This article selectively surveys recent work touching consciousness. It discusses some recent arguments and positions with a view to throwing light on a working principle of much influential philosophical psychology, namely that the first?person point of view is theoretically redundant. The discussion is divided under a number of headings corresponding to specific functions that have been attributed to the first?person viewpoint, from the experience of something it is like to undergo physical processes, to the presence of selfhood, mental substance, meaning, (...) understanding, and value. Arguments indicating limitations of the working principle are adduced, as well as arguments indicating possible exploitations of those limitations by first?personalist positions. Although some of the latter also have limitations, the direction in which the examination tends is that of a progressive widening of the concept of consciousness. (shrink)

A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.

Empirical methods of self-description, think aloud protocols and introspection have been extensively criticized or neglected in behaviorist and cognitivist psychology. Their methodological value has been fundamentally questioned since there apparently is no suficient proof for their validity. However, the major arguments against self-description can be critically reviewed by theoretical psychology. This way, these methods’ empirical value can be redeemed. Furthermore, self-descriptive methods can be updated by the use of contemporary media technology. In order to support the promising perspectives for future (...) empirical research in the field of cognitive psychology, Live Streaming is proposed as a viable data source. Introducing this new paradigm, this paper presents some of the formal constituents and accessible contents of Live Streaming, and relates them to established forms of empirical research. By its structure and established usage, Live Streaming bears remarkable resemblances to the traditional methods of self-description, yet it also adds fruitful new features of use. On the basis of its qualities, the possible benefits that appear to be feasible in comparison with the traditional methods of self-description are elaborated, such as Live Streaming’s ecological validity. Ultimately, controversial theoretical concepts, such as those in phenomenology and cultural-historical psychology, are adopted to sketch further potential benefits of the utility of Live Streaming in current psychology debates. (shrink)