Avicenna’s discussion of future contingent propositions is sometimes considered to entail metaphysical indeterminism. In this paper, I argue that his logical analysis of future contingent statements is best understood in terms of the epistemic modality of those statements, which has no consequences for modal metaphysics. This interpretation is corroborated by hitherto neglected material concerning the question of God’s knowledge of particulars. In the Taʿlīqāt, Avicenna argues that God knows particulars by knowing their complete causes, and when contrasted with the human (...) knowledge of particulars, this epistemically superior access shows that the contingency of statements about future particulars is not due to the modal properties of real particulars but to the nature of human access to them. (shrink)

God is omniscient; therefore, for any two propositions, P1 and P2, God knows both that P1 and P2. If God knows multiple things, then God is not simple. But, God is supposed to be a s...

It seems Avicenna’s passages regarding God’s knowledge of particulars are susceptible of being given two different types of interpretation. The main difference between these two accounts of his theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars is that one of them, which I call the Neglected Interpretation, appeals to some metaphysical entities as the proxies of concrete particular objects, which are distinct from God’s essence, to explain God’s knowledge of particulars, while the other type does not. The views of post-Avicennian thinkers like (...) Suhrawardī and Ṭūsī of Avicenna’s account are classifiable under the Neglected Interpretation, as shown by their objections to Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. This type of interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has been neglected in the secondary English literature on the issue. In this paper, I will present a reconstructed version of this type of interpretation of the Avicennian theory of divine knowledge. (shrink)

This article is about Avicenna’s account of syllogisms comprising opposite premises. We examine the applications and the truth conditions of these syllogisms. Finally, we discuss the relation between these syllogisms and the principle of non-contradiction.

God is omniscient; therefore, He knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red.’ If God knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red,’ then He knows it perceptually. God does not know anything perceptually. It is clear that the set of propositions – form an inconsistent triad. This is one of four problems with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God's knowledge of particulars, which I call the problem of perceptual knowledge. In order to solve PPK and three other (...) problems, Avicenna has developed a theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. Secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has mostly directed its attention to give an account of Avicenna’s positive theory rather than the problems which that theory was designed to solve. But this paper will not do the same thing as this secondary literature. In contrast, in this paper, I will concentrate on the characterization of one of the problems, i.e., PPK, because of which Avicenna has presented his positive theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. In short, this paper aims to show why Avicenna deems explaining God’s knowledge of, say, the redness of a flower, via his accepted theory of perception as problematic. In this regard, I will extract three versions of PPK based on Avicenna's philosophy and through it will shed some light on Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. (shrink)

ArgumentThe sixteenth-century physician and philosopher Julius Caesar Scaliger suggests that in particular cases plants can come into being that belong to a plant species that did not exist before. At the same time, he holds that God could not have created a more perfect world. However, does the occurrence of new species not imply that the world was not the best possible world from the beginning? In this article, I explore a set of metaphysical ideas that could provide Scaliger with (...) the means of solving this problem: His version of the notion of a plurality of substantial forms in every living being, and his version of the notion of the ordained divine power. As it turns out, Scaliger analyzes the generation of new species in terms of a development of subordinate substantial forms into dominant substantial forms. Thereby, previously existing essences of plant parts become essences of plants. These plants, thus, possess essences that no previously existing plant possessed and, in this sense, belong to a new species. In this way, Scaliger avoids positing the occurrence of new essences, thus saving the best possible world thesis. Moreover, he believes that all substantial forms stand in a relationship of mutual existential dependence by means of which God safeguards the persistence and unity of the world. This is why the agency of subordinate forms turned dominant can be understood as an expression of the ordained power of God. (shrink)

Avicenna's notorious claim that God knows particulars only 'in a universal way' is argued to have its roots in Aristotelian epistemology, and especially in the "Posterior Analytics". According to Avicenna and Aristotle as understood by Avicenna, there is in fact no such thing as 'knowledge' of particulars, at least not as such. Rather, a particular can only be known by subsuming it under a universal. Thus Avicenna turns out to be committed to a much more surprising epistemological thesis: even humans (...) know particulars only in a universal way. (shrink)

(i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any change, C, among particulars, God knows the occurrence of C. (ii) If God knows the occurrence of C, then X. (iii) not-X. It is clear that the set of propositions (i)—(iii) is inconsistent. This is the general form of two problems—which I call the ‘problem of change in knowledge’ (PCK) and the ‘problem of change in essence’ (PCE)—for Avicenna concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. No work in the secondary literature has discussed exactly what (...) PCK and PCE are. In this paper, I will clarify exactly what they are. (shrink)

O presente artigo trata do caráter contingente ou necessário da relação causal entre a causa primeira e seu efeito, tal como apresentada por Avicena e Tomás de Aquino. Para tanto, aborda o paralelismo no tratamento da inteligência e vontade divinas por parte de ambos os autores. Ambos aceitam que Deus conhece a si mesmo e, conhecendo-se, conhece aquilo que lhe é distinto. Aceitam igualmente que Deus quer ou ama a si mesmo e, querendo a si mesmo, quer acidentalmente o que (...) lhe é distinto. No entanto, discordam com respeito à necessidade ou contingência do mundo. Para Avicena, o mundo é possível em si mesmo, mas “necessário por outro”. Para Tomás, que Deus queira o mundo com necessidade hipotética corresponde mais à necessidade do querer divino, sem que isso determine a contingência ou necessidade do mundo. Com efeito, na visão tomista, é preferível um universo no qual haja mescla de necessidade e contingência, pois isso representa melhor as múltiplas perfeições divinas. (shrink)

Puheenvuoro vastaa Knuuttilan, Mattilan ja Palménin keskeisiin kommentteihin. Erityisen huomion kohteena ovat mahdolliset vasta-argumentit käsiteltävässä kirjassa esittämiäni tulkintoja tai erityisesti Ibn Sīnān itsetietoisuuden käsitettä kohtaan.