Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) is a very rare condition describing those with an intense desire or need to move from a state of ability to relative impairment, typically through the amputation of one or more limbs. In this paper, I draw upon research in critical disability studies and philosophy of disability to critique arguments based upon the principle of nonmaleficence against such surgery. I demonstrate how the action-relative concept of harm in such arguments relies upon suspect notions of biological (...) and statistical normality, and I contend that each fail to provide normative guidance. I then propose a critical theory of harm, one marked by substantive engagement with both empirical and reflective inquiry across the sciences, social sciences, and humanities. I conclude by discussing the implications of this theory and how it might enrich ongoing debates in bioethics, philosophy of disability, and the health humanities. (shrink)

In this paper, a personalist ethical perspective on end-of-life care of severely ill newborns is presented by posing two questions. (1) Is it ethically justified to decide not to start or to withdraw life-sustaining treatment in severely ill newborns? (2) Is it ethically justified, in exceptional cases, to actively terminate the life of severely ill newborns? Based on five values—respect for life and for the dignity of the human person, quality of life, respect for the process of dying, relational autonomy, (...) and justice—an ethical assessment is conducted that brings us answers to the two ethical questions. (1) Noninitiation or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment in severely ill newborns is ethically acceptable, and might even be a moral duty, when initiation or continuation of medical treatment can be considered futile or even harmful. (2) However, according to the personalist approach, it is not ethically acceptable to actively terminate the life of a severely ill newborn. (shrink)

Typical philosophical discussions of physician-assisted death have focused on whether the practice can be permissible. We address a different question: assuming that pad can be morally permissible, how far does that permission extend? We will argue that granting requests for pad may be permissible even when the pad recipient can no longer speak for themselves. In particular, we argue against the ‘competency requirement’ that constrains pad-eligibility to presently-competent patients in most countries that have legalized pad. We think pad on terminally (...) ill, incapacitated patients can be morally permissible in cases where advance directives or suitable surrogate decision-makers are available, and should be legally permissible in such cases as well. We argue that this view should be accepted on pain of inconsistency: by allowing surrogate decision-makers to request withdrawal of life-sustaining care on behalf of patients and by allowing patients to request pad, we rule out any plausible justification for imposing a competency requirement on pad. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the idea that physician-assisted death might come into question in the cases of psychiatric patients who are incapable of making autonomous choices about ending their lives. I maintain that the main arguments for physician-assisted death found in recent medical ethical literature support physician-assisted death in some of those cases. After assessing several possible criticisms of what I have argued, I conclude that the idea that physicianassisted death can be acceptable in some cases of psychiatric patients (...) who lack autonomy ought to be taken into account in assessing the moral and legal acceptability of physician-assisted death. (shrink)

The Groningen Protocol aims at providing guidance in end-of-life decision-making for severely impaired newborns. Since its publication in 2005 many bioethicists and health care professionals have written articles in response. However, only very little is known about the opinion among the general population on this subject. The aim of this study was to present the general attitude towards neonatal euthanasia (NE) among the Austrian population and the factors associated with the respondents’ opinion.

Jotkowitz, Glick, and Gesundheit (2008) rightly critique Manninen (2006) for an errant analysis of the Groningen protocol. However, they draw conclusions about the protocol itself that are not justified. Because of the nature of the care of infants, the Groningen protocol doesn't break new ethical ground. We already have to treat infants without direct access to their autonomous preferences or values; therefore, we are already making the decisions that Jotkowitz, Glick, and Gesundheit argue we are beginning to take once active (...) euthanasia of infants is allowed. (shrink)

‘Terminal discharges’ are carried out in Singapore for patients who wish to die at home. However, if due diligence is not exercised, parallels may be drawn with euthanasia. We present a theoretical discussion beginning with the definition of terminal discharges and the reasons why they are carried out in Singapore. By considering the intention behind terminal discharges and utilising a multidisciplinary team to deliberate on the clinical, social and ethical intricacies with a patient- and context-specific approach, euthanasia is avoided. It (...) is hoped that this will provide a platform for professionals in palliative medicine to negotiate challenging issues when arranging a terminal discharge, so as to avoid the pitfall of committing euthanasia in a country such as Singapore where euthanasia is illegal. It is hoped that a set of guidelines for terminal discharges may someday be realised to assist professionals in Singapore and around the world. (shrink)

The Dutch rules governing neonatal euthanasia, known as the Groningen Protocol, require parental consent for severely disabled infants with poor prognoses to have their lives terminated. This paper questions whether parental consent should be dispositive in such cases, and argues that the potential suffering of the neonate or pediatric patient should be the decisive factor under such unfortunate circumstances.