An epistemological interpretation of quantum mechanics hinges on the claim that the distinctive features of quantum mechanics can be derived from some distinctive features of an observational basis. Old and new variations of this theme are listed. The program has a limited success in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The crucial issue is how far it can be extended to quantum field theory without introducing significant ontological postulates. A C*-formulation covers algebraic quantum field theory, but not the standard model. Julian Schwinger’s anabatic (...) methodology extended a strict measurement-based formulation of quantum mechanics through field theory. His extension also excluded the quark hypothesis and the standard model. Quarks and local gauge invariance are postulates that go beyond the limits of an epistemological interpretation of quantum mechanics. The ontological significance ascribed to these advances depends on the role accorded ontology. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics has sometimes been taken to be an empiricist (vs. realist) theory. I state the empiricist's argument, then outline a recently noticed type of measurement--protective measurement--that affords a good reply for the realist. This paper is a reply to scientific empiricism (about quantum mechanics), but is neither a refutation of that position, nor an argument in favor of scientific realism. Rather, my aim is to place realism and empiricism on an even score in regards to quantum theory.

Since the publication of his seminal monograph "The scientific image", Bas van Fraassen is a key figure in philosophy of science. In this book, other philosophers with various outlooks critically discuss his work on theories, empiricism and philosophical stances. The book starts with a new article by van Fraassen on his preferred account of theories, the so-called semantic view. This account is now 50 years old, and van Fraassen takes this anniversary as an opportunity to review the account, its history (...) and the philosophical discussion about it. In the main part of the book, Nancy Cartwright, Finnur Dellsén, Matthias Egg, Steven French, Michael Friedman, Milena Ivanova and Michela Massimi discuss van Fraassen's contributions to philosophy. Three chapters focus on his engagement with realism (French, Friedman, Ivanova). Others study his voluntarism (Cartwright) and his view on representation (Massimi). Finally, there are contributions about his elaboration of empiricism (Dellsén) and his proposal to consider philosophical positions as stances (Egg). The volume includes a laudatio written by Steven French and finishes with a reply by van Fraassen to his critics. (shrink)

It is shown that the uncertainty principle has nothing directly to do with the non-localisability of position and momentum for an individual system on the quantum logical view. The product Δ x· Δ p for localisation of the ranges of position and momentum of an individual system→ ∞ , while the quantities Δ X and Δ P in the uncertainty principle $\Delta X\cdot \Delta P\geq \hslash /2$ , must be given a statistical interpretation on the quantum logical view.

In order to reconnect Quine's views to the current debate on scientific realism, I reframe Quine's scientific realism into a semantic, a metaphysical, and an epistemological dimension. With this conceptual background, I review the historical development of Quine's scientific realism from the late 1940s until his death in 2000. I challenge Soames's view that Quine is a phenomenalist at the time of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and show that he remains agnostic between a realist and an anti‐realist conceptual scheme (...) instead. I also argue that Quine's early views on regimentation are incompatible with a strong formulation of semantic realism. I proceed in reconstructing how he becomes a metaphysical and epistemological realist in the mid‐1950s and argue against the view of Keskinen and Fogelin that interprets Quine as being a metaphysical anti‐realist. Contrary to Davidson, I defend the view that he never gave up normative epistemology and really is a proper epistemological realist. Finally, I discuss how he tries to reconcile his realism with his thesis of ontological relativity and how this necessitates the switch to a stronger form of semantic realism. (shrink)

The idea that science aspires to and routinely achieves truths about the world has been challenged in recent writings. Rather than beginning with a theory of scientific development, or of scientific explanation, we begin with a consideration of truth claims in ordinary discourse, particularly with Davidson's truth-functional semantics. Next we consider the way in which some framework features of ordinary language discourse are extended to and modified in scientific discourse. Two areas are treated in more detail: quantum theory, and the (...) peculiar problem of semantic entailment it involves; and quantum field theory. These supply a basis for criticizing some historicist and logicist treatments of the truth of scientific claims. (shrink)

Wilfred Sellars appears in Bas C. van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image as one of van Fraassen’s primary realist opponents. However, little attention has been paid to Sellars’s influence on van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and van Fraassen’s criticisms of Sellarsian realism, despite the significant impact of The Scientific Image on the realism debate and recent renewed interest in Sellars’s scientific realism. In the first half of this article, I argue that reading The Scientific Image against a Sellarsian background helps clarify and (...) justify van Fraassen’s controversial characterization of scientific realism. Sellars and van Fraassen each inhabit a recognizable position in the other’s description of the realism debate and can reciprocally recognize the other as inhabiting the opposing position. The second half of this article reconstructs van Fraassen’s objections to Sellarsian realism in The Scientific Image and its precursors. I argue that van Fraassen’s criticisms of Sellarsian realism significantly developed between his 1975 paper, “Wilfrid Sellars on Scientific Realism” and his 1980 book. (shrink)

The philosophical debate whether the epistemological and conceptual structure of science is better characterized as hierarchical or as holistic cannot be decideda priori. A case study on general relativity should help to clarify our representation of this section of physics. For this purpose Sneed's model-theoretic approach is used to reconstruct the structure of relativity. The proposed axiomatization of general relativity takes into account approximations and utilizes local models for a realistic view on the functioning of the theory. A central objective (...) of the paper is to give an explication of the approximative empirical claim of general relativity, which is designed to identify the empirical content of the theory in a weak hierarchical form. (shrink)