This paper is about the reception of Ernst Mach by Brentano and his students in Austria. I shall outline the main elements of this reception, starting with Brentano’s evaluation, in his lectures on positivism, of Mach’s theory of sensations. Secondly, I shall comment the early reception of Mach by Brentano’s pupils in Prague. The third part bears on the close relationship that Husserl established between his phenomenology and Mach’s descriptivism. I will then briefly examine Mach’s contribution to the controversy on (...) gestalt qualities. The fifth part bears on Stumpf’s debate with Mach on psychophysical relations and I shall conclude on Husserl’s criticism of Mach’s alleged logical psychologism. (shrink)

How do we reconcile Husserl’s repeated criticism of Mach’s phenomenalism almost everywhere in his work with the leading role that Husserl seems to attribute to Mach in the genesis of his own phenomenology? To answer this question, we shall examine, first, the narrow relation that Husserl establishes between his phenomenological method and Mach’s descriptivism. Second, we shall examine two aspects of Husserl’s criticism of Mach: the first concerns phenomenalism and Mach’s doctrine of elements, while the second concerns the principle of (...) economy of thought, which Husserl closely associates with a form of psychologism in his Logical Investigations . Our working hypothesis is that the apparent contradictory comments of Husserl regarding Mach’s positivism can be partially explained by the double status he confers to his own phenomenology—as a philosophical program radically opposed to positivism, and as a method akin to Mach’s descriptivism. (shrink)

Como conciliar as repetidas críticas ao fenomenismo de Mach, um pouco por toda a obra de Husserl, com o papel proeminente que Husserl parece nele reconhecer em seus últimos trabalhos, quanto à gênese de sua própria fenomenologia? Para responder a essa questão, examinaremos, primeiramente, a relação estreita que Husserl estabelece entre o método fenomenológico e o descritivismo de Mach à luz do debate que opõe nativismo e empirismo sobre a origem da percepção do espaço. Em seguida, examinaremos dois aspectos da (...) crítica que Husserl faz ao positivismo de Mach: o primeiro se refere ao fenomenismo e sua doutrina dos elementos, enquanto o segundo, ao princípio de economia de pensamento, que Husserl associa a uma forma de psicologismo em Prolegômenos. A hipótese que nos guiará nesse estudo é que as opiniões aparentemente contraditórias de Husserl sobre o positivismo de Mach se explicam em parte pelo estatuto duplo que a fenomenologia recebe em seus últimos trabalhos: enquanto programa filosófico, ela se opõe explicitamente ao positivismo; enquanto método, ela se aparenta ao descritivismo de Mach. Concluiremos com a ideia de que esses dois filósofos de origem checa perseguiam o objetivo comum de apreender o sentido originário de positividade. (shrink)