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Descartes on Sensory Representation: A Study of the Dioptrics

Ann Wilbur MacKenzie

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (sup1):109-147 (1990)

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A teleological account of cartesian sensations?Raffaella De Rosa - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):311-336.details Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Color in a Material World: Margaret Cavendish against the Early Modern Mechanists.Colin Chamberlain - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):293-336.details Consider the distinctive qualitative property grass visually appears to have when it visually appears to be green. This property is an example of what I call sensuous color. Whereas early modern mechanists typically argue that bodies are not sensuously colored, Margaret Cavendish (1623–73) disagrees. In cases of veridical perception, she holds that grass is green in precisely the way it visually appears to be. In defense of her realist approach to sensuous colors, Cavendish argues that (i) it is impossible to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
Descartes’s Ontology of Sensation.Kurt Smith - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):563-584.details If we were to look caref ully at recent commentary on Descartes's theories of ideas and Sensation, we would find that a large number of commentators hold that he believes the following:.Ideas are representational,Sensations are ideas,Sensations are not representational.This is an inconsistent triad: any two of the above claims can be true together, but they cannot all be true together. The inconsistent triad can be avoided if we reject one of the claims. Some have argued that Descartes did not hold.1 (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Leibniz on Intellectual Pleasure, Perception of Perfection, and Power.Saja Parvizian - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):600-627.details Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Cartesian Imperativism.Joseph Gottlieb & Saja Parvizian - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):702-725.details We propose a novel reading of Descartes' views on the nature of pain, thirst, and hunger: imperativism. According to imperativism, rather than (exclusively) having intentional contents individuated by a set of correctness conditions specifying the way the world is, pain thirst, and hunger have contents individuated by satisfaction conditions, which specify the way the world ought to be. Unlike representationalist treatments, the imperativist reading satisfies the unique health-preserving role Descartes sets out for pain, thirst, and hunger, without inflating his austere (...) metaphysics of res extensa. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Making an Object of Yourself: Hume on the Intentionality of the Passions.Amy M. Schmitter - 2009 - In Jon Miller (ed.), Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind. Springer Verlag. pp. 223-40.details Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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