In “Violence and Metaphysics” Jacques Derrida suggests that “the only effective position to take in order not to be enveloped by Hegel would seem to be…to consider false-infinity…irreducible.” Inversely, refuting the charge of logocentrism associated with Hegelian true infinity ( wahrhafte Unendlichkeit ) would involve showing that Hegel’s speculative logic does not establish the infinity of being exempt from the negativity of the finite. This paper takes up Derrida’s challenge, and argues that true infinity is crucial to Hegel’s understanding of (...) ideality as a question of normative authority, which does not fall prey to logocentrism. Through an exposition of the dialectic of the finite and the infinite in Hegel’s Science of Logic , I argue that true infinity is not an ontological category that eliminates division, but rather refers to the metalogical standpoint involved in a philosophical account of determinacy. Although fully achieved at the end of the Logic , the metalogical standpoint that Hegel elaborates in the Seinslogik under the banner of the true infinite already clarifies that determinacy is a product of normative authority that is itself precarious. (shrink)

The absence of Islam from recent scholarship on Hegel's account of world religions is puzzling. In the first part of the article, we argue that Hegel's neglect of Islam in his systematic account of religious phenomena is not accidental and that he did not think of Islam as a determinate religion. Its size and believers aside, we suggest that it is not possible to assign any determinacy to Islam as a world-historical phenomenon under Hegel's rubric, because such determinacy that applies (...) to other religions would be in conflict with what Hegel takes to be Islam's emphasis on the negative moment of truth, its revolutionary tendencies, and its lack of any novel conceptual content as a response to Christianity. In the second part of the article, we point out how one could respond to Hegel's characterization of Islam when it is mentioned in relation to other religious traditions. First, we argue that Hegel overemphasizes the significance of Islam qua religion in explaining the history of Muslim peoples. More than that, Hegel does not see that the history of Islamic philosophy and science can be characterized by sublation and that it can be integrated into conceptual developments in the West on these terms. However, our critique of Hegel's Eurocentrism does not remain at this level, for in the third part of the article we argue for the significance of considering the response of Muslim philosophers to Hegel. In particular, we look at the responses by Mohammed al-Khosht and Mahmoud Haider, respectively. We conclude that Hegel's exclusion of Islam from any involvement in the history of the Concept indicates an undialectical commitment on his part and that to this extent being Hegelian today requires that we rectify this oversight. (shrink)

One of the reasons why there is no Hegelian school in contemporary ethics in the way that there are Kantian, Humean and Aristotelian schools is because Hegelians have been unable to clearly articulate the Hegelian alternative to those schools’ moral psychologies, i.e., to present a Hegelian model of the motivation to, perception of, and responsibility for moral action. Here it is argued that in its most basic terms Hegel's model can be understood as follows: the agent acts in a responsible (...) and thus paradigmatic sense when she identifies as reasons those motivations which are grounded in his or her talents and support actions that are likely to develop those talents in ways suggested by his or her interests. (shrink)

This article attempts two things. First, it aims to reassess the literary criticism that Georg Lukács produced in the 1930s while he was living in the Soviet Union in light of his earlier, and much-esteemed, The theory of the novel. Second, in order to carry out this reassessment, it examines the place of Hegelian aesthetics in Lukács’s theorization of realism in the 1930s criticism, in relation both to contemporary Soviet writings on the subject and to his own earlier, ostensibly Hegelian (...) work. I argue that, at least in terms of the place of art in the historical dialectic, the later work is more consistent with Hegelian philosophy than The theory of the novel. (shrink)

I seek to interpret the work of Walter Benjamin in light of the "system programme" of German Idealism, in order to confront an antinomy of contemporary radical thought. Benjamin has been regarded as an anti-Hegelian thinker of the exception. Reading him against the grain, I draw out a concept of counter-tradition that eschews the opposition of intra-historical progress and extra-historical exception. The philological inspiration is a book by Franz Joseph Molitor, student of Schelling and "teacher" of Benjamin: The Philosophy of (...) History, or, On Tradition. (shrink)

Hegel is one of the few philosophers to devote systematic attention to phenomena that can be called pathologies of juridicism. Hegel claims that the law fundamentally contaminates the way in which we relate to ourselves, to others and to the world so that our (inter-) subjectivity becomes ethically deformed, distorted, or deficient. I outline this notion and reconstruct its development in the work of the young Hegel. I reconstruct Hegel’s critique of juridical forms of normativity as developed in his Spirit (...) of Christianity with reference to the example of Judaism and sketch his idea of a non-juridical intersubjectivity. I will make apparent the considerable problems lurking in Hegel’s account of love, which turns out to be a form of social integration potentially just as violent as the law. I argue that Hegel himself became aware of this problem and modified his original model by assigning to both love and law a legitimate place within an overarching system of Sittlichkeit, as I demonstrate with reference to Hegel’s Jena article ‘Natural Law ’. In the end I briefly explain why I still find this strategy unsatisfactory. (shrink)

The growing field of Lenin Studies has been nurtured by the growth of crises and struggles in our own time and may contribute to present-day activists’ efforts at developing revolutionary strategy, organisation and struggle. Surveying this field, it is worth focusing on three recent studies by Antonio Negri, Tamás Krausz and Alan Shandro which give attention to the methodological core of what can be called ‘Leninism’. All three distinguish Lenin’s approach to Marxism from that of such prominent Marxists as Kautsky. (...) The result, highlighted by aspects of Lenin’s functioning in the early Communist International, provides a more consistent activist- and revolutionary edge that might have relevance for future struggles, particularly in relation to the question of organisation. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 3, Page 943-960, September 2022.

The paper reconstructs Hegel’s account of shame as a fundamental affect. Qua spiritual, the human individual strives for self-determination; hence she is ashamed of the fact that, q...

Marx's comments on Hegel's philosophy have left an ambiguous legacy for Marxism. One pervasive theme, though, is the interpretation of Hegel's idealist philosophy as being shrouded in mysticism. Marx's main contribution, according to this view, was to demystify Hegel's thought through a more materialist dialectical approach. At the same time, however, there have been those who have sought to rupture this Hegel-Marx connection and purge Hegelianism from Marxism altogether. Appropriate and expunge have therefore been the two main responses to Hegel's (...) influence on Marxism. I will argue against these traditions, however, to assert a more direct relationship between Hegel's and Marx's dialectic. To do so, I want to identify some of the main Marxist thinkers that can be linked with the two main schools above. I will term these the Hegelian-Marxist Materialist Appropriators and the Idealist Expungers. In contrast I put forward the Hegelian-Marxist Materialist school which states that ultimately the dialectic of Hegel is the dialectic of Marx. Before this, I begin by considering some examples of Marx's critique of Hegel. The leitmotif of this critique is a depiction of Hegel's dialectic as mystical or idealistic in contrast to Marx's more materialist dialectic. As we shall see, such a criticism was begun by Marx, perpetuated by Engels as ‘orthodox’ Marxism and ultimately accepted even by those who sought to place themselves within an Hegelian-Marxist tradition. (shrink)

Owing to various reasons, Stalinism still represents, according to this essay, a fertile intellectual topic. Therefore, my aim here is to offer a reading of Pavel Campeanu’s works on Stalinism – a relatively unknown Romanian Marxist – through the social history of the Soviet Union in general and of Stalinism in particular advanced by Moshe Lewin. The argumentation advances by taking into account the overall historical frame of the debate (Eastern and Western Marxism during the Cold War) and by stressing (...) some key issues like primitive accumulation, legitimacy, a certain overstretching of the concept of Stalinism and, finally, the issue of totalitarianism. The stake of the essay resides in claiming that Campeanu’s analyses of Stalinism, original and convincing as they are, may favor, in the above-mentioned issues, and regardless the author’s intentions, interpretations belonging to or deriving from the totalitarian school of Cold War and Soviet Studies. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhile Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase ‘second nature’ in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures ‘natural consciousness’, ‘natural notion’, and ‘inorganic nature’, in order to (...) elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the ‘official’ version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an ‘unofficial’ version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a ‘second nature’. (shrink)

I am much indebted to Jacob McNulty, Allegra de Laurentiis and Tony Smith for their generous attention to my book and their insightful remarks. Since I could not possibly do justice to all their concerns, I have unfortunately had to be selective. The issues discussed in this response are organized thematically. In the first section, I discuss why Hegel's logic of essence has to be understood historically; which is to say that the logic of essence provides an ontology that is (...) specific to capitalism. Then, in the second section, I discuss the nature of holism in the logic of essence, and correspondingly, the nature of social holism specific to capitalism. Finally, in the third section, I answer the question: if both Marx's critique of political economy and Hegel's own economic theory in the Philosophy of Right are based on the same logic of essence, why they are so divergent from, and indeed incompatible with, each other. (shrink)

This article explores Axel Honneth’s attempts to reconnect the struggles of workers with the normative content of modernity through Hegel’s intersubjective account of recognition. The importance of Honneth’s writings lies in his attempt to extend Habermas’ account of normative self-constitution to labor via the morally motivated struggles of workers to correct the modern maldistribution of social worth. To this extent, the expansion of ethical life is predicated on the struggles of excluded participants to gain inclusion within the normative content of (...) modernity. From this perspective Habermas’ attempt to legitimate the exclusion of labor (by the system) from the normative content of modernity appears unjust and unjustified. Unfortunately, Honneth shares with Habermas a tendency to locate the economic system beyond the (culturally defined) limits of ethical life. He thereby fails to acknowledge the extent to which workers play a major role in re-moralizing the former via the de-reification of the latter. (shrink)

I argue that the reception of Hegel in the sub-field of history and philosophy of science has been in part impeded by a misunderstanding of his mature metaphilosophical views. I take Alan Richardson’s influential account of the rise of scientific philosophy as an illustration of such misunderstanding, I argue that the mature Hegel’s metaphilosophical views place him much closer to the philosophers who are commonly taken as paradigms of scientific philosophy than it is commonly thought. Hegel is commonly presented as (...) someone who conceived of philosophy as a science that relied on the solitary genius of the individual thinker, and as a science whose propositions could not and should not be made accessible to “the common people”. Against this view, I argue that Hegel in fact thought that philosophy was a thoroughly anti-individualistic activity, and that he emphasized the importance of the intersubjective accessibility of philosophical discourse. I argue that when we carefully reconstruct Hegel’s reasons for his break with Schelling, and if we pay close attention to his explicit metaphilosophical pronouncements, we can see that he in fact adhered to what I call a “proto-modernist” conception of philosophy as a science. I conclude by pointing out how the mischaracterization of Hegel has served to obscure the existence of a strand of scientific philosophy that emerged by way of an immanent critique of Hegel, namely Marxist philosophy. (shrink)

Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes und seine Wissenschaft der Logik sowie Marx Kapital sind, so wird im ersten Teil gezeigt, jeweils Ausdruck einer Verlegenheit. Alle drei stehen nämlich vor der Herausforderung, in Geist, Logik und Kapital letztlich eine Methode darstellen zu müssen, und sie müssen darüber auch noch die Möglichkeit der Darstellung ebendieser Methode einholen und begründen. Diese Übereinkunft zwischen der Methode der Darstellung mit dem Methodischen aufseiten des dargestellten Geistes, der Logik und des Kapitals gelingt, so die These des zweiten (...) Teils, durch die Technik des Maßes. Maß und Messung konstituieren bereits in der Naturwissenschaft Objektivität im neuzeitlichen Sinne: Gehalten an und gebrochen durch ihre eigenen Maß, werden die Verhältnisse der Natur durch die ermittelten Werte wie ein selbständiger Gegenstand objektiv bestimmbar und im Wissen subjektiv aufgehoben. Dagegen zeigen Geist, Logik und Kapital jeweils, dass die Technik des Maßes nicht nur Objektivität im neuzeitlichen Sinne konstituiert, sondern die gesamte neuzeitliche Form der Gegenständlichkeit von Objektivität und Subjektivität, Bewusstsein und Gegenstand. In Hegels Phänomenologie und seiner Logik sowie in Marx Kapital eröffnet das Maß diese Gegenständlichkeit, indem jeweils eine Objektivität konstituiert wird, die einem Subjekt buchstäblich zu denken gegeben wird. Es ist allerdings unmittelbar die Objektivität der Subjektivität selbst, die jeweils gegeben wird: phänomenologisch wird durch das Maß die Objektivität der Subjektivität des Geistes gegeben, rein logisch wird die Objektivität des Seins durch die Subjektivität des Begriffs gegeben, und der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft ist durch quantitative Werte die eigene Objektivität gegeben, und zwar gegeben durch ein Geld, das dadurch zu einer überindividuellen, automatischen Subjektivität wird. Für das Maß steht in der Phänomenologie das Selbstbewusstsein, in der Logik der Begriff des Seins und im Kapital das Geld. Die Technik dieses Maßes erschließt sich jeweils bereits durch die Art und Weise, wie überhaupt ein Maß gegeben wird im starken Sinne einer ursprünglichen, anonymen und einseitigen Gabe, und diese geben eines Maßes in allen drei Werken der Einstieg in die Entwicklung des Geistes, der Logik und des Kapitals. (shrink)