Gilbert Harman’s famous principle of Clutter Avoidance commands that “one should not clutter one’s mind with trivialities". Many epistemologists have been inclined to accept Harman’s principle, or something like it. This is significant because the principle appears to have robust implications for our overall picture of epistemic normativity. Jane Friedman (2018) has recently argued that one potential implication is that there are no genuine purely evidential norms on belief revision. In this paper, we present some new objections to a suitably (...) formulated version of the clutter principle qua norm on belief revision. Moreover, we argue that the clutter principle is best understood as a norm on non-doxastic stages of inquiry. In our view, it is a norm of asking and considering questions rather than a norm of settling on an answer to a question by forming a belief. (shrink)

The Internet has been identified in human enhancement scholarship as a powerful cognitive enhancement technology. It offers instant access to almost any type of information, along with the ability to share that information with others. The aim of this paper is to critically assess the enhancement potential of the Internet. We argue that unconditional access to information does not lead to cognitive enhancement. The Internet is not a simple, uniform technology, either in its composition, or in its use. We will (...) look into why the Internet as an informational resource currently fails to enhance cognition. We analyze some of the phenomena that emerge from vast, continual fluxes of information–information overload, misinformation and persuasive design—and show how they could negatively impact users’ cognition. Methods for mitigating these negative impacts are then advanced: individual empowerment, better collaborative systems for sorting and categorizing information, and the use of artificial intelligence assistants that could guide users through the informational space of today’s Internet. (shrink)

Visual perception relies on stored information and environmental associations to arrive at a determinate representation of the world. This opens up the disturbing possibility that our visual experiences could themselves be subject to a kind of racial bias, simply in virtue of accurately encoding previously encountered environmental regularities. This possibility raises the following question: what, if anything, is wrong with beliefs grounded upon these prejudicial experiences? They are consistent with a range of epistemic norms, including evidentialist and reliabilist standards for (...) justification. I argue that we will struggle to locate a flaw with these sorts of perceptual beliefs so long as we focus our analysis at the level of the individual and her response to information. We should instead broaden our analysis to include the social structure within which the individual is located. Doing so lets us identify a problem with the way in which unjust social structures in particular “gerrymander” the regularities an individual is exposed to, and by extension the priors their visual system draws on. I argue that in this way, social structures can cap perceptual skill. (shrink)

Debunking arguments typically attempt to show that a set of beliefs or other intensional mental states bear no appropriate explanatory connection to the facts they purport to be about. That is, a debunking argument will attempt to show that beliefs about p are not held because of the facts about p. Such beliefs, if true, would then only be accidentally so. Thus, their causal origins constitute an undermining defeater. Debunking arguments arise in various philosophical domains, targeting beliefs about morality, the (...) existence of God, logic, and others. They have also arisen in material-object metaphysics, often aimed at debunking common-sense ontology. And while most of these arguments feature appeals to ‘biological and cultural contingencies’ that are ostensibly responsible for our beliefs about which kinds of objects exist, few of them take a serious look at what those contingencies might actually be. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to remedy this by providing empirical substantiation for a key premise in these debunking arguments by examining data from cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology that support a ‘debunking explanation’ of our common-sense beliefs and intuitions about which objects exist. Second, to argue that such data also undermines a particular kind of rationalist defense of common-sense ontology, sometimes employed as a response to the debunking threat. (shrink)

Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a (...) taxonomy which distinguishes between vigilance and access to conscious report, as well as between subliminal, preconscious and conscious processing. We suggest that these distinctions map onto different neural mechanisms, and that conscious perception is systematically associated with a sudden surge of parieto-frontal activity causing top-down amplification. (shrink)

Ignorance, or the lack of knowledge, appears to be steadily spreading, despite the increasing availability of information. The notion of informed ignorance herein proposed to describe the widespread position of being exposed to an abundance of information yet lacking relevant knowledge, which is tied to the exponential growth in misinformation driven by technological developments and social media. Linked to many of societies’ most looming catastrophes, from political polarization to the climate crisis, practices related to knowledge and information are deemed some (...) of the most imminent and daunting modern threats, evidenced by the latest report of the World Economic Forum, which has named misinformation the most severe short-term global risk. This paper’s epistemic perspective links the properties of today’s information culture and the ways in which it interacts with individual capacities and limitations in current technological and socio-political contexts. Such a position is analyzed through the lens of epistemic principles as a contemporary epistemic phenotype that emerges from an environment of ill-adapted and excessive information inputs and leads to a distinctive type of social injustice that is primarily epistemic in nature. While equity and accessibility are widely discussed as important contributing factors to epistemic discrepancies, other overlooked but fundamental issues underlying epistemic injustices are considered, such as information manipulation, cognitive limitations, and epistemic degradation. To effectively face this elusive threat, we propose an inclusive viewpoint that harnesses knowledge from cognitive science, science and technology studies, and social epistemology to inform a unifying theory of its main impacts and driving forces. By adjusting a modern epistemic framework to the described phenomena, we intend to contextually outline its trajectory and possible means of containment based on a shared responsibility to maintain ethical epistemic standards. In a time of international unrest and mounting civil acts of violence, it is pertinent to emphasize the ethical principles of knowledge systems and authorities and suggest policy adaptations to maintain a social contract based on the shared values of truth and freedom. (shrink)

We discuss the three dominant models of the phenomenological literature pertaining to temporal consciousness, namely the cinematic, the retentional, and the extensional model. This is first done by presenting the distinction between acts and contents of consciousness and the assumptions underlying the different models concerning both the extendedness and duration of these two components. Secondly, we elaborate on the consequences related to whether a perspective of direct or indirect realism about temporal perceptions is assumed. Finally, we review some relevant findings (...) from the psychology and neuroscience of temporality in order to decide which of the three models of time consciousness is better confirmed from an empirical viewpoint. Depending on the time scale, all three models of temporal consciousness might apply. We specifically argue in favor of an extensional model of time consciousness for the experienced present where the acts and contents of consciousness are both extended. The retentional model might apply to longer time intervals covered by working memory. In addition, a predictive component is highlighted as decisive for an understanding of temporality. (shrink)

Cognitive control processes are advantageous when routines would not lead to the desired outcome, but this can be ill-advised when automated behavior is advantageous. The aim of this study was to identify neural dynamics related to the ability to adapt to different cognitive control demands – a process that has been referred to as ‘metacontrol.’ A sample of N = 227 healthy subjects that was split in a ‘high’ and ‘low adaptability’ group based on the behavioral performance in a task (...) with varying control demands. To examine the neurophysiological mechanisms, we combined event-related potential (ERP) recordings with source localization and machine learning approaches. The results show that individuals who are better at strategically adapting to different cognitive control demands benefit from automatizing their response processes in situations where little cognitive control is needed. On a neurophysiological level, neither perceptual/attentional selection processes nor conflict monitoring processes paralleled the behavioral data, although the latter showed a descriptive trend. Behavioral differences in metacontrol abilities were only significantly mirrored by the modulation of response-locked P3 amplitudes, which were accompanied by activation differences in insula (BA13) and middle frontal gyrus (BA9). The machine learning result corroborated this by identifying a predictive/classification feature near the peak of the response-locked P3, which arose from the anterior cingulate cortex (BA24; BA33). In short, we found that metacontrol is associated to the ability to manage response selection processes, especially the ability to effectively downregulate cognitive control under low cognitive control requirements, rather than the ability to upregulate cognitive control. (shrink)

This article argues that the (epi)genetic, cultural, symbolic, and environmental transmission channels are insufficient to explain the structure of modern human societies. Economic exchange of knowledge embodied in goods and services constitutes an additional transmission channel that makes more efficient use of limited human cognitive capacity. Economic exchange results in a gradual shift in societies from task-based division of labor to cognitive specialization. This shifts scarce cognitive resources away from production and into learning. It accelerates learning and reinforces the drive (...) towards specialization. Cognitive specialization may constitute another “major transition” towards a higher level of aggregation in human societies, with properties that differ from symbolic transmission. Collective control of individual market-based exchange is ensured by means of economic institutions that put a constraint on individual behavior. (shrink)

This essay employs Charles Peirce’s triadic semiotics in order to develop a biosemiotic theory of life that is capable of illuminating the function of information in living systems. Specifically, I argue that the relationship between biological information structures , selecting environments, and the adapted bodily processes of living organisms is aptly modelled by the irreducibly triadic relationship between Peirce’s sign, object, and interpretant, respectively. In each instance of information-based semiosis, the information structure is a complex informational sign that represents the (...) informational object ; and the bodily, behavioral, mental, or intellectual processes that are organized by the informational sign to more or less accurately interpret the present environment constitute a complex informational interpretant—a living, interpreting organism. The essay begins by discussing the precise sense in which this biosemiotic theory is based upon Charles Peirce’s semiotic theory. Next, the theory is developed at length in relation to genetic information structures. Finally, I present a brief outline of how the theory applies to neural and linguistic information structures. The essay concludes with a reflection upon the anti-reductionist implications of the theory. (shrink)

La scalabilità è una proprietà desiderabile di sistemi informatici associata a metriche di performance. Più precisamente, un sistema è definito scalabile quando riesce a gestire, senza calo di prestazioni, un numero crescente di elementi, processi, quantità di lavoro e/o quando può essere espanso a piacimento. Progettare un sistema scalabile garantisce un’ottimizzazione dei costi e delle prestazioni, e della produttività di un’azienda. Questi scopi sono stati perseguiti, dagli anni Ottanta, attraverso numerosi studi sulla scalabilità, che sono stati sviluppati in un ambito (...) esclusivamente tecnologico. Tuttavia, negli ultimi anni è sorto il bisogno di estendere la tradizionale prospettiva tecnologica della scalabilità perché troppo limitata considerata al di fuori delle organizzazioni e applicata alle situazioni di uso quotidiano delle nuove tecnologie. Per esempio, le rubriche dei telefonini sono tecnicamente scalabili: grazie alla funzione di ricerca, essi offrono un accesso immediato alle informazioni indipendentemente dal numero dei contatti memorizzati. Inoltre, il supporto di memorie digitali esterne molto capienti permette di inserire un numero pressoché illimitato di contatti. Le versioni più avanzate delle rubriche degli smartphones sono integrate anche con i social network come Facebook. Dal punto di vista cognitivo, negli utenti si crea un’illusione di essere in grado di gestire efficacemente reti sociali sempre più estese e ricche di contenuti. In realtà, vari studi hanno dimostrato che esistono dei limiti alla gestione di relazioni sociali rilevanti, quali il famoso numero di Dunbar. Pertanto, la prospettiva tecnologica sulla scalabilità è limitata nel senso che essa riesce a descrivere solo la performance di un sistema informatico, ma non ne spiega l’impatto su performance cognitiva e sociale. Un approccio alternativo potrebbe essere basato sul presupposto che la scalabilità è una proprietà importante non solo per computer e reti informatiche, ma anche per esseri umani e reti sociali. La comprensione della correlazione fra scalabilità tecnologica e umana, renderebbe possibile migliorare il design delle tecnologie per uso quotidiano. Per esempio, le rubriche dei telefonini, come anche i siti di social network, potrebbero ottimizzare l’accesso ai contenuti in base al significato delle relazioni sociali e della situazione nella quale sono considerate. Si può ipotizzare che la comprensione della scalabilità, sia umana sia tecnologica, possa permettere di migliorare la performance dell’azione individuale e/o collettiva. Socionics, un programma interdisciplinare di ricerca che integra sociologica e informatica, offre la possibilità di estendere la definizione di scalabilità anche ai sistemi sociali. Al contrario della prospettiva tradizionale della scalabilità, che è incentrata sull’aspetto quantitativo, Socionics pone al centro dell’analisi il problema da risolvere, che è analizzato sia dal punto di vista quantitativo sia da quello qualitativo . Grazie a Socionics, nell’articolo sono introdotti i concetti di scalabilità cognitiva e scalabilità sociale, che descrivono la capacità di gestire elegantemente a livello individuale o collettivo quantità crescenti di lavoro, e/o adattarsi alla loro complessità crescente. Il processo di valutazione della scalabilità cognitiva e sociale di un problema si compone di tre fasi: la prima riguarda la definizione del contesto dell’attività a cui il problema è associato. Questo richiede di specificare gli attori coinvolti, le risorse disponibili e i compiti che essi stanno svolgendo, individualmente o in gruppo. La seconda fase si propone di identificare i bisogni legati al contesto, che servono a capire in che misura il sistema è riuscito a soddisfare il bisogno, ovvero a misurare la performance. Nella terza e ultima fase si considera la funzione delle ICT nella risoluzione del problema, al fine di capire se le ICT abbiano alleviato, accentuato o rimosso eventuali limitazioni cognitive e/o sociali. Lo stesso problema è scalabile da un punto di vista cognitivo e/o sociale se esso è risolto in modo efficace al variare dei suoi elementi quantitativi e qualitativi. Per una prima valutazione dell’approccio, è discusso il problema della coordinazione sociale tramite telefonini, che non è ridotto semplicemente al numero di persone che i telefonini riescono a mobilizzare, ma anche alla qualità e impatto della loro performance. In conclusione, i concetti di scalabilità cognitiva e sociale offrono l’opportunità di informare la progettazione e favorire l’adozione di ICT grazie alla comprensione di come gli aspetti di scalabilità tecnologica influiscano sulla performance individuale e collettiva, e viceversa.Scalability has been for long time presented as a desirable property of a networked computer system associated to measure of its performance. As information and communication technologies become ubiquitous, a need of describing scalability also from a human perspective has emerged. Indeed, technical scalability only describes the performance of a computer system, but it does not explain anything about its impact on cognitive and social performance. Without acknowledging that technical scalability does not imply human scalability, there is the risk of not realizing the full potential of ICT in the everyday life. By adopting the Socionics approach, we extend the technical view of scalability with two additional concepts, namely cognitive and social scalability. These concepts describe the capacity to process individually or collectively growing volumes of work gracefully, and/or to adjust to their increasing complexity. The notion of social scalability is then evaluated in the activity-context of social coordination through mobile devices. We conclude that by improving our understanding of scalability issues, we may positively inform the design and use of ICT not only from the viewpoint of technical performance, but also for that of individual and collective performance. (shrink)

Time travel and its associated paradoxes are a topic of academic discussion that has historically been of interest only in physics and philosophy. This paper presents a new paradox of time travel that puts psychological issues at the forefront. The new time traveller faces conflicts between agency and agency awareness that are not addressed in other paradoxes. Further, in considering these other paradoxes it is seen how concerns about the time traveller's psychological state can lead to new challenges to the (...) accepted deterministic paradox resolutions. (shrink)

We raise the new possibility that people diagnosed with developmental dyslexia (DD) are specialized in explorative cognitive search, and rather than having a neurocognitive disorder, play an essential role in human adaptation. Most DD research has studied educational difficulties, with theories framing differences in neurocognitive processes as deficits. However, people with DD are also often proposed to have certain strengths – particularly in realms like discovery, invention, and creativity – that deficit-centered theories cannot explain. We investigate whether these strengths reflect (...) an underlying explorative specialization. We re-examine experimental studies in psychology and neuroscience using the framework ofcognitive search, whereby many psychological processes involve a trade-off between exploration and exploitation. We report evidence of an explorative bias in DD-associated cognitive strategies. High DD prevalence and an attendant explorative bias across multiple areas of cognition suggest the existence of explorative specialization. An evolutionary perspective explains the combination of findings and challenges the view that individuals with DD have a disorder. In cooperating groups, individual specialization is favored when features that confer fitness benefits are functionally incompatible. Evidence for search specialization suggests that, as with some other social organisms, humans mediate the exploration–exploitation trade-off by specializing in complementary strategies. The existence of a system of collective cognitive search that emerges through collaboration would help to explain our species’ exceptional adaptiveness. It also aligns with evidence for substantial variability during our evolutionary history and the notion that humans are adapted not to a particular habitat but to variability itself. Specialization creates interdependence and necessitates balancing complementary strategies. Reframing DD therefore underscores the urgency of changing certain cultural practices to ensure we do not inhibit adaptation. Key improvements would remove cultural barriers to exploration and nurture explorative learning in education, academia, and the workplace, as well as emphasize collaboration over competition. Specialization in complementary search abilities represents a meta-adaptation; through collaboration, this likely enables human groups (as a species and as cultural systems) to successfully adapt. Cultural change to support this system of collaborative search may therefore be essential in confronting the challenges humanity now faces. (shrink)

Human multitasking suffers from a central attentional bottleneck preventing parallel performance of central mental operations, leading to profound deferments in task performance. While previous research assumed that the deferment is caused by a mere waiting time, we show that the bottleneck requires executive functions accounting for a profound part of the deferment. Three participant groups with EF impairments showed worse multitasking performance than respective control groups. Three further groups with EF improvements showed improved multitasking. Finally, three groups performed a dual-task (...) and different measures of EF and showed significant correlations between multitasking performance and working memory capacity. Demands on EF during multitasking may cause more errors, mental fatigue and stress, with parts of the population being considerably more prone to this. (shrink)

Volume 33, Issue 8, November 2020, Page 1096-1120.

Individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) often ruminate about past experiences, especially those with negative content. These repetitive thoughts may interfere with cognitive processes related to attention and conflict monitoring. However, the temporal nature of these processes as reflected in event-related potentials (ERPs) has not been well-described. We examined behavioral and ERP indices of conflict monitoring during a modified flanker task and the allocation of attention during an attentional blink (AB) task in 33 individuals with MDD and 36 healthy controls, (...) and whether their behavioral performance and ERPs varied with level of rumination. N2 amplitude elicited by the flanker task was significantly reduced in participants with MDD compared to healthy controls. Level of self-reported rumination was also correlated with N2 amplitude. In contrast, P3 amplitude during the AB task was not significantly different between groups, nor was it correlated with rumination. No significant differences were found in behavioral task performance measures between groups or by rumination levels. These findings suggest that rumination in MDD is associated with select deficits in cognitive control, particularly related to conflict monitoring. (shrink)

When humans are required to perform two or more tasks concurrently, their performance declines as the tasks get closer together in time. Here, we investigated the mechanisms of this cognitive performance decline using a dual-task paradigm in a simulated driving environment, and using drift-diffusion modeling, examined if the two tasks are processed in a serial or a parallel manner. Participants performed a lane change task, along with an image discrimination task. We systematically varied the time difference between the onset of (...) the two tasks and measured its effect on the amount of dual-task interference. Results showed that the reaction times of the two tasks in the dual-task condition were higher than those in the single-task condition. SOA influenced the RTs of both tasks when they were presented second and the RTs of the image discrimination task when it was presented first. Results of drift-diffusion modeling indicated that dual-task performance affects both the rate of evidence accumulation and the delays outside the evidence accumulation period. These results suggest that a hybrid model containing features of both parallel and serial processing best accounts for the results. Next, manipulating the predictability of the order of the two tasks, we showed that in unpredictable conditions, the order of the response to the two tasks changes, causing attenuation in the effect of SOA. Together, our findings suggest higher-level executive functions are involved in managing the resources and controlling the processing of the tasks during dual-task performance in naturalistic settings. (shrink)