Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Varieties of Testimonial Injustice.Jeremy Wanderer - 2016 - In Ian James Kidd, Gaile Pohlhaus & José Medina (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Injustice. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 27-40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Credibility Trouble: When ‘I Believe You’ is an Epistemic Wrong.Eliana Luxemburg-Peck - 2023 - Social Epistemology (6):824-838.
    This article defends the counterintuitive conclusion that public assignments of credibility – including statements, by hearers, of ‘that’s right’, ‘she is credible’, or ‘I believe you’ – can actually constitute a pernicious form of epistemic wrong. Sometimes referred to colloquially as ‘lip service’, the wrong occurs when, owing to ethically poisonous epistemic failures, hearers outwardly validate testifiers’ credibility despite not fully or duly believing them. To explain this wrong, I introduce a distinction between performed and internal credibility assignments (PCA and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Prejudice, Harming Knowers, and Testimonial Injustice.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (1):53-73.
    Fricker‘s Epistemic Injustice discusses the idea of testimonial injustice, specifically, being harmed in one‘s capacity as a knower. Fricker‘s own theory of testimonial injustice emphasizes the role of prejudice. She argues that prejudice is necessary for testimonial injustice and that when hearers use a prejudice to give a deficit to the credibility of speakers hearers intrinsically harm speakers in their capacity as a knower. This paper rethinks the connections between prejudice and testimonial injustice. I argue that many cases of prejudicial (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust: Introduction to the Special Issue.Melanie Altanian & Maria Baghramian - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):433-447.
    This is the introduction to the special issue "Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust" for the International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.
    This paper provides a critical overview of recent work on epistemic blame. The paper identifies key features of the concept of epistemic blame and discusses two ways of motivating the importance of this concept. Four different approaches to the nature of epistemic blame are examined. Central issues surrounding the ethics and value of epistemic blame are identified and briefly explored. In addition to providing an overview of the state of the art of this growing but controversial field, the paper highlights (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice.Aidan McGlynn - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):831-845.
    This paper re-examines the debate between those who, with Miranda Fricker, diagnose the primary, non-contingent harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification and those who contend it is better thought of as a kind of epistemic othering. Defenders of the othering account of the primary harm have often argued for it by presenting cases of testimonial injustice in which the testifier’s epistemic agency is affirmed rather than denied, even while their credibility is unjustly impugned. In previous work, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Redlining.Michael D. Doan - 2017 - Ethics and Social Welfare 11 (2):177-190.
    The practice of Emergency Management in Michigan raises anew the question of whose knowledge matters to whom and for what reasons, against the background of what projects, challenges, and systemic imperatives. In this paper, I offer a historical overview of state intervention laws across the United States, focusing specifically on Michigan’s Emergency Manager laws. I draw on recent analyses of these laws to develop an account of a phenomenon that I call epistemic redlining, which, I suggest, is a form of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice.Emmalon Davis - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (3):485-501.
    Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity-prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  • Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):99-114.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • (1 other version)On the Virtue of Epistemic Justice and the Vice of Epistemic Injustice.Alkis Kotsonis - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):598-610.
    In this paper, I develop an account of epistemic justice as a character-based intellectual virtue that a truth-desiring agent would want to possess. The agent who possesses this virtue is just towards other knowers in matters pertaining to epistemic goods and this involves a regard for agents as knowers. Notably, the virtue of epistemic justice has a unique position among virtues: epistemic justice is presupposed by every other intellectual virtue, while remaining a standalone virtue itself. Correspondingly, I also offer an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Testimonial Injustice in Sports.Federico Luzzi - 2023 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 18 (2):161-176.
    Epistemic injustice is a widely discussed phenomenon in many sub-disciplines (including epistemology, ethics, feminist philosophy, social and political philosophy). Yet, there is very little literature on its connection to the philosophy of sports. Here I explore the intersection between epistemic injustice and sports, focusing on testimonial injustice. I argue that there exist clear-cut cases of testimonial injustice in sport that arise when athletes attempt to communicate information. After highlighting the theoretical connections between various cases, I explore the more ambitious claim (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Injustice in Political Discourses? The Problematic Concept of Authority in Langton’s Account of Pornography.Paolo Parlanti - 2021 - Las Torres de Lucca: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 10 (19):83-96.
    Through her silencing thesis, Langton has contributed to the study of epistemic injustice by highlighting a possible cause of such a phenomenon: She asserts that the pornographic representation of sexual relationships affects the felicity conditions of speech uttered by women, so this speech is not understood as an illocution by men. This fact arguably undermines women’s credibility, since their testimony is not even registered in men’s testimonial sensibility. However, this thesis entails problematic consequences from at least two standpoints. From a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)On the Virtue of Epistemic Justice and the Vice of Epistemic Injustice.Alkis Kotsonis - 2022 - Episteme:1-13.
    In this paper, I develop an account of epistemic justice as a character-based intellectual virtue that a truth-desiring agent would want to possess. The agent who possesses this virtue is just towards other knowers in matters pertaining to epistemic goods and this involves a regard for agents as knowers. Notably, the virtue of epistemic justice has a unique position among virtues: epistemic justice is presupposed by every other intellectual virtue, while remaining a standalone virtue itself. Correspondingly, I also offer an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)Epistemic injustice in Climate Adaptation.Morten Byskov & Keith Hyams - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (4):613-634.
    Indigenous peoples are disproportionally vulnerable to climate change. At the same time, they possess valuable knowledge for fair and sustainable climate adaptation planning and policymaking. Yet Indigenous peoples and knowledges are often excluded from or underrepresented within adaptation plans and policies. In this paper we ask whether the concept of epistemic injustice can be applied to the context of climate adaptation and the underrepresentation of Indigenous knowledges within adaptation policies and strategies. In recent years, the concept of epistemic injustice has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Testimonial injustice: discounting women’s voices in health care priority setting.Siun Gallagher, John Miles Little & Claire Hooker - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (11):744-747.
    Testimonial injustice occurs when bias against the credibility of certain social identities results in discounting of their contributions to deliberations. In this analysis, we describe testimonial injustice against women and how it figures in macroallocation procedure. We show how it harms women as deliberators, undermines the objective of inclusivity in macroallocation and affects the justice of resource distributions. We suggest that remedial action is warranted in order to limit the effects of testimonial injustice in this context, especially on marginalised and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • When is Disbelief Epistemic Injustice? Criminal Procedure, Recovered Memories, and Deformations of the Epistemic Subject.Jan Christoph Bublitz - 2024 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (3):681-708.
    People can be treated unjustly with respect to the level of credibility others accord to their testimony. This is the core idea of the philosophical idea of epistemic justice. It should be of utmost interest to criminal law which extensively deals with normative issues of evidence and testimony. It may reconstruct some of the long-standing criticisms of criminal law regarding credibility assessments and the treatment of witnesses, especially in sexual assault cases. However, philosophical discussions often overlook the intricate complexities of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice.Alkis Kotsonis - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-16.
    My aim in this paper is to present and discuss a novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice. I highlight that epistemic vice such as excessive curiosity, gossip and excessive inquisitiveness do not obstruct the acquisition, transmission and retention of knowledge and are not characterized by a deficiency of epistemic desires or vicious epistemic motivations. However, I argue that such traits ought to be classified as epistemic vices because the agent who possesses them causes epistemic harm to other agents (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The other at the threshold: A Husserlian analysis of ethics and violence in the home/alien encounter.Hora Zabarjadisar - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Queensland
    In a world where, as Martin Heidegger puts it, ‘homelessness’ has become its destiny, the colonized/Oriental Other that once exclusively constituted and was neglected from the matrix of the Western imaginary has no longer maintained its distance as ‘out there’. Instead it is embodied as a ‘refugee’ appearing on the borders of the ‘home’ with its complex cultural, colonial history. The majority of refugee studies feature the refugee as the outcome of the interplay of the two concepts of the ‘rights (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Makes Epistemic Injustice an “Injustice”?Morten Fibieger Byskov - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 52 (1):114-131.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Norms of Credibility.Jennifer Lackey - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):323-338.
    In this paper, I explore whether there is a need for a multiplicity of norms governing belief due to differences in the objects of those beliefs, particularly the difference between persons and nonpersons. I call the view according to which there is a single epistemic norm governing belief monism, and the view that there is more than one such norm pluralism. I consider three different kinds of objections to monism that stem specifically from considerations unique to assessing the credibility of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Epistemic Injustice in Incident Investigations: A Qualitative Study.Josje Kok, David de Kam, Ian Leistikow, Kor Grit & Roland Bal - 2022 - Health Care Analysis 30 (3):254-274.
    Serious incident investigations—often conducted by means of Root Cause Analysis methodologies—are increasingly seen as platforms to learn from multiple perspectives and experiences: professionals, patients and their families alike. Underlying this principle of inclusiveness is the idea that healthcare staff and service users hold unique and valuable knowledge that can inform learning, as well as the notion that learning is a social process that involves people actively reflecting on shared knowledge. Despite initiatives to facilitate inclusiveness, research shows that embracing and learning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Children and testimonial injustice: A response to Burroughs and Tollefsen.Gary Bartlett - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):178-194.
    Michael Burroughs and Deborah Tollefsen (2016) claim that children are subject to widespread testimonial injustice. They argue that empirical data shows that children are prejudicially accorded less epistemic credibility in forensic contexts, and that this in turn shows that the same is true in broader contexts. While I agree that there is indeed testimonial injustice against children, I argue that Burroughs and Tollefsen exaggerate its severity and extent, by exaggerating children’s testimonial reliability. Firstly, the empirical data do not quite support (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Epistemic marginalisation and the seductive power of art.Mihaela Mihai - 2018 - Contemporary Political Theory 17 (4):395-416.
    Many voices and stories have been systematically silenced in interpersonal conversations, political deliberations and historical narratives. Recalcitrant and interrelated patterns of epistemic, political, cultural and economic marginalisation exclude individuals as knowers, citizens, agents. Two questions lie at the centre of this article, which focuses on the epistemically – but also politically, culturally and economically – dominant: How can we sabotage the dominant’s investment in their own ignorance of unjust silencing? How can they be seduced to become acute perceivers of others’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Producing ME/CFS in Dutch Newspapers. A Social-Discursive Analysis About Non/credibility.Marjolein Lotte de Boer & Jenny Slatman - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (5):592-609.
    Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME)/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) is a highly contested illness. This paper analyzes the discursive production of knowledge about, and recognition of ME/CFS. By mobilizing insights from social epistemology and epistemic injustice studies, this paper reveals how actors, through their social-discursive practices, attribute to establishing, sustaining, and disregarding their own and others’ epistemological position. In focusing on the case of the Dutch newspaper reporting about ME/CFS, this paper shows that the debate about this condition predominantly revolves around the ways (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Testimonial Injustice and Mutual Recognition.Lindsay Crawford - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Much of the recent work on the nature of testimonial injustice holds that a hearer who fails to accord sufficient credibility to a speaker’s testimony, owing to identity prejudice, can thereby wrong that speaker. What is it to wrong someone in this way? This paper offers an account of the wrong at the heart of testimonial injustice that locates it in a failure of interpersonal justifiability. On the account I develop, one that draws directly from T. M. Scanlon’s moral contractualist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Deception-Based Hermeneutical Injustice.Federico Luzzi - 2024 - Episteme 21 (1):147-165.
    I argue that patients who suffer genital surgery to ‘disambiguate’ their sexual anatomy, a practice labelled ‘intersex genital mutilation’ (IGM) by intersex advocates, can be understood as victims of hermeneutical injustice in the sense elaborated by Miranda Fricker. This claim is clarified and defended from two objections. I further argue that a particular subset of cases of IGM-based hermeneutical injustice instantiate a novel form of hermeneutical injustice, which I call deception-based hermeneutical injustice. I highlight how this differs from central types (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The caring refusenik: A portrait.Mihaela Mihai - 2019 - Constellations 26 (1):148-162.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4407-4423.
    The aim of this paper is to articulate and defend a particular role for ethico-political values in social epistemology research. I begin by describing a research programme in social epistemology—one which I have introduced and defended elsewhere. I go on to argue that by the lights of this research programme, there is an important role to be played by ethico-political values in knowledge communities, and an important role in social epistemological research in describing the values inhering in particular knowledge communities. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Critical Injustice.Allan Hazlett - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):129-144.
    In this paper I examine unjust deficits of criticism, or what I call cases of “critical injustice.” In paradigm cases of testimonial injustice, prejudice leads one person to give insufficient credibility to another. In paradigm cases critical injustice, prejudice leads one person to offer insufficient criticism of another. Here I articulate the concept of critical injustice and give an explanation of why it is a species of injustice. I also describe a non-prejudicial species of critical injustice and discuss a possible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • When Philosophical Argumentation Impedes Social and Political Progress.Phyllis Rooney - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):317-333.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • How the notion of epistemic injustice can mitigate polarization in a conversation about cultural, ethnic, and racial categorizations.Ingvill Bjørnstad Åberg - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 57 (4-5):983-1003.
    ABSTRACT It is a common contention that education done uncritically and unreflectively may serve to sustain and justify the status quo, in terms of mechanisms of cultural or racial privileging and marginalization. This article explores an argument made from within anti-oppressive education theory and advocated by theorist Kevin Kumashiro, namely that transformative education must entail altering harmful citational practices. I see two shortcomings in relation to this argument: first, its focus on discursive practice entails a prerequisite of high discursive literacy. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Interpretação de atos de fala.Bernardo Alonso & José Carlos Camillo - 2022 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 67 (1):e40490.
    Neste artigo apresentamos de forma breve uma teoria searliana de interpretação dos atos de fala. Mostramos através do exemplo das metáforas que, conforme proposta por Searle, a interpretação de atos de fala consistiria em reconhecer a intenção do falante. Esse processo se daria por meio do uso de regras convencionais da linguagem tanto pelo falante quanto pelo ouvinte. Contudo, as metáforas são um exemplo de que essa proposta de interpretação não é suficiente para descrever o processo pelo qual os agentes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conversational Epistemic Injustice: Extending the Insight from Testimonial Injustice to Speech Acts beyond Assertion.David C. Spewak - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):593-607.
    Testimonial injustice occurs when hearers attribute speakers a credibility deficit because of an identity prejudice and consequently dismiss speakers’ testimonial assertions. Various philosophers explain testimonial injustice by appealing to interpersonal norms arising within testimonial exchanges. When conversational participants violate these interpersonal norms, they generate second-personal epistemic harms, harming speakers as epistemic agents. This focus on testimony, however, neglects how systematically misevaluating speakers’ knowledge affects conversational participants more generally. When hearers systematically misevaluate speakers’ conversational competence because of entrenched assumptions about what (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark