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The Science of Belief: A Progress Report (Expanded Reprint)

Eric Mandelbaum & Nicolas Porot

In Joseph Summer Julien Musolino, The Science of Beliefs: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Cambridge University Press. (forthcoming)

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Mindshaping and Constructing Kinds.Mason Westfall - forthcoming - In Tad Zawidzki, Routledge Handbook of Mindshaping.details In this chapter, I juxtapose the mindshaping research program with the literature on the metaphysics of social construction. I suggest that these research programs are remarkably congenial. The practices of interest to mindshaping theorists are more or less straightforward instances of the processes that are taken to be essential to social construction. As such, a constructionist metaphysics of psychological kinds is readily available. I discuss some recent constructionist treatments of particular psychological kinds against this backdrop, before considering how the constructionist (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Austere relationalism and seeing aspects.Paweł Jakub Zięba - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy:e13059.details Austere relationalism combines two claims. First, the phenomenal character of perception is at least partially constituted by the perceived items. Second, perception doesn’t consist in representing the perceived items as being a certain way. Recently, Daniel Kalpokas, Avner Baz, and Søren Overgaard have cast doubt on the ability of austere relationalism to account for the peculiar phenomenology of aspect-seeing. I show that this explanatory challenge can be met. Some of the claims made by the critics can be resisted, whereas other (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
A Minimalist Threshold for Epistemically Irrational Beliefs.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong, What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details This paper aims to shed light on the nature of belief and provide support to the view that I call ‘Minimalism’. It shows that Minimalism is better equipped than the traditional approach to separating belief from imagination and addressing cases of belief’s evidence- resistance. The key claim of the paper is that no matter how epistemically irrational humans’ beliefs are, they always retain a minimal level of rationality. Download Export citation Bookmark
Credo in unam credentiam: religious beliefs are standard beliefs.Liam D. Ryan - 2024 - Synthese 204 (73):31.details Does religious belief differ in any interesting way from other kinds of belief? For now, take ‘belief’ to mean how one takes the world to be, on the basis of which they act. Call beliefs like this ‘ordinary beliefs’. There are also more complicated, or abstract, beliefs. Call such beliefs ‘non-ordinary beliefs’. Are religious beliefs different in any significant or interesting way from what we call ‘standard belief’? Our analysis shows that they are not. Although the content of religious belief (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Evidence for multiple kinds of belief in theory of mind.Alejandro Vesga, Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo - forthcoming - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.details People routinely appeal to ‘beliefs’ in explaining behavior; psychologists do so as well (for instance, in explaining belief polarization and learning). Across three studies (N = 1,843, U.S-based adults), we challenge the assumption that ‘belief’ picks out a single construct in people’s theory of mind. Instead, laypeople attribute different kinds of beliefs depending on whether the beliefs play predominantly epistemic roles (such as truth-tracking) or non-epistemic roles (such as social signaling). We demonstrate that epistemic and non-epistemic beliefs are attributed under (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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