A Minimalist Threshold for Epistemically Irrational Beliefs

In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong, What is Belief? Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This paper aims to shed light on the nature of belief and provide support to the view that I call ‘Minimalism’. It shows that Minimalism is better equipped than the traditional approach to separating belief from imagination and addressing cases of belief’s evidence- resistance. The key claim of the paper is that no matter how epistemically irrational humans’ beliefs are, they always retain a minimal level of rationality.

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