There is a device used particularly in Orthodox Christian theology known as apophatic theology. In this God is spoken of only in 'negating concepts' to emphasize the inability of language to adequately describe the nature of deity. My question is whether there is any way in which this concept, used as it is to underline the 'otherness' of a transcendental god, can be applied to a thealogy of Goddess. This'way of negation' figures prominently in mystical theology, where it is often (...) associated with the 'way of union'. Historically, many mystics believed in the possibility of a true union with God achieved through a vision of divine light. This light leads us towards Sophia, or Wisdom, arguably an ancient goddess predating the Jewish Yhwh. Thus theology and thealogy can be reconciled in this concept of light traced back to its pagan beginnings and apophasty can be applied to an 'intransitive' goddess such as Nisaba-Nidaba. (shrink)

A number of contemporary philosophers have suggested that the recent revival of interest in panpsychism within philosophy of mind could reinvigorate a pantheistic philosophy of religion. This project explores whether the combination and individuation problems, which have dominated recent scholarship within panpsychism, can aid the pantheist’s articulation of a God/universe unity. Constitutive holistic panpsychism is seen to be the only type of panpsychism suited to aid pantheism in articulating this type of unity. There are currently no well-developed solutions to the (...) individuation problem for this type of panpsychism. Moreover, the gestures towards a solution appear costly to the religious significance of pantheism. This article concludes that any hope that contemporary panpsychism might aid pantheists in articulating unity is premature and possibly misplaced. (shrink)

On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond one’s evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic ventures. I (...) suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which – one might hope – may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)