The prelims comprise: Introduction Controversial Choices Kinds of Normative Reasons for Action Limits on Respect for Autonomy Children and Controversial Choice Controversial Choices and the Duty to Strive Toward Perfection and Full Autonomy Acknowledgments Notes References.

In the United Kingdom the law and medical guidance is supportive of women making choices in childbirth. NICE guidelines are explicit that a competent woman’s informed request for MRCS should be respected. However, in reality pregnant women are routinely denied MRCS. In this paper I consider whether there is sufficient justification for restricting MRCS. The physical and emotive significance of childbirth as an event in a woman’s life cannot be understated. It is, therefore, concerning that women are having their wishes (...) ignored, and we must ascertain whether the denial of agency is justifiable. To answer this question I first demonstrate that access to MRCS is a lottery in the UK. Second, I argue that there is nothing unique about pregnancy that displaces the ethical norm of respecting patents’ sufficiently autonomous choices. Thus, the starting presumption is that all informed choices regarding MRCS should be respected. To ascertain whether any restriction of MRCS is justifiable the burden of proof must be placed on those who argue that MRCS is ethically impermissible. I argue that the most common justifications in the literature against MRCS are insufficient to displace the presumption in favour of autonomous choice in childbirth. I conclude that MRCS should be available to pregnant women, and we must strive to reduce the lottery in access to choice. (shrink)

The number of cesarean sections performed globally has been consistently rising since the 1980s.1 The number of cesareans performed now greatly exceeds the number that experts predict are necessary.2 In Brazil, the world's "cesarean capital," over half of births are surgical. In the United States, approximately one third of babies are delivered by cesarean, and in the United Kingdom around 26 percent of births are by cesarean.3 Cesarean section can be a life-saving intervention when vaginal birth poses a risk to (...) woman or fetus.4 However, some doctors believe that cesareans performed in the absence of an emergency carry substantial risks for limited or no benefit (Wagner 2000... (shrink)

BackgroundPatient autonomy is a fundamental, yet challenging, principle of professional medical ethics. The idea that individual patients should have the freedom to make choices about their lives, including medical matters, has become increasingly prominent in current literature. However, this has not always been the case, especially in communist countries where paternalistic attitudes have been interwoven into all relationships including medical ones. Patients’ expectations and the role of the doctor in the patient-physician relationship are changing. Croatia, as a transitional country, is (...) currently undergoing this particular process.MethodsQualitative research was conducted by means of six focus group discussions held in the years 2012 and 2013 in Croatia. Focus groups were held separately with each of the following: first year and final year medical students, physicians engaged in medical ethics education, physicians practicing in a clinical hospital, family medicine residents and individuals representing patients with chronic disease. This research specifically addresses issues related to patient autonomy, in particular, the principles of truth telling, confidentiality, and informed consent. All focus group discussions were audio taped and then transcribed verbatim and systematized according to acknowledged qualitative analysis methods.Results and discussionPatient autonomy is much more than a simple notion defined as the patient’s right to make treatment decisions independently. It has to be understood in context of the broader socio-cultural setting. At present, both patients and medical doctors in Croatia are increasingly appreciating the importance of promoting the principle of autonomy in medical decision-making. However, the current views of medical students, physicians and patients reveal inconsistencies.Conclusions Knowing how to respect the various facets of patients’ autonomy should be part of physician’s professional duties, and also be reflected in his or her core clinical competencies. For this reason greater importance should be dedicated to patient autonomy issues in medical education in Croatia. (shrink)

Clinical evidence suggests that many patients undergo surgery that they would decline if fully informed. Failure to communicate the relevant risks, benefits, and alternatives of a procedure violates medical ethics and wastes medical resources. Integrating shared decision-making, a method of communication between provider and patient, into medical decisions can satisfy physicians' ethical obligations and reduce unwanted procedures. This article proposes a three-step process for implementing a nationwide practice of shared decision-making: create model integration programs; provide legal incentives to ease the (...) transition; and incorporate shared decision-making into medical necessity determinations. (shrink)

Medical practice should evolve alongside medical ethics. As our understanding of the ethical implications of physician-patient interactions becomes more nuanced, physicians should integrate those lessons into practice. As early as the 1930s, epidemiological studies began to identify that the rates of medical procedures varied significantly along geographic and socioeconomic lines. Dr. J. Alison Glover recognized that tonsillectomy rates in school children in certain school districts in England and Wales were in some cases eight times the rates of children in other (...) districts, with the only significant predictive factors being the current chief medical officer in the area and the socioeconomic well-being of the child's parents. Unfortunately, Dr. Glover's work revealed that the increase in tonsillectomies did not improve the health of adolescent patients and appeared to be performed “as a routine prophylactic ritual for no particular reason and with no particular result.”. (shrink)

Autonomy has been hailed as the foremost principle of bioethics, and yet patients’ decisions and research subjects’ voluntary participation are being subjected to frequent restrictions. It has been argued that patient care is best served by a limited form of paternalism because the doctor is better qualified to take critical decisions than the patient, who is distracted by illness. The revival of paternalism is unwarranted on two grounds: firstly, because prejudging that the sick are not fully autonomous is a biased (...) and unsubstantial view; secondly, because the technical knowledge of healthcare professionals does not include the ethical qualifications and prerogative to decide for others.Clinical research settings are even more prone to erode subjects’ autonomy than clinical settings because of the tendency and temptation to resort to such practices as shading the truth when consent to participation is sought, or waiving consent altogether when research is done in emergency settings.Instead of supporting such dubious practices with unconvincing arguments, it would seem to be the task of bioethics to insist on reinforcing autonomy. (shrink)

Although autonomy is clearly still the paradigm in bioethics, there is increasing concern over its value and feasibility. In agreeing with those concerns, I argue that autonomy is not just a status, but a skill, one that must be developed and maintained. I also argue that nearly all healthcare interactions do anything but promote such decisional skills, since they rely upon assent, rather than upon genuinely autonomous consent. Thus, throughout most of their medical lives, patients are socialised to be heteronomous, (...) rather than autonomous. Yet, at the worst possible time – critical care decision-making – when life and death consequences are attached to the choices, the paradigm shifts and real consent is sought, even demanded, thereby making an often traumatic situation even harder.I go on, though, to also reject paternalistic models of beneficence as an alternative. Rather, I conclude that the problem is so fundamental in healthcare that a genuine solution would require a radical restructuring. I recommend steps that can be taken in the interim to improve the situation and to move toward such a restructuring. (shrink)

Between 1992 and 1996, a small number of women in the UK were forced by the courts to undergo caesarean section against their expressed refusal. Analysis of the reported cases reveals the blanket assumption of maternal incompetence and the widespread use of thinly veiled coercion. Such attitudes and practices are themselves frequently compounded by inadequate communication. Medical discretion in such problematic cases seems to err on the side of safety and so appears to favour the life of the fetus over (...) maternal autonomy. Despite current policy’s placement of the pregnant woman at the centre of maternity care, obstetricians’ concerns appear to lie more with the unborn fetus. In other words, there seems to be a point at which the value of fetal life begins to outweigh, not so much the life of the woman, but her right to self-determination, her plans and her choices. While it is important to acknowledge that these court ordered caesareans represent an unusual extreme within contemporary maternity care in this country, that they have happened brings into sharp relief some of the stereotypical assumptions about women. These are assumptions that underlie much of current medical practice and may compromise or disempower women in other ways during their experience of pregnancy and labour. Using the first and last of the six reported cases as contextual illustrations, this article focuses on the complex interplay of processes that have brought the medical profession to a position in which their own self-conviction and determination to do what they believe is best for their patients has resulted in gross denial of women’s autonomy and the use of the law to override pregnant women’s refusal of consent. (shrink)

How should we respond to patients who do not wish to take on the responsibility and burdens of making decisions about their own care? In this paper, we argue that existing models of decision-making in modern healthcare are ill-equipped to cope with such patients and should be supplemented by an “appointed fiduciary” model where decision-making authority is formally transferred to a medical professional. Healthcare decisions are often complex and for patients can come at time of vulnerability. While this does not (...) undermine their capacity, it can be excessively burdensome. Most existing models of decision-making mandate that patients with capacity must retain ultimate responsibility for decisions. An appointed fiduciary model provides a formalized mechanism through which those few patients who wish to defer responsibility can hand over decision-making authority. By providing a formal structure for deferring to an appointed fiduciary, the confusions and risks of the informal transfers that can occur in practice are avoided. Finally, we note how appropriate governance and law can provide safeguards against risks to the welfare of patients and medical professionals. -/- . (shrink)

Biomedical research has brought to the fore the issue of which rights and duties we have to each other and society. Several scholars have advocated reframing the notion of participation, arguing that we have a moral duty to participate in research from which we all benefit. However, less attention has been paid to how we justify and defend the concept of self-determination and what the implications are in a biomedical setting. The author discusses the value and importance of self-determination on (...) the basis of the framework of the liberal-communitarian debate. Biobank research is used as an example of a project wherein, through our participation, we confirm our sense of belonging to society and acknowledge our mutual dependence on each other. We need a richer concept of self-determination that encompasses both liberal and communitarian insights in order to make sense of the value we attach to self-determination. (shrink)

The validity of the double effect doctrine is examined in euthanasia and abortion. In these two situations killing is a method of treatment. It is argued that the doctrine cannot apply to the care of the dying. Firstly, doctors are obliged to harm patients in order to do good to them. Secondly, patients should make their own value judgments about being mutilated or killed. Thirdly, there is little intuitive moral difference between direct and indirect killing. Nor can the doctrine apply (...) to abortion. Doctors kill fetuses as a means of treating the mother. They also kill them as an inevitable side effect of other treatment. Drawing a moral distinction between the direct and the indirect killing gives counterintuitive results. It is suggested that pragmatic rules, not ethics, govern practices around euthanasia and cause it to be more restricted than abortion. (shrink)