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Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra [33]G. Rodriguez-Pereyra [1]
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  1. Grounding is Not a Strict Order.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):517-534.
    The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.
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  2. Why Truthmakers?Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford University Press. pp. 17-31.
    Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...)
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  3. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Clarendon Press.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.
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  4. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the (...)
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  5. The Bundle Theory is Compatible with Distinct but Indiscernible Particulars.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):72-81.
    1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...)
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  6. Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
    This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.
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  7. Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):965-982.
    The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman's Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if `x resembles y' is understood as `x and y share some property'. (...)
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  8. Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from (...)
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  9. Truthmaker Maximalism Defended.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):260–264.
    Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.
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  10. Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? A Probabilistic Answer Examined.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (4):505-521.
    Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument’s premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the question (...)
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  11. Truthmaker Maximalism Defended Again.Eduardo Barrio & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):3-8.
    In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section (...)
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  12. The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):427-443.
    This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction (...)
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  13. The Subtraction Arguments for Metaphysical Nihilism: Compared and Defended.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Puzzle of Existence. Why is There Something rather than Nothing? Routledge. pp. 197-214.
    The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument. In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird and Stoneham (...)
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  14. Leibniz on Substance in the Discourse on Metaphysics.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - In T. Stoneham & P. Lodge (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance. Routledge.
    In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident is an entity (...)
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  15. II—Resemblance Nominalism, Conjunctions and Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):21-38.
    The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of 〈Socrates is white〉 ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of 〈Socrates resembles Plato〉, and Socrates and Aristotle those of 〈Socrates resembles Aristotle〉. But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle〉 and 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle〉 have the same truthmakers, (...)
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  16. How Not to Trivialise the Identity of Indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - In P. F. Strawson & A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Concepts, Properties and Qualities. Ashgate.
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  17. Leibniz’s Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in His Letter to Casati.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2012 - The Leibniz Review 22:137-150.
    Leibniz’s short letter to the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati of 1689 is a short but interesting text on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, to which it is entirely dedicated. Since there is no watermark in the paper of the letter, the letter is difficult to date, but it is likely that it was written during Leibniz’s stay in Rome, sometime between April and November of 1689 (A 2 2 287–8). When addressing the letter, Leibniz wrote ‘Casani’, but this (...)
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  18. Infinite Analysis, Lucky Proof, and Guaranteed Proof in Leibniz.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Paul Lodge - 2011 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):222-236.
    According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but (...)
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  19. Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):395 – 408.
    Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...)
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  20. The Language of Publication of "Analytic" Philosophy.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):83-90.
    This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended against thirteen objections.
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  21. The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - forthcoming - In Maria Rosa Antognazza (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Leibniz. Oxford University Press.
    Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...)
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  22.  76
    Kant on the Existence and Uniqueness of the Best Possible World.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - forthcoming - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy.
    In the 1750s Optimism, the Leibnizian doctrine that the actual world is the best possible world, popularised by Pope in 1733 in his Essay on Man, was a hot topic. In 1759 Kant wrote and published a brief essay defending Optimism, Attempt at some Reflections on Optimism. Kant’s aim in this essay is to establish that there is one and only one best possible world. In particular, he argues against the claim that, for every possible world, there is a possible (...)
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  23. Postscript to Why Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - In E. J. Lowe & A. Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-making. Acumen Publishing.
    In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).
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  24. Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts: Reply to Bird.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):229–237.
    In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.
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  25. Sobre los escepticos griegos.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1989 - Idea 3 (3):59-74.
    In this paper I argue that Ancient Greek Sceptics implicitly presupposed a Parmenidean ontology.
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  26. Sobre una version del Nominalismo de Semejanzas.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1996 - Revista de Filosofía (Misc.) 11 (1/2).
    The concern of this paper is a version of Resemblance Nominalism according to which resemblance classes, i.e. classes of resembling things, are determined by paradigms. I show that the theory is false, since paradigms do not generally determine resemblance classes. Although I concentrate upon the version of the theory which was delineated by H. H. Price, my results apply to any other theory constructing resemblance classes out of paradigms.
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  27. Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):175–181.
    Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...)
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  28. Leibniz : Mind-Body Causation and Pre-Established Harmony.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2009 - In Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal & Ross Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge. pp. 109-118.
    Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it.
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  29. Kripke y las descripciones rígidas.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1993 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 19 (1):109-113.
    In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properties by means of (...)
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  30. Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651.
    Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently (...)
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  31. El problema metafísico de la verdad.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2000 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 26 (2):351-59.
    In this paper I present what I call the 'Metaphysical Problem of Truth', which consists in explaining in virtue of what all true sentences are true, and argue that a version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth is the most plausible solution to this problem.
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  32. Truth and Ontology, by Trenton Merricks. [REVIEW]Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):542-552.
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  33. Review of "Facing Facts", by S. Neale. [REVIEW]Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):780-786.
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  34.  87
    La anotación 202 de las Investigaciones Filosóficas de Wittgenstein.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1993 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 27 (2):25-3.
    The paper clarifies the sense of remark 202 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* with respect to its relation to the private language argument. It argues, against what some have maintained, that remark 202 is not meant to reject the possibility of a private language as this is defined in remark 243.
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