In this paper, we argue that the comparator model is not a satisfactory model of sense of agency (SoA). We present a theoretical argument and experimental studies. We show (1) most studies of SoA neglect a distinction between SoA associated with movements (narrow SoA) and SoA associated with environmental events (broad SoA); (2) the comparator model emerges from experimental studies of sensory consequences narrowly associated with movements; (3) narrow SoA can be explained by a comparator model, but a motor signal (...) model is simpler and explain narrow SoA equally well; and (4) standard experimental paradigms study only broad SoA. Finally, we present results from two experiments, where we have failed to induce illusory narrow SoA in healthy participants. We believe our experimental approaches should have led to illusory SoA, if the comparator model of SoA was correct. The results challenge proponents of the comparator model of narrow SoA. (shrink)

We linked between the social-psychology and experimental-philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) what intuitions do people have about free-will and determinism? (2) do free will beliefs predict differences in free-will and determinism intuitions? and (3) is there more to free-will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did (...) so with certainty. Examining intuitions of prosociality, future-orientation, learning, meaningfulness, human uniqueness, and well-being, ratings were highest in the indeterministic universe condition and lowest in the deterministic universe condition, both significantly different from the uncertain universe condition. Participants’ free will beliefs had only weak impact on realism, happiness, and learning intuitions, but did not reverse the general intuition favoring indeterminism, and showed no impact on other intuitions. (shrink)

Free will has been the object of debate in the context of addiction given that addiction could compromise an individual’s ability to choose freely between alternative courses of action. Proponents of the brain-disease model of addiction have argued that a neuroscience perspective on addiction reduces the attribution of free will because it relocates the cause of the disorder to the brain rather than to the person, thereby diminishing the blame attributed to the person with an addiction. Others have worried that (...) such displacement of free will attribution would make the person with a drug addiction less responsible. Using the paradigmatic literature on the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations, we tested whether neuroscience information diminishes attributions of free will in the context of addiction and whether respondent characteristics influence these attributions and modulate the effect of neuroscience information. We performed a large-scale, web-based experiment with 2,378 German participants to explore how attributions of free will in the context of addiction to either alcohol or cocaine are affected by: (1) a text with a neurobiological explanation of addiction, (2) a neuroimage showing effects of addiction on the brain, and (3) a combination of a text and a neuroimage, in comparison to a control group that received no information. Belief in free will was measured using the FAD-Plus scale and was, subsequent to factor analysis, separated into two factors: responsibility and volition. The investigated respondent characteristics included gender, age, education, self-reported knowledge of neuroscience, substance-use disorder (SUD), and having a friend with SUD. We found that attributions of volition (in the cocaine-subsample) were reduced in the text and neuroimage-treatment compared to the control group. However, respondent characteristics such as education and self-reported knowledge of neuroscience were associated with lower attributions of responsibility for both substances, and education was associated with lower attribution of volition for the alcohol sub-sample. Interaction analyses showed that knowledge of neuroscience was found to generally decrease attribution of responsibility. Further research on attribution of free will should consider the effects of context and respondent characteristics, which appeared surprisingly larger than those induced by experimental treatments. (shrink)

Research in neurocriminology has explored the link between neural functions and structures and the psychopathic disposition. This online experiment aimed to assess the effect of communicating the neuroscience of psychopathy on the degree to which lay people exhibited attitudes characteristic of psychopathy in particular in terms of moral behaviour. If psychopathy is blamed on the brain, people may feel less morally responsible for their own psychopathic tendencies. In the study, participants read false feedback about their own psychopathic traits supposedly inferred (...) from their Facebook likes, described either in neurobiological or cognitive terms. Participants were randomly allocated to read that they either had above-average or below-average psychopathic traits. We found no support for the hypothesis that the neuroscientific explanation of psychopathy influences moral behaviour. This casts doubt on the fear that communicating the neuroscience of psychopathy will promote psychopathic attitudes. (shrink)

There might be value in examining the phenomenon of free will, without attempting to solve the debate surrounding its existence. Studies have suggested that diminishing belief in free will increases cheating behavior and that basic physiological states such as appetite diminish free will. These findings, if robust, could have important philosophical and ethical implications. Accordingly, we aimed to critically review methodologies and results in the body of literature that speaks to the two following questions: whether certain factors can change belief (...) in free will or not and whether changes in belief in free will impact different attitudinal or behavioral factors or not. Searching the PubMed and PsycInfo databases with different keyword strategies supplemented with reference section searches, we found 52 relevant papers for review. For each distinct study, we extracted information regarding: sample characteristics and related analyses, procedures and methodology, factors investigated, results, and effect sizes. Overall, we found that the samples were heavily constituted of women, of students and younger participants, with little information about representation of ethnic minorities. Procedures and methodology relied strongly on the use of experimental manipulations and a wide array of scales, including scales created by researchers. Several studies suggest the static and consequential properties of belief in free will. However, these conclusions are restrained by numerous limitations of the supporting body of evidence and the absence of replication studies. (shrink)

Previous research associates free will skepticism with adverse well-being effects. However, it is doubtful that skeptical participants in these studies disbelieved in the incompatibilist notion of what it means to have free will. This is one of the first studies to exclusively examine such skeptics. A sample of 167 participants who claimed to believe that there is no free will responded to an online survey. After examining whether participants in fact disbelieved in the incompatibilist concept, they were asked to describe (...) how their skepticism is affecting their personal life and well-being. Reoccurring themes were identified through thematic analysis. Positive consequences were most commonly reported, including increased compassion for others and oneself, being less controlling and more relaxed, as well as having more control through environmental awareness. Other participants felt unaffected by their disbelief and most frequently mentioned the persisting feeling of having free will as a reason. The most common negative implications were to feel less effective as an agent and to miss a sense of purpose. These findings may shed new light on how to handle the issue of free will in the public sphere as well as inform future research investigating incompatibilist free will skepticism. (shrink)

The empirical investigation of free will beliefs is a fascinating and extensive field, offering potential insights into the extent and ramifications of free will beliefs, but this research is not without its limitations. Many competing definitions of free will exist. These competing definitions have informed the variety of free will manipulations and measures currently used, often without researchers properly addressing the important differences in the understandings of free will being operationalised, manipulated and measured. These manipulations and measures are also typically (...) broad ranging, also including statements targeting determinism, reductionism and other related constructs. They therefore lack the focus necessary to identify just what aspect of these supposed free will manipulations are actually impacting cognitions, beliefs, and behaviours. Across 7 studies we address some of these limitations. Study 1 confirms past findings demonstrating that perceptions of having choice and being free from constraints are central to lay understandings of free will. Study 1 also tests new single item measures of free will and determinism. In studies 2 and 3 we use our new measure of lay free will, to demonstrate that the previously established utility of free will beliefs for predicting subjective wellbeing, is due to the perceptions of having control that form the core of lay free will beliefs. We then reason that, as pro deterministic/anti free will messages can undermine free will beliefs these manipulations may also impact perceived control and subsequently indicators of subjective wellbeing. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrate that an abridged version of the Crick essay, can undermine perceived control. This suggests that past successful manipulations of behaviour via the Crick essay, may have been due, at least in part, to reductions in perceived control rather than just free will beliefs. The Crick essay is a broad ranging, poorly focused manipulation, simultaneously championing determinism while undermining the idea of free will. We therefore then endeavour to create two new, better focused, manipulations of free will/determinism, with reduced demand characteristics. In study 6 our TMS manipulation lead to a significant reduction between participants’ pre and post manipulation scores but this was also true for participants in the neutral condition. These complex findings are explored, suggesting that placing participants in an intimidating environment may undermine their perceptions of having free will. In study 7 our deterministic video manipulation successfully undermines free will belief but does not undermine perceived control or self-efficacy. These findings are explored further with participants’ agreement with the deterministic or non-deterministic video lecture, moderating the impact of condition on participants’ ratings of free will, self-efficacy and perceived control. When compared to non-determinism, high agreement with determinism was associated with lower perceived control and free will belief. By contrast low agreement with determinism was associated with higher perceived control self-efficacy and free will. In study 1 we created a new measure of cheating/dishonesty that can be used online. In study 7 we used this new measure of cheating and contrary to our predictions, exposure to a deterministic argument led to less cheating than exposure to a non-deterministic argument. In the general discussion the various strands of research are brought together and their contribution to the literature discussed. The limitations of our research are explored with new ideas proposed to address those limitations and further our work. Taken together, the research outlined in this thesis provides valuable new insight into the nature and implications of beliefs relating to free will and determinism, provides a valuable critique of research in this field and offers suggestions to improve and extend the current literature. (shrink)