our own mysteries? -- Do we know anything at all? -- What is reality? -- Why is there something rather than nothing? -- Why is nature ordered? -- Reductionism and emergence -- Does science dispel mystery? -- What of current mysteries in physics and cosmology? -- What of current mysteries in biology? -- What am i? -- What is consciousness? -- Do we have free will? -- Does god exist? -- Is there an (...) objective meaning to our lives? -- The mystery of the ordinary. (shrink)

By nihilism I shall understand the thesis that it is metaphysically possible that there are no concrete objects. I think there is a version of an argu- ment, the subtraction argument, which proves nihilism nicely (see Baldwin 1996 and Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997). But E. J. Lowe, who is no nihilist, has a very interesting argument purporting to show that concrete objects exist necessarily (Lowe 1996, 1998). In this paper I shall defend nihilism from Lowe’s argument.

Why is there anything, rather than nothing at all? This question often serves as a debating tactic used by theists to attack naturalism. Many people apparently regard the question—couched in such stark, general terms—as too profound for natural science to answer. It is unanswerable by science, I argue, not because it’s profound or because science is superficial but because the question, as it stands, is ill-posed and hence has no answer in the first place. In any form in which it (...) is well-posed, it has an answer that naturalism can in principle provide. The question therefore gives the foes of naturalism none of the ammunition that many on both sides of the debate think it does. (shrink)

Suppose nothing exists. Then it is true that nothing exists. What makes that true? Nothing! So it seems that if nothing existed, then the principle that every truth is made true by something (the truthmaker principle) would be false. So if it is possible that nothing exists, a claim often called 'metaphysical nihilism', then the truthmaker principle is not necessary. This paper explores various ways to resolve this conflict without restricting metaphysical nihilism in such a way that it would become (...) trivial and uninteresting. (shrink)

کلام الهی از پرچالش‌ترین مباحث کلامی در حوزه ذات و صفات واجب به شمار می‌رود. آنچه در این مسئله زمینۀ آرای متعارض را مهیا می‌سازد تبیین حقیقت کلام الهی است. گرچه دیباچه اختلافات حکما و متکلمان مربوط به اثبات حدوث و قدم کلام الهی است، تفسیر حقیقت کلام واجب و کیفیت تعلق آن اوج تشدید اختلافات و تشکیک آراء محسوب می‌گردد. علامه دوانی، بر خلاف بسیاری از حکمای متقدم، کلام الهی را مصدر تألیف کلمات و مغایر با علم الهی می‌داند. (...) دیدگاه دوانی در بحث کلام واجب مورد انتقادات جدی فیلسوف همعصر او، غیاث‌الدین دشتکی، قرار گرفته است. اشکالات دشتکی بر دیدگاه دوانی منحصر در موردی خاص نیست، بلکه می‌توان گفت اکثر لوازم و پیامدهای دیدگاه او را در مسئلۀ کلام الهی مانند مبدئیت و قوه، ترسیم تکلم در خیال، عدم صدور عمومیت کلام از عمومیت علم و... مخدوش و مهدوم می‌داند. این مقاله ابتدا به تبیین دیدگاه دوانی در مواجهه با دیدگاه اشاعره و معتزله می‌پردازد و سپس، ضمن بیان دیدگاه خاص دوانی، انتقادات دشتکی بر آن را مورد تحلیل و ارزیابی قرار می‌دهد. (shrink)

In this dissertation I suggest an answer to the famous question ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ I argue that there is something because there could not have been nothing. The focus of my discussion is the empty possible world of metaphysical nihilism, and the first chapter is a rejection of the only prominent argument for that position; the subtraction argument. In the second part of my discussion I construct a positive argument against metaphysical nihilism, I assume, as is (...) common in the literature, that inconceivability provides evidence of impossibility. I establish the inconceivability of nothingness taking propositional imagining to be the core of conceivability, claiming that we have no experience of nothingness in the relevant sense and are unable to imagine it. Finally, I suggest that a distinction should be made between everyday use of the term ‘nothing’, and the sense under discussion here. The inconceivability of nothingness applies only in the latter case. Given that nothingness is inconceivable, we have prima facie reason to suppose that the empty world is impossible. I conclude that given the failure of the subtraction argument and in light of my argument against metaphysical nihilism, that position should be rejected. (shrink)