A well-established tradition has argued that it is not legitimate to attribute to Parmenides a Fregean semantics, i.e. the distinction between ‘naming’ and ‘meaning’. Nonetheless, Parmenides claims more than once (B 8.53, B 9.1) that mortalsdo namereality, although incorrectly. As many scholars have emphasised, because it is fair neither to conclude that mortals’ names are ‘empty names’ nor dismiss Opinion's account (i.e., broadly speaking, the mortals’ account of reality) itself as meaningless, it seems that Parmenides is suggesting that some kind (...) of distinction between what names refer to and what names mean must be drawn. In view of this, what is Parmenides’ account of names?My suggestion is that in order to explain the Eleatic philosophy of language (and the Eleatic account of names) a step back is required. More specifically, Parmenides’ epistemology has to be taken into account. Indeed, if we assume that Parmenides is arguing for an ‘epistemological disjunctivism’ – such that the veridical and truthful state and the erroneous and deceptive state are essentially different – it will be clear that he is further arguing for what could be defined as a ‘semantic disjunctivism’, so that true speech and false speech are essentially different as well. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the materialistic account of the blending and the way it shapes an original organism model. I aim to shed light on the threads of connections we can gather between the Presocratic and the Stoic views on the physical krasis of the body. The Stoics share with Parmenides and Empedocles the idea of a single material cosmic continuum in which thought and perception depend on the various blendings of the physical constituents of the body. Both of these (...) naturalistic traditions are committed to the view that substance is continuous and undergoes constant and qualitative change. My point is to underline how this view of a sympathetic cosmos presupposes a model of the individuality that is radically open. Thus, by taking off the notion of the krasis, the Stoics take off a problem – namely, that of the organism – that is first fleshed out by the Presocratics – Parmenides and Empedocles in particular – philosophers. In this respect, the Stoic view of relational identity indebts to the Presocratic account, beyond and against the Aristotelian one. (shrink)

L'article vise à déterminer si le nóos dans sa valeur volitionnelle a été attribué par Xénophane non seulement au theós, mais aussi aux humains. Dans ce but, l'étude commence avec l'examen du fr. 25, où un nóos volitionnel est clairement reconnu comme une caractéristique de la nature divine : le fragment suggère que la spécificité du theós tient dans sa capacité à provoquer des effets sur toute chose, et cela, sans effort. L'analyse se tourne alors vers l’examen des fragments de (...) Xénophane sur le thème du savoir et sur la description des dieux, afin de démontrer que des capacités noétiques, en général, et du nóos volitionnel en particulier, sont attribuables aux humains : elle s'appuie sur le contraste entre la nature absolue du divin et celle purement comparative de la dimension humaine, La relation étroite qui, selon Xénophane, lie la sophíe à la areté et à ses implications pratiques est aussi une clé pour comprendre quels pourraient être les effets réels du nóos volitionnel de l’homme. (shrink)