The rationale for the common rejection of classical societal functionalism is that it entails treating a society as an intelligent purposer, capable of directing its own internal organization in furtherance of survival. But a more acceptable alternative account of the origins of a society's functional organization is conceivable: the individual unconsciously recognizes the needs of his group and directs his behaviour so that they are met. The plausibility of this explanation hangs on whether selection between groups occurs to any significant (...) extent, however, and it is therefore on this question that the plausibility of classical societal functionalism itself depends. (shrink)

Is it helpful to model the idea of professional formation on ethical formation?ing from the specifically ethical interest of Aristotle's own doctrine, in the ?narrow?, ?moral? sense of ethical, and aiming at the same time for an inclusive, ?broad? formulation which extends to various types of métiers (occupations/professions), this paper argues that an Aristotelian perspective offers a more robust concept of personal, professional and civic responsibility??responsibleness??than any that our present ?managerial? rationality can promote. Drawing on some Aristotelian texts, I show (...) that the practical knowledge of one with ?formation? (appropriate to the métier in question) enables an agent to find the relevant end and the appropriate act in the name of that end?as if simultaneously. The end and the means to the end are perfectly suited to one another. Crucially, the structure of the agent's practical reasoning is grounded on the telos which guides the agent and this is summoned implicitly from formation. This Aristotelian model of practical rationality stands as a rival to the public rationality that now predominates, a rationality which sees the meeting of explicit, pre-specified outcomes, objectives or targets as the chief way in which the accountability of agents may be secured. (shrink)