Surveillance has become a routine, everyday occurrence ininformational societies. Many agencies have an interest in personal data, and a wide spectrum of them use searchabledatabases to classify and catalogue such data. From policingto welfare to the Internet and e-commerce, personal data havebecome very valuable, economically and administratively. Whilequestions of privacy are indeed raised by such surveillance,the processes described here have as much to do with social sorting,and thus present new problems of automated categorization of datasubjects. Privacy and data protection measures (...) do address someof the questions raised, but they tend to be limited to individualisticreadings of the situation, and not to consider issues of fairnessand equality. An ethics for everyday surveillance is proposed thatconsiders personhood as central, but highlights its social andembodied dimensions. Reductionism of practice and of analysisis thus avoided as the face comes to the fore. Hence the title. (shrink)

That technologies may raise ethical issues is now widely recognised. The ‘responsible innovation’ literature – as well as, to a lesser extent, the applied ethics and bioethics literature – has responded to the need for ethical reflection on technologies by developing a number of tools and approaches to facilitate such reflection. Some of these instruments consist of lists of questions that people are encouraged to ask about technologies – a methodology known as the ‘Socratic approach’. However, to date, these instruments (...) have often not adequately acknowledged various political impacts of technologies, which are, I suggest, essential to a proper account of the ethical issues they raise. New technologies can make some people richer and some people poorer, empower some and disempower others, have dramatic implications for relationships between different social groups and impact on social understandings and experiences that are central to the lives, and narratives, of denizens of technological societies. The distinctive contribution of this paper, then, is to offer a revised and updated version of the Socratic approach that highlights the political, as well as the more traditionally ethical, issues raised by the development of new technologies. (shrink)

It is often claimed that surveillance should be proportionate, but it is rarely made clear exactly what proportionate surveillance would look like beyond an intuitive sense of an act being excessive. I argue that surveillance should indeed be proportionate and draw on Thomas Hurka’s work on proportionality in war to inform the debate on surveillance. After distinguishing between the proportionality of surveillance per se, and surveillance as a particular act, I deal with objections to using proportionality as a legitimate ethical (...) measure. From there I argue that only certain benefits and harms should be counted in any determination of proportionality. Finally I look at how context can affect the proportionality of a particular method of surveillance. In conclusion, I hold that proportionality is not only a morally relevant criterion by which to assess surveillance, but that it is a necessary criterion. Furthermore, while granting that it is difficult to assess, that difficulty should not prevent our trying to do so. (shrink)

Despite recent growth in surveillance capabilities there has been little discussion regarding the ethics of surveillance. Much of the research that has been carried out has tended to lack a coherent structure or fails to address key concerns. I argue that the just war tradition should be used as an ethical framework which is applicable to surveillance, providing the questions which should be asked of any surveillance operation. In this manner, when considering whether to employ surveillance, one should take into (...) account the reason for the surveillance, the authority of the surveillant, whether or not there has been a declaration of intent, whether surveillance is an act of last resort, what is the likelihood of success of the operation and whether surveillance is a proportionate response. Once underway, the methods of surveillance should be proportionate to the occasion and seek to target appropriate people while limiting surveillance of those deemed inappropriate. By drawing on the just war tradition, ethical questions regarding surveillance can draw on a long and considered discourse while gaining a framework which, I argue, raises all the key concerns and misses none. (shrink)

Portable digital devices, such as smartphones, tablets, and netbooks, now permeate our society. These devices allow substantial efficiencies in access to and communication of information by mental health professionals. They also bring with them risks to psychotherapist–client privacy. This article reviews these threats and offers suggestions as to their mitigation.

Ethics plays a key role in the normative analysis of the impacts of technology. We know that computers in general and the processing of data, the use of artificial intelligence, and the combination of computers and/or artificial intelligence with robotics are all associated with ethically relevant implications for individuals, groups, and society. In this article, we argue that while all technologies are ethically relevant, there is no need to create a separate ‘ethics of X’ or ‘X ethics’ for each and (...) every subtype of technology or technological property—e.g. computer ethics, AI ethics, data ethics, information ethics, robot ethics, and machine ethics. Specific technologies might have specific impacts, but we argue that they are often sufficiently covered and understood through already established higher-level domains of ethics. Furthermore, the proliferation of tech ethics is problematic because (a) the conceptual boundaries between the subfields are not well-defined, (b) it leads to a duplication of effort and constant reinventing the wheel, and (c) there is danger that participants overlook or ignore more fundamental ethical insights and truths. The key to avoiding such outcomes lies in a taking the discipline of ethics seriously, and we consequently begin with a brief description of what ethics is, before presenting the main forms of technology related ethics. Through this process, we develop a hierarchy of technology ethics, which can be used by developers and engineers, researchers, or regulators who seek an understanding of the ethical implications of technology. We close by deducing two principles for positioning ethical analysis which will, in combination with the hierarchy, promote the leveraging of existing knowledge and help us to avoid an exaggerated proliferation of tech ethics. (shrink)

In this article, we critically scrutinize the principle of proportionality when used in the context of security and government surveillance. We argue that McMahan’s distinction from just warfare between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality can generally apply to the context of surveillance. We argue that narrow proportionality applies more or less directly to cases in which the surveilled is liable and that the wide proportionality principle applies to cases characterized by ‘collateral intrusion’. We argue, however, that a more demanding criterion (...) than the lesser-evil justification that wide proportionality frequently entails is necessary in cases characterized by intentional intrusion upon non-liable individuals. The distinction between foreseeing and intending intrusion into the lives of individuals who are not liable has not previously been specifically addressed in discussions concerning surveillance ethics. This specification is thus increasingly important due to the general growing tendency for adherence to the precautionary principle and policies aimed at anticipating criminal acts before they are committed. Preventive surveillance of non-liable actors is considered an important instrument for obtaining this aim and thus calls for moral scrutiny in terms of permissibility and proportionality. We suggest the concept ‘wide proportionality +’ which applies to cases of intentional intrusion of non-liable individuals. (shrink)

This paper seeks to address research governance by highlighting the notion of public accountability as a complementary tool for the establishment of an ethical resonance space for emerging technologies. Public accountability can render development and design process of emerging technologies transparent through practices of holding those in charge of research accountable for their actions, thereby fostering ethical engagement with their potential negative consequences or side-effects. Through practices such as parliamentary questions, audits, and open letters emerging technologies could be effectively rendered (...) transparent and opened up to broader levels of scrutiny and debate, thereby contributing to a greater adherence of emerging technologies to ethics and moral consensus. Fundamental democratic practices could thus not only lead to better informed choices in design and development processes, but also contribute to more morally substantive outcomes. (shrink)

In discussions on the ethics of surveillanceand consequently surveillance policy, thepublic/private distinction is often implicitlyor explicitly invoked as a way to structure thediscussion and the arguments. In thesediscussions, the distinction public and private is often treated as a uni-dimensional,rigidly dichotomous and absolute, fixed anduniversal concept, whose meaning could bedetermined by the objective content of thebehavior. Nevertheless, if we take a closerlook at the distinction in diverse empiricalcontexts we find them to be more subtle,diffused and ambiguous than suggested. Thus,the paper argues (...) for the treatment of thesedistinctions as multi-dimensional, continuousand relative, fluid and situational orcontextual, whose meaning lies in how they areinterpreted and framed. However, the aim ofthis paper is not to finally sort things out. The objective is rather to demonstrate thecomplexities of the distinction in variouscontexts and to suggest that those using thedistinction, when considering the ethics andpolitics of surveillance technologies, wouldbenefit from more clearly specifying whichdimensions they have in mind and how theyrelate. (shrink)

In recent years the power and reach of prominent hacker groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec has been clearly demonstrated. However, in a world where hackers are able to wield significant online power, can they do so ethically as legitimate agents? To answer this question this paper will develop an ethical framework based on the premise that hackers have exhibited instances where they have acted to protect people from harm at a time when there was no one else to do (...) so. At its core this paper will argue that political hacking can be justified when it is done to protect the vital interests of oneself or others. Moreover, it will also argue that just because hackers are outside the state does not automatically discount them as ethical actors and that when the state fails to protect people – whether it is due to a lack of ability, political will or because the state is the source of the threat – hackers can fill the void. In order to achieve this, first it is necessary to highlight the space for hackers to operate; second, guide hacker activity by creating an ethical framework detailing what actions are justified towards what end; third, to offer mechanisms that can aid in reaching these ethically justified decisions; and as a result, inform further ethical debates on how to react to these political hackers. This means that the framework can be used to both justify and condemn hacking depending on the circumstances, allowing those on the outside to distil and evaluate a political hack, both past and present, while guiding hacker collectives by providing clearer ethical tools for determining the appropriate agendas and methods. (shrink)

With its wealth of readily and often publicly available information about Web users’ lives, the Web has created new opportunities for conducting online research. Although digital data are easily accessible, ethical guidelines are inconsistent about how researchers should use them. Some academics claim that traditional ethical principles are sufficient and applicable to online research. However, the Web poses new challenges that compel researchers to reconsider concerns of consent, privacy and anonymity. Based on doctoral research into the investigation of online medicine (...) purchasing, this article presents a case study involving online forums, and reviews the existing ethical guidance surrounding the Web. The suggestion is that new ethical guidelines, particularly in relation to informed consent and participants’ own perceptions of what is public or private, are needed owing to the unique challenges of online research. (shrink)

A growing literature addresses the ethical implications of electronic surveillance at work, frequently assigning ethical priority to values such as the right to privacy. This paper suggests that, in practice, the issues are sociologically more complex than some accounts suggest. This is because many workplace electronic technologies not designed or deployed for surveillance purposes nevertheless embody surveillance capacity. This capacity may not be immediately obvious to participants or lend itself to simple deployment. Moreover, because of their primary functions, such systems (...) embody a range of other features which are potentially beneficial for those utilising them. As a result, more complex ethical dilemmas emerge as different desired goods compete for priority in the decision-making of individuals and groups. From a sociological point of view this raises interesting questions about the way ethical dilemmas arise in the context of the ongoing social relationships of work. The paper explores these issues using data from a study of the development and implementation of a computerised instructional package in a maternity setting. This medical setting illustrates clearly how seeking to assign ethical priority to a particular concern, such as the right to privacy, cannot but oversimplify the real day to day dilemmas encountered by participants. At the same time,the example of the instructional package demonstrates that it is difficult to predict in advance what ethical issues will be raised by technologies that almost always turn out to have a range of capabilities beyond those envisaged in their original design specification. (shrink)