The main purpose of this study is to probe into the human capacity of understanding systems and defects in human knowledge of the world. The study addresses the greyness levels and systems levels and explains why the world cannot be perceived as a purely white or black structure. It also clarifies why human knowledge of systems always remains grey. The investigation relies on logical and deductive reasoning and uses the theoretical foundations of systems thinking and Boulding’s systems hierarchy. The most (...) important argument that this study advances is that human knowledge, in any form or under any circumstances, is grey and incomplete and will remain grey. Because the notion of “perfect knowledge” is ambiguous given human epistemic limits, any proportion of knowledge is incomplete and prone to change. Less complexity could lead to more accurate predications, but even in the simplest forms of systems, reaching perfect knowledge seems to be an unwarranted claim. Furthermore, because our perception of past events is incomplete, we cannot predict the future with certainty, as a result of which both the past and the future appear grey to us. The world, as an integrated system, is neither black nor white, but it remains grey, and the systems partially recognized by humans are part of the grey world. Gaining knowledge and increasing discoveries only contribute to the grey systems that are already known. (shrink)

This paper examines the problem of vituperative feedback from peer reviewers. We argue that such feedback is morally unacceptable, insofar as it humiliates authors and damages their dignity. We draw from social-psychological research to explore those aspects of the peer-review process in general and the anonymity of blind reviewing in particular that contribute to reviewers’ humiliating comments. We then apply Iris Murdoch's ideas about a virtuous consciousness and humility to make the case that peer referees have a moral obligation not (...) to humiliate the authors whose work they review. (shrink)

This study examines the role of wisdom in the cross-cultural adaptation of Chinese visiting scholars in Canada, as mediated by different coping styles. Path analysis was used to for hypotheses testing. The findings suggest that wisdom measured by 3D-WS and Adult Self-Transcendence Inventory, independently had direct correlation with social and psychological adaptation, and positively associated with engaged coping ; the independent effects of 3D-WS and ASTI on social adaptation, psychological adaptation, and life satisfaction were mediated by proactive–reflective coping; wisdom, when (...) measured by 3D-WS, promoted positive psychological adaptation through decreasing passive coping. This study shows that wisdom is a critical factor affecting cross-cultural adaptation, and the use of proactive–reflective coping is a wise way of handling future life challenges. (shrink)

The issue bedeviling the various era of philosophy of education made it germane for different philosopher of the respective age to critically address those basic educational issue as there are peculiar to them. The work, sequel to the progressivist tennet juxtaposes existentialist philosophy of education side by side the realist philosophy of education, and argues in support of the claim that realist philosophy of education is a renewal of the existentialist theory of education. It arrives at the conclusion that both (...) system deals with the individual as the center of their postulation, existence preceding essence in their argument and the practical experience as superior to non-experiential knowledge or education. Hence they jettison any claim that is not based on experience and that cannot help the individual attain self-realization. The work uses the analytical, logical, and systematic approach of philosophy to strengthen its argument. And concludes that this awareness will enable scholarship to thrive successfully in philosophy of education. (shrink)

The objective of the paper is to present philosophical positions arguing the unity of nature: from the pantheistic doctrine of the Stoics and the version of pantheism proposed by G. Bruno and B. Spinoza, through the Leibniz concept which assumes that every element of nature is spiritual and capable of intentional actions, to contemporary doctrines. One of the concepts – the “deep ecology” of A. Naess, emphasizes the need for the subjective treatment of every element of nature – people, animals (...) and plants; it postulates the specific equality of all species. The assumptions of eco-philosophy are perfectly in line with the findings of contemporary nature researchers proving that the bonds between individual elements of a given ecosystem are deeper than previously assumed, forming a complex multi-level network. A violation of the precisely developed balance can have far-reaching negative effects including for humankind. Modern philosophers stress that people responsible for shaping ecological policy should aim at protecting entire ecosystems, and they should ensure the maintenance of its balance. This philosophical message can be dedicated especially to the politicians responsible for the decision on the unprecedented logging of the Bialowieza Forest. (shrink)

The point of this paper is to compare substitution from the perspective of Levinas and the replacement sympathy as two approaches in facing the other. Sympathy, as one of the moral issues, is a way of paying attention and understanding the anxiety, worry, or need of others, which occurs consciously and with the recognition and replacement of the other. The substitution from the perspective of Levinas is also in relation to the “other” and outlines the scope of the subject’s responsibility (...) towards him. In the beginning, Levinas’ subject imperially reduces the other to himself, but in the face of the “other,” he pays attention to the irreducibility and dependence of the consistency of his nature on it. In this way, the infinite responsibility towards the “other” becomes apparent; a responsibility that is formed before any kind of consciousness and self-consciousness and in a more passive space than any passivity, and its scope extends to the substitution of the “other” and expiation of the “other.” In the shadow of this infinite responsibility, substitution is distinguished from sympathetic and empathetic replacement. Sympathy, which has been described as a virtue in many moral systems, is a form of altruism through which an actor, by entering into the worries and sufferings of others, replaces himself in a scene of their pain. This replacement is based on knowing the other and imagining his position and ultimately transforming the other into another me. Accordingly, some have introduced sympathy and benevolence as the basis of morality and by emphasizing the essential role of compassion in human moral life, an argument is made on compassion as a pillar of morality.. Levinas also speaks of substitution in several places in his work, which is defined as a replacement in sympathy in relation to another. In other words, replacement in sympathy is the product of the relation between the actor and the other, and substitution in Levinas is based on subjectivity, which is itself based on the relation between the subject and the “other.” This paper wants to provide a comparative analysis of the subject’s substitution in Levinas with the concept of replacement on sympathy.Of course, although the concept of “other” in Levinas’s thought is different from the other in sympathy, the relationship between ‘replacement’ and ‘substitution’ in the two can be examined; for although in Levinas’s view the position of the “other” is defined beyond the essence of the subject and in sympathy after the stage of essence, substitution in Levinas can be proposed in terms of rank later than the stage of essence.‘Substituting the other’ in Levinas, unlike “replacing the other” in sympathy, while excluding cognition, changes from another level of understanding the other to the position of expiation of the other, and such a change is justified by the explanation of subjectivity.No independent research has been done on the relationship between the replacement in sympathy and substitution with the “other” in Levinas, and no analysis has been provided in this regard. This paper, in order to analyze the relation of replacement as one of the principles of sympathy and substitution proposed in Levinas, first defines sympathy and examines the other’s place in it, and then in order to achieve the concept of substitution in Levinas’s thought, examines concepts such as subject, saying, said and responsibility from his point of view. (shrink)