La formulación tradicional de los derechos humanos se basa en la libertad y la igualdad, pero Emmanuel Lévinas hace de la diferencia absoluta la fuente y el fundamento de tales derechos. Los Derechos Humanos aparecen entonces como los derechos del Otro y extienden el alcance de la responsabilidad hasta comprometer la propia libertad. La primera parte de este trabajo muestra cómo la preocupación por los derechos humanos fue una constante en la existencia y el pensamiento de Lévinas. La segunda parte (...) está dedicada a exponer la fundamentación levinasiana de los derechos humanos con base en la illeidad. (shrink)

Because our actions change, our responsibility is modified; because our responsibility is modified, we need to question the ethics of the action. Our action is situated right there between announcing a diagnosis, the theoretical and practical result of identification, the determining and naming of a fact and voicing the disease which is a human action where medical and technical expertise comes up against a life and its story. Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Gehrig’s disease, is a degenerative disease of (...) the motor neurons leading to paralysis. In the absence of any curative treatment, the natural course always results in death. Since 1989, progress in the management of this disease in France has been exponential, resulting in the creation of 17 expert centres throughout the country in 2003. Guidelines have been drawn up through consensus conferences and coordination meetings. For the delicate stage of the announcement, three requirements have been adopted: the quality of receptiveness of the medical practitioner and his team, their ability to listen and to adapt to the particularities of the patient in their care; their commitment with regard to legal obligations as to how and to whom to transmit information; and the need for a multidisciplined approach to be able to rapidly support the patient and his family. Questioning in the field of applied ethics has led us to examine whether having a benevolent and non-harmful attitude towards these patients, respecting their autonomy and legal rights are parameters required in this specialized practice. Through a transversal thematic analysis of the experiences of the medical practitioners at the Centres, we would like to explore a hypothesis of the remarkable epistemological progression of the neurologist in this form of care in the pure Hippocratic tradition. Through the compassionate experience of the other by these committed doctors and their teams, we will try to outline the view of anthropological phenomenology with regard to the ALS patient, their awareness of the future paralysis of the body that is being announced, their awareness of the temporality and will characteristic of the ALS patient and of his finality that they will be accompanying. (shrink)

This work tries to show that the metapoetic meditation developed by Ramos Rosa throughout his very extensive poetic work not only did not condemn his poetry to a cold cloister in the textual plane, but also contributed decisively to the opening to the real, to the effect of evidence and to the sense of communion that would become increasingly sensitive in his writing. To this end, we propose to clarify the thread that, under the aegis of the poetic lucidity consecrated (...) by the author, leads us from his metapoetic meditation to a poetic meditation of an ontophenomenological and sapiential nature, that is, from his metapoetry to a poetry whose wisdom provides a set of intuitions with a sapiential and philosophical accent. It is our intention to contribute, in this way, to the understanding of the (cognitive and ontological) demand and scope of Rosa’s poetic path, as well as, collaterally, to the debate around topics such as poetic (self-)reference, the ontological status of the poetic text or the philosophy-literature relationship. (shrink)

The release of Emmanuel Levinas’s Prison Notebooks (Carnets de captivité) as a part of the first tome of his collected works has further illuminated the extent of the philosopher’s preoccupation with art, especially literature. Levinas’s own literary efforts have been well documented, but less attention has been paid to the relationship between the Prison Notebooks and Levinas’s early philosophy of art. In this article, I suggest that much of what Levinas has to say apropos art in his early philosophy can (...) be traced back to meditations undertaken in captivity. I will unearth the influence of the Prison Notebooks in three articles from the 1940ʹs “L’autre dans Proust,” “La réalité et son ombre,” and “La transcendance des mots.” I argue that in Levinas’s early philosophy of art follows two distinct “paths”: the path of eros and the path of sensation. On one hand, Levinas questions how and if literature can do justice to the question of alterity, whereas on the other he seeks to make sense of the relationship between art and sensibility. I argue that in his notebooks Levinas offers an account of the meaning of sensations that forms the basis of his early aesthetics. Thus, the study of the Prison Notebooks is important as it allows us to see how Levinas’s early philosophy of art, including his seminal “La réalité et son ombre,” functions as a continuation of a philosophical project already begun during his time in captivity. (shrink)

Levinas est traditionnellement perçu comme une voix critique à propos de la pensée de la totalité de Hegel et, ainsi, comme un philosophe qui cherche à dénoncer la négation de toute différence dans la pensée de l’identité, que ce soit dans l’unité de la vie, de l’esprit, du savoir ou du concept. Or, le paradoxe de Levinas est de critiquer Hegel tout en réinterprétant et en s’appropriant certains de ses concepts fondamentaux. Plus particulièrement, c'est le cas avec la radicalisation de (...) la puissance du négatif. Il s’agit donc de s’interroger sur l’effort de Levinas pour développer une forme intrinsèque à la dialectique hégélienne que Hegel aurait entrevue sans développer dans sa philosophie, encore trop enracinée dans une métaphysique que Levinas tente de quitter. Ce faisant, il s’agit d’éclaircir si l’on peut même parler d’une dialectique négative lévinassienne. (shrink)

The recent liberation of phenomenology’s “metaphysical” word seems to us to present a twofold risk: on the one hand, that of leading us to lose in intension what they will have made us gain in extension - what exactly does the term “metaphysical” mean here, and can we even hope to provide an exact definition? On the other hand, it would convert our former reservations, which may indeed have been excessive, into a temerity that would ultimately be no less so. (...) The aim we have set ourselves here must therefore be modest: to attempt to avert this twofold risk by first equipping ourselves with a clear and unambiguous concept of what is or could legitimately be understood by the term “phenomenological metaphysics; to show then how and why phenomenology, rightly or wrongly, but without really realizing what was preventing it from doing so, has never really managed to do so; to indicate finally the question that a “phenomenological metaphysics” conforming to its concept would have to ask, and to which it would have to commit itself to answer. (shrink)

No núcleo da leitura efetuada por Emmanuel Lévinas do projeto de uma "ontologia fundamental", concretizado por Martin Heidegger em Ser e Tempo , encontramos uma severa crítica à noção de "compreensão do ser". Lévinas não considera essa expressão senão o solo de uma filosofia sobremaneira incapaz de dimensionar a questão do outro. O objetivo deste artigo é, com base em reflexões de Heidegger acerca da expressão "sentido do ser" - reunidas em diversas passagens de seus Contributos à filosofia -, analisar (...) a pertinência e os limites dessa crítica levinasiana, estabelecendo, com isso, alguns elementos sobre o quais se pode fundar um debate, que historicamente nunca existiu, entre Lévinas e o segundo Heidegger.The most important aspect of the reception of Martin Heidegger's project of a "fundamental ontology", which can be found in Being and Time , by Emmanuel Lévinas lays in the critique of the concept of "comprehension of being". This expression is for Lévinas nothing else but a cornerstone of a philosophy which cannot deal adequately with the question of the other. The aim of this article is to estimate properly the relevance as well as the limits this critique by the means of the interpretation of some passages of Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy which handle with the concept of "comprehension of being" By showing this we hope to identify elements which could consolidate a philosophical debate - which historically never took place - between Lévinas and the later Heidegger. (shrink)

In marked contrast to Husserlian “unities of sense” that structure consciousness around _egoic_ ideal-meaning intention, contemporary phenomenology orders sense according to an excess of givenness – a surfeit of presence – that surpasses this intentional relation. But Emmanuel Falque argues that there is a resistance that _precedes_ the phenomenological order of givenness and sense. Before the saturated phenomena (Marion), the _pathos_ of the flesh (Henry), and the irruption of the Other (Levinas), there is a resistance of presence that is not (...) _sensu stricto_ given at all. Falque turns to the early writings of Emmanuel Levinas on trauma and insomnia and the hum and buzz of the _il y a_ (the “there is …”) that precedes the order of givenness and sense, including the Levinasian Other, in order to make sense of this _a priori_ resistance. There is a presence of the body, experienced in some sense via trauma, insomnia, and Falque’s own notion of the “spread body” that is not given yet constitutes an integral part of embodied experience. The way Falque engages with these bodily experiences reformulates the phenomenological limit, not in terms of excess and givenness, but in terms of resistance and the “extra-phenomenon.” Phenomenological engagement with resistance thus becomes a wager on meaning and sense, the outcome of which cannot be known in advance, that is, cannot be always and already ordered to phenomenological givenness. (shrink)

According to ‘global institutionalism,’ individuals who do not share a state have duties of justice to one another, and this is explained, in part, by the institutional connections that obtain between them. In this chapter, I defend this view against two challenges. First, I consider challenges raised by ‘non-institutionalists,’ who deny that facts about global institutional interaction bear on the nature of duties of justice that arise between particular individuals. Second, I address challenges posed by ‘domestic institutionalists,’ who accept the (...) claim that facts about institutional interaction bear upon the scope of justice but deny that the right sort of interaction necessary to ground duties of justice is found in the global domain. (shrink)

The question of the relationship between time and literature has long been the subject of discussions by various thinkers and philosophers. One of the contemporary writers whose works manifestly presents such as the French writer and thinker, Maurice Blanchot. The purpose of the present paper is to examine this relationship in Blanchot's works. A careful study of his fiction reveals the evolution that took place, in the first place, in his understanding of the question of time, and secondly in his (...) continual attempt to challenge the views of other thinkers on the same subject, an attempt which has seemingly led Blanchot to a new formulation of the concept of time. An elaboration on this requires tracing the idea back to the definitions and discussions found among his endless dialogues with the other contemporary writers and thinkers (especially with his famous friend Emmanuel Levinas). (shrink)

This article examines in what way and to what extent phenomenological philosophy has given rise to a new understanding of the modern novel and to a transformation of its narrative techniques. The starting point for this examination is the claim, made by Merleau-Ponty in “Metaphysics and the Novel”, according to which, in phenomenological philosophy, the task of philosophy is inextricably bound to that of literature. I examine this claim in two ways. First, I situate it historically with regard to the (...) modern novel’s characteristic realism. Then, I show how the phenomenological attitude – formulated by Husserl as a methodological device in distinction with the natural attitude – transforms the novel’s narrative technics. Sartre’s first novel, La Nausée, constitutes an exemplary case to assess this transformation. Combining these two ways, I argue that the claim made by Merleau-Ponty is paradoxical: on the one hand, the intrinsic connection between phenomenological philosophy and literature promotes the cognitive value of the modern novel, but on the other hand, it breaks with the conventions of the novel form and initiates a fragmented writing. (shrink)

The work is the presentation of a logical theory - Logic in Reality (LIR) - and of applications of that theory in natural science and philosophy, including ...

This article examines the concept of dialogue in the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, with a focus on the context of education. Its aim is to create a conversation between the Lévinasian theory and the theories of other philosophers, especially Martin Buber, in an effort to highlight the ethical significance that Lévinas assigns to the act of dialogue itself. As a philosopher whose essential interest was trained on the infinite ethical responsibility of the human subject, Lévinas places major emphasis on the (...) ethical meaning of dialogue. On a more fundamental level, he considers the ethics that precede dialogue and enable it to exist, as well as the individual's acceptance of responsibility during dialogue stemming from his recognition of the alterity of the Other. (shrink)

Dialogo filosofijos mąstytojų Rosenzweig‘o ir Levino darbų esmė – mirties bedugnės ir asmens tapatumo santykis. Rosenzweig‘as niekį laiko galutiniu kantiškojo mąstymo tašku. Mirtis, kaip egzistencinis niekio patyrimas, buvo laikoma kiekvieno žmogaus realybe sudėtingu amžių sandūros laikotarpiu. Rosenzweig‘ui niekis buvo atspirties taškas, permąstant ir siekiant išsaugoti asmens tapatumą. Asmens tapatumas apsaugo nuo niekio, tačiau jis taip pat yra atviras pokyčiams. Savo ankstyvuosiuose tekstuose Levinas daro panašias prielaidas, laikydamas Buvimą asmens tapatumo pradžia. Levinas plėtojo dialektinę fenomenologiją pradėdamas nuo mirties. Asmens tapatumas traktuojamas (...) kaip hipostazė, tačiau Levino darbe „Totalité et Infini“ įvyksta svarbus lūžis – jame asmens tapatumo šaltiniu laikomas troškimas. Buvimas tampa dėmesio centru kaip antroji elementale pusė, o asmens tapatumas suvokiamas kaip atsiskyrimas. (shrink)

The article focuses on justifying the relevance of a phenomenological approach to the study of dreams, as well as outlining directions for such research. The author views the experience gained by a person in a dream as something that can be brought into existentia.The article illustrates that although dreams cannot be the object of reflection in real time, they become a moment of consciousness when (and if) they remain in memory. Visually or emotionally vivid dreams can remain in a person’s (...) memory on par with memories of real events. At the same time, a clear distinction is maintained between events from the dream and those that occurred in reality.The author interprets dreams as a component of individual experience and at the same time as an element of the intersubjective world. The intersubjectivity of the dream experience is determined by the universality of certain psychological experiences and bodily experiences associated with sleep and dreaming, as well as by the universality of certain motifs that occur in dreams. The work analyzes the categories of “I”, “Other”, and “Stranger” in the context of dream research. The author concludes that dreams, as a component of experience and an element of the intersubjective world, can serve as a point of intersection of experiences. Thus, through dreams, the I opens up to the Other, resulting in the emergence of new meanings. Dreams are interpreted as a situation where the I discovers the Other and the Stranger within itself. After all, by receiving the text of a dream, the I thereby receives the result of its own unconscious creativity. The author illustrates this process through the metaphor of a message in a bottle that is washed ashore on the island of consciousness by the waves of the eternal tide of the unconscious. The author explores states of consciousness that are somehow related to sleep, namely drowsiness, fantasy, and insomnia. Thus, drowsiness is considered as a borderline state between sleep and wakefulness, fantasy — as a likeness of a dream in reality, and insomnia — as a sharp desire to temporarily free oneself from the burden of existentia. (shrink)

This contribution shows how the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has been confronted autobiographically with National-Socialism (1933-1945) and how his personal experience and the experience of the Jewish people under Hitlerism were translated in his philosophical understanding of ‘being’ as ‘il y a’ (in English: ‘there is’). The Holocaust provides a unique negative point of entry to understand Levinas’ ontological category which is as such not understandable since in the il y a, there is no longer a subject that stands before (...) the objectivity of reality. On the contrary, the il y a is exactly the category that expresses a situation where the subject itself has no longer the ‘right’ to exist as such but still does not stop to exist. This violence of being is exactly what Hitlerism wanted to do in creating the Holocaust and submitting the Jewish people to it. This makes understandable how the whole philosophy of Levinas is an effort to overcome the il y a through a moral answer to the Holocaust. (shrink)

This essay develops an approach to a phenomenology of shame by taking recourse to different notions of shame found in various humanistic disciplines and in the history of phenomenology. The first part of this paper analyzes some of the central ideas on the nature of shame to be found in cultural anthropology, pedagogy, history and psychoanalysis. The second part discusses the phenomenological theories of shame proposed by Sartre and Levinas. Since their approaches are opposite to each other in crucial respects, (...) the third part of this paper returns to the analyses of shame undertaken in the first part in order to resolve this apparent conflict and advance a coherent theory of shame. The essay’s final thesis is that shame is neither fundamentally destructive nor fundamentally constructive but that it can assume both guises. While it can threaten the subject up to the point of destruction triggering it in aggressive defensive mechanisms, it can also contribute to the development of the subject into a fully free individual capable of acknowledging and answering to others. (shrink)

Identity as traditionally conceived in mainstream Western thought is focused on theory, representation, knowledge, subjectivity and is centrally important in the works of Emmanuel Levinas. His critique of Western culture and corresponding notion of identity at its foundations typically raises the question of the other. Alterity in Levinas indicates existence of something on its own account, in itself independently of the subject’s will or consciousness. The objectivity of alterity tells of the impossible evasion of signs from their destiny, which is (...) the other. The implications involved in reading the signs of the other have contributed to reorienting semiotics in the direction of semioethics. In Levinas, the I-other relation is not reducible to abstract cognitive terms, to intellectual synthesis, to the subject-object relation, but rather tells of involvement among singularities whose distinctive feature is alterity, absolute alterity. Humanism of the other is a pivotal concept in Levinas overturning the sense of Western reason. It asserts human duties over human rights. Humanism of alterity privileges encounter with the other, responsibility for the other, over tendencies of the centripetal and egocentric orders that instead exclude the other. Responsibility allows for neither rest nor peace. The “properly human” is given in the capacity for absolute otherness, unlimited responsibility, dialogical intercorporeity among differences non-indifferent to each other, it tells of the condition of vulnerability before the other, exposition to the other. The State and its laws limit responsibility for the other. Levinas signals an essential contradiction between the primordial ethical orientation and the legal order. Justice involves comparing incomparables, comparison among singularities outside identity. Consequently, justice places limitations on responsibility, on unlimited responsibility which at the same time it presupposes as its very condition of possibility. The present essay is structured around the following themes: Premiss; Justice, uniqueness, and love; Sign and language; Dialogue and alterity; Semiotic materiality; Globalization and the trap of identity; Human rights and rights of the other: for a new humanism; Ethics; The World; Outside the subject; Responsibility and Substitution; The face; Fear of the other; Alterity and justice; Justice and proximity; Literary writing; Unjust justice; Caring for the other. (shrink)

The article introduces some aspects of Levinas's writings which are important to review his reception within feminist circles. It then analyses his text `And God Created Woman', and shows to what extent his view of women can be criticized as being traditional and patriarchal. Finally, it deals with the relation between Levinas and feminism of difference, and rejects the idea that his theory can be effectively applied to move beyond the debate equality vs difference.