This paper is a critical response to Hylarie Kochiras’ “Gravity and Newton’s substance counting problem,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 267–280. First, the paper argues that Kochiras conflates substances and beings; it proceeds to show that Newton is a substance monist. The paper argues that on methodological grounds Newton has adequate resources to respond to the metaphysical problems diagnosed by Kochiras. Second, the paper argues against the claim that Newton is committed to two speculative doctrines attributed to (...) him by Kochiras and earlier Andrew Janiak: i) the passivity of matter and ii) the principle of local causation. Third, the paper argues that while Kochiras’ arguments about Newton’s metaphysical commitments are mistaken, it qualifies the characterization of Newton as an extreme empiricist as defended by Howard Stein and Rob DiSalle. In particular, the paper shows that Newton’s empiricism was an intellectual and developmental achievement that built on non trivial speculative commitments about the nature of matter and space.Keywords: Newton; Substance; Action at a distance; Space; Matter; Empiricism. (shrink)

Según la concepción heredada, los matemáticos británicos del siglo XVIII fueron responsables de una decadencia de las matemáticas en el país de Newton; una decadencia atribuida al chovinismo y a una preferencia por el pensamiento geométrico. Este artículo debate este punto de vista describiendo, primero, la complejidad de la herencia matemática de Newton y su recepción durante las primeras décadas del siglo XVIII. Una sección dedicada al monumental Treatise of Fluxions (1742) de Maclaurin describe el intento de lograr una síntesis (...) de las diferentes corrientes de pensamiento del legado matemático de Newton, y lo compara con el trabajo contemporáneo continental. Se demuestra que a mediados del siglo XVIII los matemáticos académicos continentales tales como Euler y Lagrange estaban inspirados por suposiciones culturales locales en direcciones que divergían sensiblemente de las seguidas por Maclaurin y sus seguidores conterráneos. (shrink)

In this article I dispute the claim, made by several contemporary scholars, that Spinoza was a naturalist. ‘Naturalism’ here refers to two distinct but related positions in contemporary philosophy. The first, ontological naturalism, is the view that everything that exists possesses a certain character permitting it to be defined as natural and prohibiting it from being defined as supernatural. I argue that the only definition of ontological naturalism that could be legitimately applied to Spinoza's philosophy is so unrestrictive as to (...) tell us nothing about the content of his ideas. The second, methodological naturalism, is the view that the natural sciences are the best means of finding out substantial truths about the concrete world. I present some historical research showing that Spinoza's way of positioning himself with respect to other philosophers in the Dutch Republic casts very serious doubt on the claim that he was a methodological naturalist. This adds further weight to arguments that have already been made against the naturalist reading of Spinoza. (shrink)