Abstract Psychology's goal has been to become a science, taking the modern natural sciences as the model. It has not been understood that each science undergoes a transition from early disunification to later unification, that a fundmental dimension is involved that differentiates sciences. Psychology is a modern disunified science, distinguished by its chaotic knowledge and ways of operating. A philosophy of science based on modem unified science, as philosophies generally are, is inappropriate as a means of understanding psychology or of (...) guiding its development. We need a philosophy to describe the special problems of theory construction of modern disunified sciences, and to advance paths by which to work on those problems. Theory tasks to be undertaken in large quantities range from articles to reduce artificial diversity to the construction of grand unified theory. Psychology must begin those tasks, and it must understand its characteristics as a modern disunified science, if it is to make good decisions concerning its development and organization. Otherwise it will continue on its path towards fragmentation, an impenetrable obstacle to full development as a science and a profession. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to reconsider the relationship between marxism and existential-phenomenological sociology in light of margolis' (1978) recent articulation and systematic defense of what he terms nonreductive materialism--a material monist ontology which acknowledges an irreducible dualism of attributes. it is argued that reductive materialism is philosophically indefensible and that the most important reasons for thinking that marxism entails reductive materialism are mistaken.

Thomas Kuhn's thesis concerning the structure of scientific change was critically examined in relation to the historical problems of social science. The use and interpretation of Kuhn's ideas by psychologists was reviewed and found to center around the proliferation of theoretical views as paradigms, the viewing of theoretical differences as paradigm clashes, and efforts to affirm particular conceptions of psychology's past or future. Such use was seen as curbing discussion of fundamental issues, and to reflect a continuing neglect of the (...) foundational problems peculiar to social science. The relevance of Kuhn's work was seen to rest on a more critical view of his idea of “mature” science, better understanding of the type of social psychology upon which his thesis rests, and greater appreciation of his hermeneutic approach to social-historical analysis. (shrink)

In 2009 Alexandra Rutherford presented readers with a much-needed post-revisionist interpretation of the the behaviorist movement by elucidating the ways in which social context affected popular acceptance of, and resistance to, the central tenants of B.F. Skinner’s psychological theories. By outlining the ways in which American culture both facilitated and hindered behaviorism success, Rutherford's "Beyond the Box: B.F. Skinnner's technology of behavior from laboratory to life, 1950s-1970s" provides an alternative to strictly intellectual histories of behaviorism by examining how technological approaches (...) to behaviour were employed within a multitude of public forums, and emphasizing the importance of changing American attitudes towards technology, consumer culture and ethics. (shrink)

The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional systems is an exemplar (...) of the interpretive stance radical behaviorism requires; a corresponding interpretive position can be based initially on a radical behaviorist view of human behavior and its determinants. This "contextual stance" is ontologically and methodologically distinct from the intentional stance over the range of explanations for which scientific psychology, cognitive or behaviorist, is responsible. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century psychology became the study of "behavior." This article reviews developments within animal psychology, functional psychology, and American society and culture that help explain how a term rarely used in the first years of the century became not only an accepted scientific concept but even, for many, an all-encompassing label for the entire subject matter of the discipline. The subsequent conceptual and linguistic activity of John B. Watson, Edward C. Tolman, Clark L. Hull, and B.F. Skinner, (...) as they attempted to explain "behavior" throughout the course of the twentieth century, is then discussed. Finally, the article suggests the need for greater conceptual and linguistic diversity in psychology. In this last regard, reference is made to cognition and consciousness, to William James and John Dewey, and to the fact that prediction and control might not be the most relevant aims of contemporary psychology. (shrink)