Reevaluates Western and Chinese philosophical traditions to question the boundaries of entrenched conceptual frameworks.

This essay takes issue with two possible stances in comparative and intercultural philosophy. First, there is the idea of ascertaining a method or conditions of possibility before engaging in intercultural comparison. This amounts to contemplating a form prior to any content. Second, there is the idea that a plurality of given philosophical traditions exist that do not have to be held together by a notion of what philosophy is. This is equivalent to asserting a diversity of content without giving it (...) a form. In both cases, the disunity of form and content subverts comprehension of universality. After problematizing both stances, I will seek to retrieve a notion of universality, drawing from Hegel’s insights into the peculiar character of philosophy. For Hegel, philosophy has the character of life, which does not allow for the isolation of form or content. Philosophy thus conceived does not apply any methods but is its own method. (shrink)

In this article we focus on the famous dialogue between Zhuangzi 莊子 and Huizi 惠子 concerning the question whether or not ren 人 (in particular the shengren 聖人) have qing 情. Most scholars have understood qing in this exchange as referring to “feelings” or “emotions.” We take issue with such readings. First, we demonstrate that, while Huizi probably understands qing as something like feelings or emotions, Zhuangzi’s view is that having qing is connected with making shifei 是非 judgments whereas having (...) no qing means that shifei has no grip on those ren, especially the shengren. What follows is that the expression wuqing 無情 should not be identified as a “doctrine of nonemotion.” Instead, wuqing implies that Zhuangzi advises us to lead a life of tranquility, calmness, and stillness. We show that these peaceful attitudes are associated with the idea of wuwei 無為 in the Zhuangzi. (shrink)

The article considers the relation between Chinese philosophy as an academic discipline and Western philosophy. In the academy there are three ways Chinese philosophy can relate to Western philosophy: Chinese philosophy may see itself as the other of Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy may seek recognition from Western philosophy, and Chinese philosophy may refuse to see Western philosophy as the measure for what is philosophy. I consider scholars from each of these three positions as well as the debate between them. Through (...) this review it becomes clear that the relation between Chinese and Western philosophy is an uneasy one. In conclusion I suggest that the relation between Chinese and Western philosophy is not a relation between two separate entities; the rise of Chinese philosophy is rather a symptom of the decline of Western learning. (shrink)

The essay deals with problems encountered by Western researchers working in the field of Chinese philosophy. It begins with a discussion of intercultural and transcultural methodologies and illuminates some of the most common issues inherent in traditional intercultural comparisons in the field of philosophy. Taking into account the current state of the so-called postcomparative discourses in the field of transcultural philosophy and starting from the notion of culturally divergent frames of reference, it focuses upon semantic aspects of the Chinese philosophical (...) tradition and exposes the need for discursive translations. On this basis, a new postcomparative approach in transcultural philosophical studies of Chinese philosophy is suggested. In this context, the author proposes the application of an innovative principle, based upon what can preliminary be denoted as the method of sublation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many recent works on the methodology of intercultural philosophy point to a fundamental dilemma of the discipline: if there is a common ground for intercultural understanding, then the essence of this ground is universal instead of multi-cultural; if there are irreducible and incommunicable factors in different cultures, then complete understanding seems to be impossible. In this paper, I propose that this dilemma is founded on the assumption that intercultural philosophy is equivalent to intercultural understanding. I argue that, however, intercultural (...) philosophy should begin with questioning. Instead of understanding another culture using one’s own conceptual scheme, intercultural questioning puts one’s conceptual scheme and traditional worldview into question. The new questions obtained by phenomenologically reducing traditional thought will become a ground for intercultural dialogue without reducing one’s culture to another culture. Finally, I will use a case in Chinese philosophy to demonstrate the process of intercultural questioning. (shrink)