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  1. Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline: a reply to Manor.Saul Smilansky - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):333-337.
    I made two claims against CE. First, that under careful analysis, CE compels us to bring about states of affairs so unacceptable that the position becomes absurd. By virtue of its very conceptual structure, CE gives us manifestly wrong instructions. Second, that CE’s hope of reconciling a strong egalitarianism with robust personal choice and something like the prevailing market economy is a chimera. Manor’s paper does not dispute my second claim. Indeed, his own claim, that in fact CE leads to (...)
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  • How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?Gerald Lang - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):698-722.
    Imagine a two-person distributive case in which Ernest's choices yield X and Bertie's choices yield X + Y, producing an income gap between them of Y. Neither Ernest nor Bertie is responsible for this gap of Y, since neither of them has any control over what the other agent chooses. This is what Susan Hurley calls the “Boring Problem” for luck egalitarianism. Contrary to Hurley's relatively dismissive treatment of it, it is contended that the Boring Problem poses a deep problem (...)
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