This article draws on key normative principles grounded in important values – solidarity, partiality and friendliness – in African philosophy to think critically and deeply about the ethical challenges around returning individual genetic research findings in African genomics research. Precisely, we propose that the normative implication of solidarity, partiality and friendliness is that returning findings should be considered as a gesture of goodwill to participants to the extent that it constitutes acting for their well-being. Concretely, the value of friendliness may (...) imply that one ought to return actionable results to participants even when their preferences regarding feedback are unknown. Notwithstanding, returning individual genetic results will have a cost implication. The cost of feeding back is relevant in the context of African genomics research projects, which are often funded by international sponsors and should be researched further. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 2, February 2020, Page 38-41.

Although the principle of fair subject selection is a widely recognized requirement of ethical clinical research, it often yields conflicting imperatives, thus raising major ethical dilemmas regarding participant selection. In this paper, we diagnose the source of this problem, arguing that the principle of fair subject selection is best understood as a bundle of four distinct sub-principles, each with normative force and each yielding distinct imperatives: (1) fair inclusion; (2) fair burden sharing; (3) fair opportunity; and (4) fair distribution of (...) third-party risks. We first map out these distinct sub-principles, and then identify the ways in which they yield conflicting imperatives for the design of inclusion and exclusion criteria, and the recruitment of participants. We then offer guidance for how decision makers should navigate these conflicting imperatives to ensure that participants are selected fairly. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 2, February 2020, Page 20-22.

Ethics committees like Institutional Review Boards and Research Ethics Committees are typically empowered to approve or reject proposed studies, typically conditional on certain conditions or revisions being met. While some have argued this power should be primarily a function of applying clear, codified requirements, most institutions and legal regimes allow discretion for IRBs to ethically evaluate studies, such as to ensure a favourable risk-benefit ratio, fair subject selection, adequate informed consent, and so forth. As a result, ethics committees typically make (...) moral demands on researchers: require them to act in a way the committee considers ethically right or appropriate. This paper argues that moral demands are legitimate only if publicly justifiable; and as a result, committee decisions are subject to a public justification requirement. Ethics committees can permissibly request for more information, changes to the research protocol or that the research is delayed or even stopped only if these demands are publicly justifiable. This latter claim is in turn justified on the basis that moral demands to φ are permissible only if we are in a position to know that the addressee ought to φ and that we are in a position to know a proposition only if it is publicly justifiable. This argument suggests that ethics committees must consciously and explicitly appeal to public reasons in their decision-making. In cases where public reasons cannot be offered, committees would not be permitted to reject a given study or make approval conditional on an amendment. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 2, February 2020, Page 35-38.