Syntactic approaches in the philosophy of science, which are based on formalizations in predicate logic, are often considered in principle inferior to semantic approaches, which are based on formalizations with the help of structures. To compare the two kinds of approach, I identify some ambiguities in common semantic accounts and explicate the concept of a structure in a way that avoids hidden references to a specific vocabulary. From there, I argue that contrary to common opinion (i) unintended models do not (...) pose a significant problem for syntactic approaches to scientific theories, (ii) syntactic approaches can be at least as language-independent as semantic ones, and (iii) in syntactic approaches, scientific theories can be as well connected to the world as in semantic ones. Based on these results, I argue that syntactic and semantic approaches fare equally well when it comes to (iv) ease of application, (v) accommodating the use of models in the sciences, and (vi) capturing the theory-observation relation. (shrink)

Carnap and Goodman developed methods of conceptual re-engineering known respectively as explication and reflective equilibrium. These methods aim at advancing theories by developing concepts that are simultaneously guided by pre-existing concepts and intended to replace these concepts. This paper shows that Carnap’s and Goodman’s methods are historically closely related, analyses their structural interconnections, and argues that there is great systematic potential in interpreting them as aspects of one method, which ultimately must be conceived as a component of theory development. The (...) main results are: an adequate method of conceptual re-engineering must focus not on individual concepts but on systems of concepts and theories; the linear structure of Carnapian explication must be replaced by a process of mutual adjustments as described by Goodman; Carnap’s condition of similarity can be analysed into two components, one securing a relation to the specific extensions of the pre-existing concepts, one regulating the transition to the new system of concepts; these two criteria of adequacy can be built into Goodman’s account of reflective equilibrium to ensure that the resulting concepts promote theoretical virtues while being sufficiently similar to the concepts we started out with. (shrink)

Carnap suggests that philosophy can be construed as being engaged solely in conceptual engineering. I argue that since many results of the sciences can be construed as stemming from conceptual engineering as well, Carnap’s account of philosophy can be methodologically naturalistic. This is also how he conceived of his account. That the sciences can be construed as relying heavily on conceptual engineering is supported by empirical investigations into scientific methodology, but also by a number of conceptual considerations. I present a (...) new conceptual consideration that generalizes Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for analytic–synthetic distinctions and thus widens the realm in which conceptual engineering can be used to choose analytic sentences. I apply these generalized conditions of adequacy to a recent analysis of scientific theories and defend the relevance of the analytic–synthetic distinction against criticisms by Quine, Demopoulos, and Papineau. (shrink)

La raccolta di dati nella nostra era dell’”Information Technology” ha generato una rivoluzione nella conoscenza. Nell’era dei “big data”, la conseguente crescita senza precedenti dei dati, ha reso necessari cambiamenti nella scala, nella natura e nello stato dei dati, portando quindi i ricercatori ad adottare nuovi paradigmi e metodologie nella ricerca filosofica. In particolare, l’attenzione teorica della filosofia del linguaggio si è spostata verso la conoscenza cognitiva, con un’enfasi sulla proposizione particolare del “data turn” nella cognizione cognitiva nell’era dei “big (...) data”. Il paper esplora la potenziale portata della ricerca quantitativa del “data turn” nella filosofia del linguaggio, tramite l’analisi della necessità di trasformare i paradigmi della ricerca qualitativa e quantitativa, ricostruendo l’approccio quantitativo della filosofia del linguaggio ed ampliando l’analisi delle relazioni uomo-dati nella filosofia dei “big data”. Il paper conclude affermando che sono necessarie ulteriori ricerche per esaminare in modo ancor più approfondito la relazione tra linguaggio, dati e filosofia. (shrink)

This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific (...) status of intelligent design, and further discuss confirmation, reduction, and concept formation. (shrink)

In the last decades, scientific laws and concepts have been increasingly conceptualized as a patchwork of contextual and indeterminate entities. These patchwork constructions are sometimes claimed to be incompatible with traditional views of scientific theories and concepts, but it is difficult to assess such claims due to the informal character of these approaches. In this paper, we will show that patchwork approaches pose a new problem of theoretical terms. Specifically, we will demonstrate how a toy example of a patchwork structure (...) might trivialize Carnap’s semantics for theoretical terms based upon epsilon calculus. However, as we will see, this new problem of theoretical terms can be given a neo-Carnapian solution, by generalizing Carnap’s account of theoretical terms in such a way that it applies also to patchwork constructions. Our neo-Carnapian approach to theoretical terms will also demonstrate that the analytic/synthetic distinction is meaningful even for patchwork structures. (shrink)