Abstract. It is commonplace that economic globalization poses new challenges to legal theory. But instead of responding to these challenges, legal scholars often get caught up in heated yet purely abstract discussions of positivist and legal pluralist conceptions of the law. Meanwhile, economics-based theories such as "Law and Social Norms" have much less difficulty in analysing the newly arising forms of private and hybrid "governance without government" from a functional perspective. While legal theory has much to learn from these approaches, (...) we argue that they fail in one crucial point: They cannot uphold the analytical distinction between law and non-law. The reasons for this shortcoming are theory-immanent in that the economic theories' focus on efficiency and their actor-based perspective are necessarily blind to "law's own rationality." We therefore propose to further develop those functional approaches to the study of global governance by complementing them with elements from Niklas Luhmann's systems theory of law. This will provide us with a conceptual framework for analyzing the workings of global governance regimes without ignoring their potential for "legalisation" and "constitutionalisation." As we will show in three concrete examples (Corporate Social Responsibility, lex mercatoria , and internet regulation) we can thus describe the evolution of new forms of legal regulation beyond the nation-state. This will also allow us to draw some preliminary conclusions on the role of law in the context of globalization and, at the same time, show the direction for further empirical research. (shrink)

Western buying companies impose Supplier Codes of Conduct (SCC) on their suppliers in developing countries; however, many suppliers cannot fully comply with SCC and some of them even cheat in SCC. In this research, we link contract characteristics - price pressure, production complexity, contract duration - to the likelihood of supplier's commitment to SCC through a mediating process: how the buying companies govern their suppliers. Our structural equation model analysis shows that the hierarchy/relational norms governance is a perfect mediator of (...) contract characteristics' effects on the likelihood of supplier's commitment; the market governance, an insignificant one. The managerial implications are provided for successfully implementing SCC in global supply chains. (shrink)

Contractualism conceives of firm-stakeholder relations as cooperative schemes for mutual benefit. In essence, contractualism holds that these schemes, as well as the normative principles that guide and constrain them, are ultimately ratified by the consent and endorsement of those subject to them. This paper explores the empirical validity of a contractualist perspective on firm-stakeholder relations. It first develops a typology of firm-stakeholder contracting problems. It subsequently confronts this typology with empirical data collected in an interview study of concrete stakeholder management (...) practices, involving in-depth research interviews with forty-four managers working in the Dutch financial services industry. The findings of this theory-building study suggest that there are limits to the applicability of the contract model in the context of stakeholder management, and that disregarding either the model or its limitations may lead to highly ineffective firm-stakeholder relations. (shrink)

ABSTRACTNoncompete clauses, or agreements by employees to not work for a competitor or start a competing business, have recently faced increased public scrutiny and criticism. This article provides a qualified defense of NCCs. I focus on the argument that NCCs should be banned because they unfairly restrict the options of employees. I argue that this argument fails because it neglects the economist Thomas Schelling’s insight that limiting exit options can be beneficial for a person. This employee-based defense of NCCs does (...) not absolve all their uses, but it does give us a rough test for evaluating the permissibility of NCCs. With this test in hand, I turn to some of the more controversial uses of NCCs. For those who weigh heavily the interests of employees, the question is not whether NCCs, but when. (shrink)

This study explores the legal and ethical issues associated with contract pricing. In particular, it focuses on a set of legal precedents which have addressed the enforceability of allegedly unfair contract prices. Traditionally, the common law has emphasized the consent of the parties. If the parties consented to a given price; it is presumptively fair and enforceable. The cases reviewed in this study, however, seem to draw upon alternative moral conceptions of fairness not normally associated with the common law. The (...) analysis begins by distinguishing the traditional legal conception of fairness from alternative moral conceptions. The cases are then read with a critical eye so as to tease out the underlying principles which best explain them. The analysis illustrates that, notwithstanding judicial rhetoric to the contrary, the courts continue to employ the traditional legal notion of fairness, to the exclusion of alternative moral concerns. The study clarifies an otherwise murky area of the law and illustrates that the legal meaning of fairness differs greatly from the moral one. (shrink)

Should people who perform equal work receive equal pay? Most would say ‘yes’, at least insofar as this question is understood to be asking whether employers should be permitted to discriminate against employees on the basis of race or sex. But suppose the employees belong to all of the same traditionally protected groups. Is (what I call) nondiscriminatory unequal pay for equal work wrong? Drawing an analogy with price discrimination, I argue that it is not intrinsically wrong, but it can (...) be deceptive, in which case it is wrong. (shrink)

Stakeholder theorists distinguish between normative stakeholders, those who gain moral standing by making contributions to the firm, and derivative stakeholders, those who can constrain the corporate association even though they make no contribution. The board of directors has the legal authority to distinguish among these stakeholder groups and to distribute rights and obligations among these stakeholder groups. To be sure, this stakeholder formulation appropriately seizes on the firm’s voluntary, associative character. Yet, the firm’s constituents contribute assets and incur risks to (...) participate in market, economic activities. And, as such, the firm’s “stakeholders” must share an imperfect language to assist in making two key economic decisions: (1) who are the legitimate and who are the derivative stakeholders; and (2) who should sit on the board? Still, stakeholder theorists have good reason to be skeptical of neoclassical economics. Its assumptions that all act opportunistically and that all can calculate rationally and fully hardly correspond to studies on the managerial experience of corporate coordination. However, advances in behavioral law and economics now provide a cogent economic logic that readily fits into a stakeholder mode. In brief, we argue that (1) the firm’s economic purpose designates legitimacy to core stakeholders, to those who add value, assume unique risk, and can incur harm; (2) the board serves as the principal who coordinates these core stakeholders to sustain competitive advantage and new wealth creation; and (3) state incorporation law, Delaware in particular, reinforces the board’s function. These, in turn, supply selection criteria for board membership. We aim to synchronize concepts from behavioral law and economics with stakeholder theory. (shrink)

This article examines whether ethical business practice enhances financial performance with respect to interorganizational favour exchange. We argue that the link between the ethicality and economic utility of interorganizational favour exchange is governed by: (1) organizational–individual interest alignment/conflict and (2) the fairness or justifiability of favour exchanges from the perspective of third parties. We classify interorganizational (IO) favour exchange into four types (Business–Personal, Personal–Business, Personal–Personal and Business–Business favour exchange). Our analysis shows that the first three types of favour exchange are (...) unethical as they involve conflicts between organizational and individual interests in one or both participating organizations that negatively affect organizational value creation. The last type of favour exchange involves organizational–individual interest alignment in both participating organizations and positively affects the capacity of those involved in the exchange to create value. Favour exchanges of this fourth variety are ethically justifiable unless they unfairly damage the legitimate interests of third parties. In the latter case, these favour exchanges create the risk of negative third party reactions, which in turn affect the sustainability of the benefits of the favour exchanges to the focal group (the dyad). Our research results advance understanding of the ethical and economic implications of IO favour exchange, counter the prejudice against this behaviour in organizations, provide ethical guidance for management and business practice, and have implications for the relationship between doing well and doing good. (shrink)

Contractualism is one of the most promising ‘centers of gravity’ in business ethics. In this guest editorial we provide a concise roadmap to the field, sketching contractualism’s historic and disciplinary antecedents, the basic argumentative structure of the contract model, and its boundary conditions. We also sketch two main dimensions along which contributions to the contractualist tradition can be positioned. The first dimension entails positive versus normative theorizing – does a given contribution analyze the world as it is or how it (...) ought to be? The second dimension involves four different levels of analysis that are commonly employed in contractualist business ethics: the nano, micro, meso, and macro levels. We then proceed to position the articles comprising this special issue along these two dimensions. (shrink)