Es comúnmente reconocida la relación íntima que la casa que Wittgenstein construyó para su hermana guarda con el proyecto del Tractatus —un proyecto que haciendo visible el mundo tal como la ciencia lo representa, despierta en el lector la necesidad apremiante de una reorientación ética de su vida. Sin embargo, Wittgenstein llegó a percibir ambas obras como fracasos. Los objetivos de este artículo son I) dilucidar la razón (o razones) de dicho fracaso; II) argumentar que el segundo Wittgenstein no abandonó (...) su proyecto ético, sino que modificó las estrategias para llevarlo a cabo —algo que también afectó a su concepción de la filosofía; y III) mostrar cómo Wittgenstein pudo resolver un problema básico para el conservadurismo tardío anclándolo en el orden inherente a la actividad humana ordinaria. (shrink)

This essay, published originally in 2002, is reprinted in “Contextualism—The Next Generation: Symposium on the Future of a Methodology,” because of its impact on the thinking that informs and has led to this new symposium. Burke's argument is that the term context has become “an intellectual slogan or shibboleth” and that “there is a price to pay” for its “more and more frequent use... in a number of disciplines—among them, anthropology, archaeology, art history, geography, intellectual history, law, linguistics, literary criticism, (...) philosophy, politics, psychology, sociology, and theology.” A brief history of the uses of the term and its cognates in these disciplines is provided, along with an examination of “recent interest in the phenomenology of recontextualism or ‘reframing,’” which “depends on agency, creativity, and the power to adapt” and which, indeed, almost defines what is meant by “originality, innovation, invention, or creativity.” The essay concludes that context ought to be used mainly in the plural to indicate that no topic is properly interpretable in any single framework. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to consider the narrative that Philipp Frank’s decline in the United States started in the 1940s and 1950s. Though this account captures a kernel of truth, it is not the whole story. After taking a closer look at Frank’s published writings and at his proposed book, one can see how he imagined the reunion of logical empiricism. His approach was centered on sociology and on the sociological aspects of science and knowledge. As I will (...) argue, Frank’s longstanding interest in the reunion of the sciences and the humanities can be detected in his sociology and philosophy of science as well as in his reading of Carnap’s critique of metaphysics. But Frank’s intention was never fully recognized, partly due to the atmosphere of American philosophy and sociology in the second half of the twentieth century. As a result, his conception of unified science and logical empiricism died with him. (shrink)

The paper is a reflection on the biography and philosophy of Ágnes Heller. It considers questions of emigration, personality, politics, change, continuity, and friendship in the development of her philosophy.

Arguing for the merits of an antipodean perspective that embraces the linked historical and current relations between Tasman, British and other worlds, this paper focuses on the majoritarian responses of those of English ancestry in Britain and within the British diaspora to wide ranging changes that potentially challenge their national supremacy in both contexts. After briefly assessing some of the approaches to exploring the identities of the 'English/ British' separately in Australia and New Zealand, some suggestions are made about how (...) majoritarian narratives are best reframed, conceptually and methodologically, both within the antipodes and the broader contexts within which they have always been placed. The adoption of an antipodean perspective is deemed necessary in order to understand how changes in majority status and shifts in national identity are mutually constituted within and across the above worlds. (shrink)

Focusing on the production of lists of evaluative criteria has oversimplified our judgments of qualitative research. On the one hand, aspirations for global criteria applicable to “qualitative” or “interpretive” research have glossed over crucial analytic differences among specific types of inquiry. On the other hand, the methodological concern with appropriate ways of acquiring trustworthy data has led to an overly narrow proceduralism. I suggest that rational evaluations of analytic worth require the delineation of species of analytic tasks and the exercise (...) of genre-appropriate judgments, to determine what constitutes explanatory, interpretive, or explicatory adequacy. I focus on the parameters of judgment for interpretations and explications because their analytic differences have not yet been made distinct in qualitative research. (shrink)

Karl Popper is famous for having proposed that science advances by a process of conjecture and refutation. He is also famous for defending the open society against what he saw as its arch enemies – Plato and Marx. Popper’s contributions to thought are of profound importance, but they are not the last word on the subject. They need to be improved. My concern in this book is to spell out what is of greatest importance in Popper’s work, what its failings (...) are, how it needs to be improved to overcome these failings, and what implications emerge as a result. The book consists of a collection of essays which dramatically develop Karl Popper’s views about natural and social science, and how we should go about trying to solve social problems. Criticism of Popper’s falsificationist philosophy of natural science leads to a conception of science that I call aim-oriented empiricism. This makes explicit metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe that are an implicit part of scientific knowledge – implicit in the way science excludes all theories that are not explanatory, even those that are more successful empirically than accepted theories. Aim-oriented empiricism has major implications, not just for the academic discipline of philosophy of science, but for science itself. Popper generalized his philosophy of science of falsificationism to arrive at a new conception of rationality – critical rationalism – the key methodological idea of Popper’s profound critical exploration of political and social issues in his The Open Society and Its Enemies, and The Poverty of Historicism. This path of Popper, from scientific method to rationality and social and political issues is followed here, but the starting point is aim-oriented empiricism rather than falsificationism. Aim-oriented empiricism is generalized to form a conception of rationality I call aim-oriented rationalism. This has far-reaching implications for political and social issues, for the nature of social inquiry and the humanities, and indeed for academic inquiry as a whole. The strategies for tackling social problems that arise from aim-oriented rationalism improve on Popper’s recommended strategies of piecemeal social engineering and critical rationalism, associated with Popper’s conception of the open society. This book thus sets out to develop Popper’s philosophy in new and fruitful directions. The theme of the book, in short, is to discover what can be learned from scientific progress about how to achieve social progress towards a better world. (shrink)

With the publication of The Social Frameworks of Knowledge? the English speaking world has at last been given a serious opportunity to approach the complex sociological thought of Georges Gurvitch. However, as the author himself admits in the Preface, this book appears ?abstract and schematic particularly to the uninitiated?.1 The aim of this paper will be to try to relate this translated work to the main body of Gurvitch's writing and particularly to his stance in the sociology of knowledge. First (...) I will examine the intellectual origins of his sociology of knowledge and his attitude to his predecessors in the field. Secondly I will compare his approach to the sociology of knowledge to that of P. L. Berger and T. Luckmann. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the conceptual and methodological points of convergence and divergence of two intellectual currents frequently referred to as the decolonial and ontological turns in social and anthropological theory. Salient points considered are the ways both theoretical projects unsettle modernity’s dominant ontological and epistemological foundations by seriously engaging the conceptual potential of thinking with alterity (ethical dimension) and from exteriority (geopolitical dimension). I compare their subversive methodological contributions, examining, in particular, Enrique Dussel’s analectical hermeneutic approach and Eduardo (...) Viveiros de Castro’s ethnographic method of controlled equivocation. Lastly, I discuss how both theories and approaches complement each other’s efforts to destabilize Western modernity’s philosophical and anthropological foundations. (shrink)

Mainstream management scholarship has for the last half century largely legitimated its scholarship and production of knowledge on the grounds that its research is objective, neutral, scientific and uninfluenced either by its researchers or by data distorted by subjectivist human factors (Locke & Spender 2011). However, over the decades there have been serious and sustained criticisms of aspects of this scholarship not least from within the field by mainstream scholars, eg Otley (Accounting, Organizations and Society 5: 413-428, 1980, 1995, 2007) (...) and Panozzo (Accounting, Organizations and Society 22: 447-480, 1997) on grounds of the inadequacy of synchronic studies that were found to be non-replicable; of the limitations of surveys/questionnaires, so frequently used to acquire data; of abstract idealisations unrelated to the real world and on an ‘obsessive preoccupation with numbers’ (Locke & Spender 2011:xiii). Serious criticisms have been made of this type of scholarship more generally in the social sciences on the grounds of political bias (see eg Bourdieu 1990). Claims to the scientific nature and therefore legitimacy of this type of research have also been contested. On the other hand examples of alternate scholarship, advocating and using mixed method and multi-paradigmatic approaches, have been published in the same high-ranking journals as has research using the mainstream approaches mentioned above (see eg Chenhall & Euske 2007, Brown & Brignall 2007). These showed a richness in the data, generally unobtainable in solely objectivist approaches. Yet despite these factors, mainstream scholarship has in the main continued to produce objectivist, empiricist, quantitative-focussed research and knowledge (Green 2013). Reasons for this have been suggested, at the local level, the academy, including its administration, heads of department and journal editors driven by the criteria set by high-ranking journals (Green 2012b). At a wider level, the US government’s fright at the successful launch of the Soviet Sputnik led to demands for ‘hard’ science also in the management field (Green 2012b). Managerialism, a dominant ideology (and not only in the West), has been an influence on researchers’ approaches, giving managers the prerogative of having the necessary knowledge and also the power and capability successfully to implement strategies independently of their subordinates (Green 2012b, 2013). Although these explanations may have some mileage in explaining the persistence of this type of scholarship, and its resistance to the multitude of criticism against it and to compelling examples of more inclusive research, further explanations have been sought. It is argued in this paper that deeper explanations may lie in the power of neoliberal ideas, principles and policies which have spread beyond economics, permeating and seriously affecting other aspects of life including education and scholarship. (shrink)

This article deals with phenomena occurring at the interface of the existential, the religious, and scientific inquiry. On the basis of in-depth interviews with Polish physicists and biologists, I examine the role that science and religion play in their narrative of the meaning of the Universe and human life. I show that the narratives about meaning have a system-related character that is associated with responses to adjacent metaphysical questions, including those based on scientific knowledge. I reconstruct the typical amalgam questions (...) of Polish scientists and come to a conclusion about the stability of religious and nonreligious amalgams in this group. Critically referring to the thesis concerning the secularizing impact of science, I conclude that science by itself does not have a destructive effect on Polish scientists’ confidence that life and the Universe are meaningful, but is rather an exacerbating factor of the existing worldview system. (shrink)

What phenomenological details can investigations by human scientists provide to classical phenomenological inquiries regarding sense-constitution, the reflexivity of mundane understanding, and the production of objective knowledge? Problems of constitutional phenomenology are summarized and specifications are provided regarding ways to study intersubjective events. After a review of some quandaries suggested by an examination of Husserl, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Schutz, Gurwitsch, Garfinkel, and Adorno, the author provides two demonstrations of social phenomenologically inspired human studies—the playing of games with rules and the objective determination (...) of flavors by coffee tasters—in order to identify and describe some of the local details of sense organization that the human sciences can provide to phenomenological researchers. (shrink)

The paper recalls my response to Berger’s and Luckmann’s book on reading it shortly after its initial publication. It seeks to convey why it was that I failed to make use of the book at that time, even though I recognised it as an outstanding contribution to my intended field of research, and how later I came to see that this may have been a lost opportunity. The story touches upon diverse important issues including the relationship between epistemology and the (...) sociology of knowledge; the epistemic authority of the natural sciences; the relevance of causal accounting as topic and resource in sociology; the importance of Durkheim in the sociology of knowledge; and the great value of Berger’s and Luckmann’s book as a corrective to the undue individualism that has long been a feature of the social sciences in the English-speaking world. Even so, the paper is more recollection than analysis, and unreliable recollection at that, after many decades in which there has been time to forget, or even to reconstruct, a very great deal. (shrink)

The article examines Randall Collins's magnum opus, The Sociology of Philosphies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change in relation to a number of discourses bearing on the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of philosophies, from Hegel and 19th-century historicism to Mannheim, Foucault, Bourdieu and Gillian Rose's Hegel Contra Sociology. The article explicates Collins's dual theory of intellectual networks and institutional conflict as factors in the explanation of intellectual change. The article interprets Collins's work as a classic application of Durkheimian (...) sociological principles to the analysis of knowledge. However, the article argues that Collins is less successful in accounting for the internal normative motives of inquiry and the problem of what Hegel saw as the claims of reason in history based on the orientation to truth. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Marxist theory of the proletariat in many ways projects a romanticized self-description or 'false shadow' of its revolutionary spokesmen, and hence more proximately describes the missionary complex and Bohemian life-style of marginalized political intellectuals than a 'really existing' working class. This 'mistaken iden tity play' between spokespersons and their favourite sociological con stituency, which is already alluded to in various historical left-wing and right-wing 'farewells to the proletariat', is more systematically criti cized in recent reassessments (...) by, for example, Bahro, Gouldner, Gorz, or Bauman. Next to its psychological and sociological infrastructure, classical proletarian standpoint theory has also attracted critical atten tion because of its suggestive epistemological linkage between the con dition of estrangement and claims for scientific objectivity. This connection is reasserted by recent feminist and postcolonial standpoint epistemologies - which, however, also tend to repeat the logic of classi cal Marxism's metonymic 'identity play'. The paper concludes with a defence\of the idea of 'situated knowledges', which wishes to preserve the classical liaison between objectivity, distanciation and marginality, while simultaneously rendering it more reflexive in critical confron tation with the ubiquitous 'spokesperson problem'. (shrink)

Acceptance of the quantization of the elementary electrical charge was preceded by a bitter dispute between Robert Millikan and Felix Ehrenhaft, which lasted for many years. Both Millikan and Ehrenhaft obtained very similar experimental results and yet Millikan was led to formulate the elementary electrical charge and Ehrenhaft to fractional charges. There have been four major attempts to reconstruct the historical events that led to the controversy: Holton ; Franklin ; Barnes et al. ; Goodstein. So we have the controversy (...) not only among the original protagonists but also among those who have interpreted the experiment. The objective of this study is a critical appraisal of the four interpretations and an attempt to provide closure to the controversy. It is plausible to suggest that Ehrenhaft's methodology approximated the traditional scientific method, which did not allow him to discard anomalous data. Millikan, on the other hand, in his publications espoused the scientific method but in private was fully aware of the dilemma faced and was forced to select data to uphold his presuppositions. A closure to the controversy is possible if we recognize that Millikan's data selection procedure depended primarily on his commitment to his presuppositions. Franklin's finding that the selection of the drops did not change the value of e but only its statistical error carries little weight as Millikan did not perform Franklin-style analyses that could have justified the exclusion of drops. It is plausible to suggest that had Millikan performed such analyses, he would have included them in his publication in order to provide support for his data selection procedures. In the absence of his presuppositions, Millikan could not tell which was the ‘expected correct’ value of e and the degree of statistical error. Finally, if we try to understand Millikan's handling of data with no reference to his presuppositions, then some degree of ‘misconduct’ can be perceived. Introduction An appraisal of Holton's interpretation An appraisal of Franklin's interpretation An appraisal of Barnes, Bloor and Henry's interpretation An appraisal of Goodstein's interpretation A crucial test: the second drop of 15 March 1912 Conclusion: Is closure possible? (shrink)

This article argues that the sociology of knowledge as a critical subfield of sociology and the artist Marcel Duchamp are engaged in epistemologically analogous projects. Two sets of claims demonstrate the analogy: that Duchamp and the sociology of knowledge both have the same conception of and attitude toward their objects, and that they both mount similar critiques of the institutions they occupy. A set of similar practices leads both to adopt an attitude of reflexivity which courts self-refutation by changing the (...) ontological status of their objects and the epistemological status of their own practices. The analogy implies some new ways of thinking about the institutional role of the sociology of knowledge, the practice and epistemology of sociology, and perhaps the epistemic character of modernism. (shrink)

The ArgumentAlexandre Koyré is one of the most important historians of philosophic and scientific though since the thirties. Research on the Scientific Revolution, on Galileo, Descartes, Newton, as well as on Paracelsus and Boehme has deeply changed under his influential method: it has been a model for Kuhn's methodology of paradigms and revolutions in the histroy of science. Whereas Koyré used to be considered opposed in his ideology and method to sociological approaches, he has recently been characterized by Yehuda Elkana (...) as a sociologist of knowledge. In fact, until now one of the main sources of his method had not been identified: it is only by acknowledging the influence of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl on Koyré that it is possible to explain how the latter wrote his thesis on Boehme's mystical thought just before his Etudes galiléennes. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl was teaching history of philosophy at the Sorbonne, and Koyré was strongly influenced by his idea of “prelogical thinking” as a universel phenomenon and in a general way by the sociological school of Durkheim. Conceptual analysis deriving from Husserl, collective representations and attitude mentale, came together in Alexandre Koyrè's method. (shrink)

This article takes an intergenerational lens to the study of fathers. It draws on evidence from two economic and social research council-funded intergenerational studies of fathers, one of which focused on four-generation British families and the other which included new migrant (Polish) fathers. The article suggests both patterns of change and continuity in fatherhood across the generations. It demonstrates how cultural forces and material conditions need to combine to facilitate change in fathers? exercise of agency and how social class and (...) the conditions of being a migrant shape fathers? practices. It argues that in seeking to recast the public debate about parenting, it is necessary to penetrate below the discursive level of talk about parenting to examine the habitual nature of many family practices, an endeavour to which an intergenerational approach is well suited. This approach enabled us to tease out the horizontal pull of within-generation influences on fathers, the vertical pull of inheritance from older to younger generations and the material and cultural conditions of fathers? current locations, all of which shape their practices. This analysis also alerted us to changes in conceptual language ? not only from fatherhood to fathering ? but also to the historical resilience of the concept of childcare as reserved largely for the role and practices of mothers. (shrink)

Four basic problems that a theory of science has to deal with concern epistemology, structure, causality, and dynamics of science. These problems deal with the relationship of induction/deduction, actors/structures, internal/external factors, and continuity/discontinuity. Traditionally they have been solved one-sidedly. Considering science as a self-organizing system allows a more integrative approach. Science is a complex, nonlinear system that is made up of two moments: scientific actors and scientific structures. Scientific self-organization operates synchronously and diachronically. Synchronous scientific self-organization is a mutual production (...) process between scientific actors and structures. Scientific systems are self-organizing units that perform the production of theories and truths by the way of a productive, circular causal duality of scientific actors and scientific structures. Science is a dynamic system where research practices produce and reproduce structures that produce and reproduce research practices. Scientific structures are medium and outcome of scientific actions. At the action level one can find a systemic hierarchy that is made up of individual researchers, research groups, scientific communities, and the overall scientific community. Scientific structures include theories, research institutions, technologies, journals, publications, science funds; norms, values, and rules of scientific conduct. The main scientific practices can be categorized as genuinely scientific practices (innovation, dissemination, scientific interchange, funding-related activities, teaching), cultural practices (public discourse), political practices (science policy), and economic practices (action related to scientific knowledge as commodities, patents, science-industry-partnerships, sponsorship). Science is an open system that is structurally coupled to other subsystems of society, it is neither internally, nor externally determined, its development is caused by a complex interplay of internal and external factors, it is a relatively autonomous system. Systems in nature and society act as a sort of data for the scientific system, research processes establish an informational relationship between the scientific system and its environment in the sense that theories are complex, non-linear reflections of environmental processes. Due to the fact that all complex systems are informational, one can say that science produces information about information systems. Science is a 2nd order information system, it produces meta-information. Philosophy of science is a science of science, it produces information about information about information, it is a 3rd order information system. The metaphor of science as a grand hypertext refers to the self-referential character of scientific texts. A scientific text by the way of citation refers to other scientific texts, it incorporates part of the history of science, and methodologically discusses other texts. The formation of scientific knowledge can be described as a double-process of induction and deduction, abstraction and concretization, where scientific knowledge consists of both empirical knowledge and theoretical knowledge and is formed in loop that consists of two self-organization processes. The self-organization of scientific knowledge is a mutually productive relationship between experience and theory. Scientific knowledge is a unity of experience and theory. The self-organization of scientific knowledge is a dialectical cycle where signals from material reality are transformed into experienced data that is interpreted and results in hypotheses and theories which are transformed into methods and technologies that are employed in order to cause effects in material reality that can again be observed as data. In this self-organization process there is the bottom-up-emergence of theoretical knowledge and the top-down-emergence of experiences and material effects. Each scientific theory is a truth claim, but one that is based on a systematic methodology, permanent evaluation and correction, and conflict-based discourse. Hence scientific truths are not absolute truths, they are truths-in-question, truths-in-discourse, and truths-in-conflict, and truths-in-development. One can distinguish formal, adequate, discursive, and practical truth of a theory. Due to the fact that the knowledge-based society is a high risk society, practical truth of science in the form of an ethically responsible science is of central importance. Diachronic self-organization of science means that dominant scientific paradigms at some point of time loose their effectiveness, paradoxes and instabilities show up, science enters crisis, a new dominant paradigm emerges. If a large gap between scientific theory and the problems posed for science by itself and by society emerges, the dominant structural patterns are increasingly questioned. This can have scientific or wider societal causes, or a combination of both. The resulting crisis is a process of creation and destruction. The whole process is one of the emergence of scientific order from noise. Variation is a permanent phenomenon of scientific evolution, but in phases of instability where the self-organization of science shifts from self-reproduction to order from noise the degree of variation and development by chance is much larger. (shrink)