This article proposes a different aesthetic state of Gilles Deleuze’s crystal-image defined as ‘psychedelic crystal’, a formation of the crystalline regime in light of the contemporary revival of scientific research exploring the healing potentialities of hallucinogenic drugs. The proposition of the psychedelic crystal occurs between Deleuze’s crystals of time, the therapeutic dimension of psychedelics, and Siegfried Kracauer’s concept of redemption (as salvation) through the cinematic medium. What lies in the middle of this encounter is a shared understanding of media – (...) films as media; drugs as media – as holding a curative influence: to resume an affirmative potentiality for life and to restore a belief in the (physical and psychical) world. The film-philosophical dimension of the psychedelic crystal, developed specifically through an engagement with Jan Kounen’s Blueberry (2004) as case study, sees cinema with the potential to reanimate our mental and physical reality, especially when in relation to traumatically repressed, dissociated or repeated memory formations – thus looking at certain film aesthetics as a mind-revealing, mind-expanding and mind-healing technology which can be considered as intrinsically entangled with the current revival of therapeutic practices of psychoactive substances. As a proposition, the psychedelic crystal discloses a potential dimension of the psychedelic frontier of healing which transversally embraces the transdisciplinary gamut of film-philosophy, film theory and psychedelic research. (shrink)

We are no longer in a position to attribute a positive essence to humanity and its presumed centrality. What it means to be human cannot be ascertained once and for all or in any a priori fashion....

This essay seeks a new approach between philosophy and neuroscience inspired by the recent ontological turn to think about one of the affects modulations across the contemporary sociopolitical scenario. In this regard, it theoretically triangulates the appropriation of Spinoza's philosophy by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and the reception of Damasio's neuroscience by philosopher Catherine Malabou, taking Gilles Deleuze as a connecting point between these perspectives. It proposes to think the concept of destructive plasticity as a metamorphosis in the organism that, shocked (...) by some traumatic event, turns to a new configuration that deactivates its somatic markers and ends up taking a form of disaffection. Finally, it concludes by bringing this figure closer to what Achille Mbembe, taking the death drive as central concept for thinking necropolitics, names as "lumpenradical". (shrink)

Transcendental materialism is a philosophical perspective that uses German Idealism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and natural science to offer a materialist account of subjectivity and culture. This essay compares this philosophical framework with recent work in the study of religion and philosophy of religion. While transcendental materialism has until now been unconcerned with religion, it offers parallels with this recent work. It differs, however, in its specific understanding of the material dimension of the dialectical relationship between abstraction/conceptuality and practice/embodiment.

The topic of the self has long been salient in feminist philosophy, for it is pivotal to questions about personhood, identity, the body, and agency that feminism must address. In some respects, Simone de Beauvoir's trenchant observation, "He is the Subject, he is the Absolute — she is the Other," sums up why the self is such an important issue for feminism. To be the Other is to be the non-subject, the non-person, the non-agent — in short, the mere body. (...) In law, in customary practice, and in cultural stereotypes, women's selfhood has been systematically subordinated, diminished, and belittled, when it has not been outright denied. Since women have been cast as lesser forms of the masculine individual, the paradigm of the self that has gained ascendancy in U.S. popular culture and in Western philosophy is derived from the experience of the predominantly white and heterosexual, mostly economically advantaged men who have wielded social, economic, and political power and who have dominated the arts, literature, the media, and scholarship. Responding to this state of affairs, feminist philosophical work on the self has taken three main tacks: (1) critique of established views of the self, (2) reclamation of women's selfhood, and (3) reconceptualization of the self to incorporate women's experience. This entry will survey feminist perspectives on the self from all three of these angles. (shrink)

As Jan Christoph Bublitz (2024) rightly notes, the first international declaration on neurotechnologies and human rights would set the tone for further international and domestic regulations. For t...

Bildung has lost its critical potential, some thinkers worry, but I put forward that this might not necessarily be the case. Jan Masschelein and Norbert Ricken argue that modernity has seen Bildung and bio-power grow complicit, effectively negating Bildung’s critical edge by turning criticism into a necessary aspect of contemporary society. However, a development of this sort seems to demand a view of both Bildung and bio-power as sovereign entities that subvert the individuals who constitute them. I challenge this view (...) by reference to Catherine Malabou's philosophy. Malabou argues that bio-power seems to suffer from a residual sovereign element which upholds a separation between a material and a symbolic mode of life, even if bio-power was originally thought as a break with sovereign thinking altogether. Malabou’s engagement with the biological concept epigenesis by way of her own concept plasticity provides an ostensibly non-sovereign approach to bio-power, one that emphasizes change, creativity, accident, and reciprocal influence. I suggest that this point of view might challenge the apparent sovereignty of bio-power and open up for a non-sovereign formulation of Bildung. (shrink)

: How is it possible to account for the double dimension of the “anthropos” of the Anthropocene? At once both a responsible, historical subject, and a neutral, non-conscious and non-reflexive force? According to Chakrabarty, the “anthropos” has to be considered a geological force; according to Smail, it has to be considered an addicted brain. A subjectivity without being for the former, an emotional and dependent biological and symbolic entity for the latter. As an in between solution, I propose a rereading (...) of the concept of “mentality” proposed by Braudel and his followers from the Annales School. The mental would be intermediarily located between the inorganic and the neural, thus helping to fill the gap between two opposed concepts of history, that are both implied in the current redefinition of ecology. (shrink)

What form might truth take in a theoretical frame which precludes notions of origin and telos? Catherine Malabou’s theory of ‘plasticity’ is such a frame, as it takes the accumulation of life and not the search for eternal truths to be a central premise of philosophy. I conduct a close reading of central texts of Malabou’s to conceptualise truth as a plastic phenomenon over three stages: conception, gestation, and nativity. The conception of truth involves its coming-into-shape; gestation its consolidation of (...) shape; nativity the precariousness of being alive. ‘Plastic truth’ represents a meeting of negotiations, accidents, history, and morality, in constant motion; an epistemic modality with moral and political consequences for education. (shrink)

Sensation is a concept with a conflicted philosophical history. It has found as many allies as enemies in nearly every camp from empiricism to poststructuralism. Polyvalent, with an uncertain referent, and often overshadowed by intuition, perception, or cognition, sensation invites as much metaphysical speculation as it does dismissive criticism. -/- The promise of sensation has certainly not been lost on the phenomenologists who have sought to ‘rehabilitate’ the concept. In Plastic Bodies, Tom Sparrow argues that the phenomenologists have not gone (...) far enough, however. Alongside close readings of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, he digs into an array of ancient, modern, and contemporary texts in search of the resources needed to rebuild the concept of sensation after phenomenology. He begins to assemble a speculative aesthetics that is at once a realist theory of sensation and a philosophy of embodiment that breaks the form of the ‘lived’ body. Maintaining that the body is fundamentally plastic and that corporeal identity is constituted by a conspiracy of sensations, he pursues the question of how the body fits into/fails to fit into its aesthetic environment and what must be done to increase the body’s power to act and exist. (shrink)

This paper attempts to reintegrate the concept of plasticity into educational philosophy. Although John Dewey used the concept in Democracy and Education it has not generated much of a critical or practical legacy in educational thought. French philosopher, Catherine Malabou, is the first to think plasticity rigorously and seriously in a contemporary philosophical context and this paper outlines her thinking on it as well as considering its applicability to education. My argument is that her definition not only successfully reintroduces the (...) concept in a way which is generative for contemporary educational philosophy and practice but that it also significantly extends the remit of educational plasticity as previously conceived by Dewey. This paper will examine the concept of educational plasticity as providing an opportunity as well as ‘the feeling of a new responsibility’ towards the plastic subject in philosophical approaches to education. (shrink)

Context: W. R. Ashby’s work on homeostasis as the basic mechanism underlying all kinds of physiological as well as cognitive functions has aroused renewed interest in cognitive science and related disciplines. Researchers have successfully incorporated some of Ashby’s technical results, such as ultrastability, into modern frameworks (e.g., CTRNN networks). Problem: The recovery of Ashby’s technical contributions has left in the background Ashby’s far more controversial non-technical views, according to which homeostatic adaptation to the environment governs all aspects of all forms (...) of life. This thesis entails that life is fundamentally “heteronomous” and it is conceptually at odds with the autopoiesis framework adopted by Ashby’s recent defenders as well as with the primacy of autonomy in human life that most of the Western philosophical tradition upholds. The paper argues that the use of computer simulations focused on the more conceptual aspects of Ashby’s thought may help us recover, extend and consequently assess an overall view of life as heteronomy. Method: The paper discusses some computer simulations of Ashby’s original electro-mechanical device (the homeostat) that implement his techniques (double-feedback loops and random parameter-switching). Results: First simulation results show that even though Ashby’s claims about homeostatic adaptivity need to be slightly weakened, his overall results are confirmed, thereby suggesting that an extension to virtual robots engaged in minimal cognitive tasks may be successful. Implications: The paper shows that a fuller incorporation of Ashby’s original results into recent cognitive science research may trigger a philosophical and technical reevaluation of the traditional distinction between heteronomous and autonomous behavior. Constructivist content: The research outlined in the paper supports an extended constructionist perspective in which agency as autonomy plays a more limited role. (shrink)

This paper explicates Simone de Beauvoir’s concept of “decline” in ageing and assesses both its plausibility and its ethical and political promise. Though I maintain that the concept is largely plausible, and that it helps us to envision social justice for the aged, I also note certain limitations, and these lead me to suggest philosophical and ethical caution as to its range of application. Briefly, both in theory and in practice, Beauvoir appears to questionably conflate the decline of the phenomenological (...) subject with that of a younger adult version of the psychological self or structure of the personality. Through examinations of Beauvoir’s account of dementia and her paternalism towards her dying mother and the declining Jean-Paul Sartre, I suggest how her concept of decline may fall short, but also how her rich phenomenological descriptions point the way to a pluralistic approach to ageing as a social justice issue. (shrink)

This essay argues that the reigning medical and scientific understanding of the endocrine system, which insists on its fundamental biological plasticity, was historically constructed through a dual child–animal metaphor. The work accomplished by such organic metaphors, as Donna Haraway terms them, returns us to the endocrine laboratories and clinics in which they were built in Europe and the United States in the first half of the twentieth century. The child and animal metaphors implanted the concept of plasticity into the human (...) body to the effect of bringing sexed and gendered life under the jurisdiction of science and medicine, where it could not only be normalized in a sense long appreciated by transgender studies but also cultivated towards the ostensible “improvement” and “perfection” of the human. This is also, then, a history of the eugenic heritage of modern endocrinology, which has been largely ignored in recent discussions of plasticity and the body’s materiality. To interrogate the role of foundational organic metaphors in endocrinology is to open up plasticity not only to its historical context but also to radical contestation, making the contemporary assumptions of transgender medicine untimely, particularly the medicalization of the transgender child. (shrink)

The question of affect emerges in the daily realm of routine, and survival; of your physical and existential existence. No matter what the situation or condition in life, as observed, different systems are reactive and generative, corruptible and powerful, colonisable and subversive; that is to say, all systems are subject to affects as much as they are affective, and generative of positive and negative affects within and of a system. This proposition can be tested against whatever the degree of sentience (...) or sensitivity that a system’s responsive domains or bodies may hold. This Spinozist principle of understanding – that every body has the capacity to be affected in positive and or negative ways – provides one of the core axioms for any affect ecology. But if affect is to be taken as more than an indicator of change – a barometer of the change of conditions for a system – then how do we describe affect itself? How can the changes that the notions of affect seek to express be registered or measured? How can affect be situated by and generative of a system simultaneously? This question has long been the subject of Marie-Luise Angerer’s extensive research into and analysis of the conception of affect. (shrink)

Catherine Malabou in The New Wounded develops a general theory of trauma by extending her account of destructive plasticity to the realm of post-traumatic stress disorder. “The new wounded,” she claims, “all come together around a single fact: the radical rupture that trauma introduces in the psyche”. This rupture is demonstrated by an affective fissure, which renders traumatized persons emotionally and socially mute, and a temporal fissure, which punctures subjects’ relationships to their pasts, thus tearing them from any sociohistorical context. (...) Malabou’s new wounded are marked by extreme indifference and a new, unrecognizable identity created ex nihilo with total absence at its center; at times she... (shrink)

This article brings Catherine Malabou's explorations of bodily mutation and metamorphosis at the intersections of philosophy and biomedical science into contact with film. In particular, it explores dialogues between Malabou's work on biomedical understandings of bodily plasticity and filmic representations of medical interventions in the body. This article specifically explores Malabou in relation to Katell Quillévéré's film Heal the Living (Réparer les vivants, 2016), an adaptation of Maylis de Kerangal's novel The Heart (Réparer les vivants, 2014). The film tells the (...) story of Simon Limbres, who is taken to a hospital following a road accent and pronounced brain dead. The film then explores how Simon undergoes organ donation, following his organs on their journey to other bodies in need. I argue that Heal the Living allows us to challenge and extend Malabou's central thinking of (neuro)plasticity, precisely by emphasising the plasticity of the body beyond and in the wake of the brain. Further, the film's emphasis on transplantation allows for an exploration of interpersonal plasticity, developing an ethics of transplanted plasticity in testing and extending conceptions of otherness and alterity central to Malabou's thinking. (shrink)

This article brings together the work of Catherine Malabou and films by Jacques Audiard, Céline Sciamma and Mia Hansen-Løve to probe what a Malabouian approach to cinema might be and how it could be brought into dialogue with specific works. Grounding itself in Malabou's thought around change, migration, metamorphosis and brain plasticity, it homes in on her discussion of cineplastics and the brain as image of the world and screen. It argues that, although the cineplastic is paradoxically not applied to (...) film by Malabou, it constitutes a more productive route into film analysis than her direct cinematic references. Turning to the filmmakers to apply a cineplastic approach, it explores how they enable us to reflect on the mobile encounter between plastic subjects and their world, as the world reaches into them and shapes them and they reflexively respond by shaping themselves and reaching out into the world, moulding their relation to it. Building on the careful line Malabou draws between plasticity and neoliberal flexibility, the article uses her thought to probe the films' politics, finding most interest in their reflexivity, their capacity to render visible the contingency of apparently fixed forms and the non-reconciliation of filmic subjects to their worlds. (shrink)

While much interdisciplinarity brings together proximate fields, broad interdisciplinarity sees integration between disciplines that are perceived to be non-neighboring. This paper argues that the heterogeneity among disciplines in broad interdisciplinarity calls for stricter epistemic norms of testimony for experts that act as translators between the disciplines than those suggested for intra-scientific testimony. The paper is structured around two case studies: the affective turn in social theorizing and the use of quantum mechanics in critical theory as exemplified by Vicky Kirby’s use (...) of work by Karen Barad. These are argued to be instances of broad interdisciplinary borrowing where few translators have joint expertise in both disciplines. For most, therefore, the engagement with for instance the integration between quantum mechanics and critical theory is possible only by the aid of translators. For those without sufficient interactional expertise, however, the epistemic credentials of the translations they inevitably rely upon are inscrutable. Furthermore, any comparison between translations is challenged since translations are argued to be few due to the cognitive divergence between disciplines in broad interdisciplinarity. Consequently, the epistemic integrity of broad interdisciplinarity can only be secured through additional norms of testimony for translators. The paper proposes that (a) all translator’s testimony in broad interdisciplinarity must aim to be neutral with respect to disputed issues within the relevant disciplines and (b) any deviation from (a) must be clearly highlighted. (shrink)

In thinking the passage from the “all-human cerebrum” to what one might call the contemporary “all-too-human” cerebrum in neo-liberal societies and beyond to the “all-too-transhuman” cerebrum in the cybernetic society, in contrasting Wells’s idea of a new world order with the dystopia of the disordering un-world, in considering the prospects of a “world brain” faced with the realities of the “global mnemotechnical system”, in highlighting the differences between the global and authoritarian instrument of “control” in Wells and the descriptions of (...) the control society by Deleuze, and finally, in critiquing the “unifying of the general intelligence services of the world” in Wells and the capturing of the “general intellect”, this paper maps the contemporary prospects of the “world brain” against the backdrop of the worldweariness of the present. (shrink)

This article explores Catherine Malabou’s philosophical foray into neuroscience, especially her continuing work on the topics of brain plasticity and epigenesis. I lay the groundwork for a productive intersection of Malabou’s philosophy with Lacanian psychoanalytic film theory, despite Malabou’s tendency to treat the brain’s plasticity as an issue beyond the scope of the Freudian-Lacanian conception of the unconscious. Through consideration of Todd McGowan’s development of a Lacanian ontology, and by reference to the structure of derivative finance in late capitalism, especially (...) as depicted in The Big Short (Adam McKay, 2015), the article argues in favor of an epigenesis of desire, in which attentiveness to the sedimented layers and conflicted temporalities of the brain’s synaptic connections may prove illuminating for philosophical studies of films that adopt a pedagogical stance toward recent historical or political events. (shrink)

This article interprets Agnès Varda’s Sans toit ni loi (Without roof or law) through the lens of Catherine Malabou’s concept of anarchy as the “non-governable”: order without command or origin. I elucidate key elements of Malabou’s anarchy in my analysis of Varda’s character Mona Bergeron, a rebellious girl who wanders free from structures of domination. I read Varda’s Mona as an emblem of sexual anarchy, with detailed reference to Malabou’s argument that the clitoris – a “little pebble” of concealed pleasure (...) – symbolically disrupts heteronormative governance. Turning to Varda’s filmmaking approach, I engage with Rebecca J. DeRoo’s view that Varda practiced “strategic naivety”, and that her ostensibly artless stance towards cinema history helped her navigate and survive in a male-dominated industry. DeRoo also underscores the influence of non-cinematic works, like Renaissance painting and vernacular photography, in Varda’s films. My article suggests that the intermedial role of photography and ancient myth – akin to a “little pebble” or “scruple” – punctuates both the montage and narrative of Sans toit ni loi. I propose that Varda’s film, with its camera tracking beside the walker and rendering silence, captures the transient freedom of her rebellious girl and discloses an anarchic order that temporarily collapses social hierarchies and governances, while also revelling in the caesura – the cuts or disappearances – that accompany this alternative formation. (shrink)

In the South Korean film, The Parasite, the underling family, in an act of desperation, uses deceptive means to infiltrate the rich family. The term parasite refers nominally to the underling family, and their efforts to befriend and inhabit the class territory and social hierarchy of the rich family. How can this be of use for education? To answer this, we ask: what can we learn from Parasite to inform contemporary philosophy of education? Primarily, this experimental piece written from different (...) philosophical viewpoints, suggests that the images, narrative, and social context of the film cannot be read stereotypically. Using a blend of Deleuze and Stiegler ‘cinema-theory’, we present a heuristic perspective on the Parasite from three viewpoints: (1) South Korean society, and how a pedagogy of the parasite helps to understand the dynamics of contemporary philosophy of education in a global context. South Korea is uniquely placed at the cusp and threshold of deterritorializing Western capitalism, given its position next to the only in-tact communist state system; (2) The film shows how theorizing an exceptional notion of time contributes to the overall pedagogy of the parasite. Here, being a parasite is about waiting to attach oneself to a host, yet this waiting is an anxious, perceptive, adherent time, a reciprocal time, and one internally interconnected to that of the host; (3) The ethics of the parasite. The parasite chooses a host from a certain viewpoint before attaching itself and trying to be absorbed into the host. The pedagogy of the parasite suggests a unique ethical treatment of these assimilative processes and allows us to consider cinema as a parasitic means to shake the passive audience out of its stupor when bearing witness to the violence in the film and its own collusion in the trauma and reality of contemporary capitalism. (shrink)

Drawing on Catherine Malabou’s notion of plasticity, this article argues for a conception of resilience as plastic. Resilience has proven an important concept in health care, describing how we manage life-changing illnesses. Yet, resilience is not without its critics, who suggest it neglects a political, social, or personal dimension in illness. In this article, I propose that a concept of plastic resilience can address these criticisms. On this account, success should not be based on a return to function, but rather (...) on how actively we are involved in the formation of a new self after illness. I address some approaches that can benefit from “plastic resilience,” namely, art therapy, expert companionship, and shared decision-making. In each case, I underline how we should help patients thematize and engage with their new selves, while also being constantly vigilant for how these changes might impact our current assumptions around their preferences for treatment. (shrink)

Em uma síntese emergente na neurociência contemporânea, uma certa noção de metaestabilidade ocupaum papel central. Iniciando por situar a importação do conceito de metaestabilidade da teoria de sistemas dinâmicose da mecânica estatística de redes complexas para essa síntese teórica na neurociência, buscamos uma aproximaçãocom a formação do conceito de plasticidade cerebral na obra de Catherine Malabou. Em seguida, exploramos algumasdas consequências de uma nova ficção ou relato neurocientífico, baseado nessa síntese e proposto principalmente porKarl Friston. Esse relato inclui, além das (...) noções de metaestabilidade e plasticidade, uma tentativa de fundamentaçãoneurobiológica de concepções metapsicológicas a partir da dinâmica de redes neurais. Essa ficção é, por fim, desenroladanuma analogia dos processos demenciais com a intrusão, desde dentro, de processos de individuação física. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the relationship betweenperformativity, as it appears in Judith Butler's work, andplasticity, as it appears in the work of Catherine Malabou. I argue that these concepts are isomorphic. Butler and Malabou both hold that resistance to contemporary forms of power, or “insubordination,” is contingent on a subject's ability to become other than what it is; Butler articulates this ability in terms of performativity, and Malabou articulates it in terms of plasticity. I reveal the social-constructivist dimension of (...) Malabou's work while also making apparent the extent to which Butler's work, contrary to her own way of conceptualizing it, and hence surprisingly and uneasily, presupposes a biologically basic capacity for change. Plasticity is this biologically basic capacity. Both thinkers affirm the idea that insubordinate forms of transformation can be impeded by the discourse that conditions what a subject can think. I suggest that this is an insight that must be heeded, even as I seek to affirm a form of plasticity beyond discourse. (shrink)

In his experimental studies on tactile recognition, the German neurologist Kurt Goldstein observes a peculiar ‘twitching movement’ of the body in neurologically impaired patients suffering from mind-blindness. Drawing on Goldstein’s interpretation of these bodily movements as kinaesthetic reactions, the present article advances a symmetrical conception of tactility that relocates the bipolarity of the sense of touch within the human body. In line with this symmetrical approach, the kinaesthetic reactions will be construed as tactile self-activation or self-touch of the body and (...) conceptualized, following Michael Polanyi’s epistemological notion, as the ‘tacit dimension of touch’. Combining neuropathological aspects with a media theoretical and epistemological trajectory, this article aims at re-evaluating the centrality of the registers of the sense of touch as the fundamental ground for grasping the world in its concrete encounters as well as in its symbolic abstractions. (shrink)

After years of skepticism and denials regarding the significance of concussions in sport, the issue is now front and center. This is fitting, given that the impact of concussions in sport is profound. Thus, it is with trepidation that one ventures to direct some attention onto brain injuries other than concussions incurred through sport. Given a closer look, however, it may be that considering various kinds of brain injuries, with different causes, will help us better understand the range and seriousness (...) of brain injuries in sport. My focus is on emotional trauma in sport. I argue that severe emotional pathology is evidence of underlying brain injury. Any attempt to minimize the significance of emotional disturbance that results from emotional trauma as ‘merely’ psychological in nature is thus misguided. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.