This paper examines the ethics of the Australian business community’s responses to the phenomenon of modern slavery. Engaging a critical discourse approach, we draw upon a data set of submissions by businesses and business representatives to the Australian government’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade ‘Parliamentary Inquiry into Establishing a Modern Slavery Act in Australia’—which preceded the signing into law of Australia’s Modern Slavery Act 2018—to examine the business community’s discursive construction in their submissions of the ethical–political (...) concept of freedom. The paper shows how the concept of freedom was employed by Australian business in a manner that privileged their own subject status and advocated for legislation with minimal burden. Relating this contemporary case to a longer historical context, we show how Australian business responses towards modern slavery map onto liberal and neoliberal ethics in which the freedom of the propertied takes precedent over that of the property-less. Further, we show discursive similarities in the arguments presented by modern Australian businesses and certain historical efforts by members of the business community to privilege commercial freedoms in responses to 18th and 19th Century abolitionist movements. Overall, our research makes two important contributions: first, it highlights the value of a critical discourse lens in business ethics research to show how business and other stakeholders in the field construct and shape their own and other’s ethically-laden understanding of reality; and second, it presents a case for considerable scepticism about the motivation of business to employ the freedoms made available to it under neo/liberal discourse to confront a key human rights challenge. (shrink)

Most theorisations of fascism, Marxist and otherwise, have taken for granted its idolatry of the state and phobia of freedom. This analytical common sense has also inhibited the identification of continuities with contemporary movements of the far Right, with their libertarian and anti-statist affectations, not to mention their embeddedness in neoliberal policies and subjectivities. Drawing on a range of diverse sources – from Johann Chapoutot’s histories of Nazi intellectuals to Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s theorisation of the anti-state state, and from Marcuse’s (...) explorations of fascist competitive individualism to debates on neoliberal authoritarianism – this essay sketches the counter-intuitive but disturbingly timely image of a fascism enamoured of freedom and at odds with the state. (shrink)

The Frankfurt School attacked Veblen ’ s claims regarding machine-induced rationality in industrial societ y. Their criticisms stemmed in part from the fact that Veblen failed to present his ideas systematically in a formal treatise on either economics or sociolog y, and because he did not use concepts or jargon familiar to the critical theorists. This article thus aims at: (1) demonstrating through textual exegesis the meaning of social rationality in the corpus of Veblen ’ s writing, especiall y The (...) Theory of Business Enterprise (1904); (2) elucidating the problems that arose in the Frankfurt School ’ s critique of Veblen because he used nomenclature and conceptualizations unfamiliar to Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer; (3) reiterating Veblen ’ s thesis on the impact of ‘transfer effects’ on workers interacting with the machine process; and (4) outlining the failure of the Frankfurt School adequately to examine his claims in the American political environment in which they were made. (shrink)

Andrew Feenberg?s most recent contribution to the critical theory of technology, Questioning Technology , is best understood as a synthesis and extension of the critiques of technology developed by Heidegger and Marcuse. By thus situating Feenberg?s endeavor to articulate and preserve a meaningful sense of agency in our increasingly technologized lifeworld, I show that some of the deepest tensions in Heidegger and Marcuse?s relation re-emerge within Feenberg?s own critical theory. Most significant here is the fact that Feenberg, following Marcuse, exaggerates (...) Heidegger?s ?fatalism? about technology. I contend that this mistake stems from Feenberg?s false ascription of a technological ?essentialismfito Heidegger. Correcting this and several related problems, I reconstruct Feenberg?s ?radical democraticEfficacyll for a counter-hegemonic democratization of technological design, arguing that although this timely and important project takes its inspiration from Marcuse, in the end Feenberg remains closer to Heidegger than his Marcuseanism allows him to acknowledge. (shrink)

Data analytics, particularly the current rhetoric around “Big Data”, tend to be presented as new and innovative, emerging ahistorically to revolutionize modern life. In this article, we situate one branch of Big Data analytics, spatial Big Data, through a historical predecessor, geodemographic analysis, to help develop a critical approach to current data analytics. Spatial Big Data promises an epistemic break in marketing, a leap from targeting geodemographic areas to targeting individuals. Yet it inherits characteristics and problems from geodemographics, including a (...) justification through the market, and a process of commodification through the black-boxing of technology. As researchers develop sustained critiques of data analytics and its effects on everyday life, we must so with a grounding in the cultural and historical contexts from which data technologies emerged. This article and others develop a historically situated, critical approach to spatial Big Data. This history illustrates connections to the critical issues of surveillance, redlining, and the production of consumer subjects and geographies. The shared histories and structural logics of spatial Big Data and geodemographics create the space for a continued critique of data analyses’ role in society. (shrink)

This article seeks to analyze the theory of technology formulated by the philosopher Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979). It shows the ways in which the author repurposes fundamental concepts of classical aesthetics in order to formulate a theory of technology aimed at liberating both nature and humanity. To this end, we argue that Marcuse mobilizes the theories of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805). In the first part of the article, we tackle some important aspects of Kant’s and Schiller’s aesthetic theories. (...) We begin with an analysis of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), focusing on central concepts that would later be absorbed by Schiller and Marcuse. Next, we try to show the reception of the Third critique in Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795) and this author’s contribution to aesthetic studies within political thought. In the second part, we focus on Marcuse’s work, highlighting two key moments in his analysis on technology. We show that his theory undergoes transformation and development until it reaches its stable form in the 1960s and 1970s, during which the author proposes a new theory of technology based on human aesthetic possibilities whose goal is the liberation of nature. (shrink)

Our contemporary condition is deeply infused with scientific-technological rationales. These influence and shape our ethical reasoning on war, including the moral status of civilians and the moral choices available to us. In this article, I discuss how technology shapes and directs the moral choices available to us by setting parameters for moral deliberation. I argue that technology has moral significance for just war thinking, yet this is often overlooked in attempts to assess who is liable to harm in war and (...) to what extent. This omission produces an undue deference to technological authority, reducing combatants, civilians and scenarios to data points. If we are to develop a maximally restrictive framework for harming civilians in war, which in my view should be a goal of just war thinking, then it is imperative that the scientific-technological dimension of contemporary war is given due attention. (shrink)

The present paper motivates one possible answer to Kant’s question, “What remains of the Enlightenment?” by reinterpreting the relation between Foucault and critical tradition from Kant to the Frankfurt School. The Enlightenment has left us with “normative superstition,” or a healthy form of skepticism about the justification of modern institutions and ideals. Along these lines, I adopt an interpretation of Foucault that diverges from the standard view. I argue that he shares with his detractors a common heritage of this “critical (...) attitude,” placing him squarely in line with Kant, Hegel, and critical theory generally. If it is possible to view this critical attitude as an expression of Enlightenment-oriented views, then there are reasons to believe that his so-called “postmodernism” is nothing more than hyper-modernism. The lines of this last argument have been made elsewhere, notably in Robert Pippin’s important work, but there is a need to situate Foucault in the unfolding narrative of modernity, rather than label him a hostile opponent to it. In my view, the “Foucault addiction” now so popular is consistent with the critical tradition and the aim of this paper is to develop this claim. (shrink)

O senso comum dá-nos motivos para acreditar que a identidade dos seres vivos naturais é diferente da identidade dos artefactos. Alegadamente, a identidade dos artefactos está dependente da forma que lhes é atribuída pelos seus criadores e não lhes vem de dentro, não é imanente. Digamos que é esta a distinção que, em geral, se presume entre “corpos vivos organizados” e “corpos artificiais organizados”. Ao presumir um ato construtivo humano, o corpo organizado artificial recebe de fora o seu princípio organizador (...) e o que define o seu uso. As obras de arte contam-se entre estes objetos assim como os instrumentos. No século XIX, algumas descrições sobre as manufaturas tinham chegado a uma definição de máquina como um corpo organizado dotado de moção interna, colocando assim o problema do estatuto das máquinas entre os artefactos. Não se estranha que um dos problemas recorrentes nas discussões filosóficas atuais sobre a técnica e a arte seja o do estatuto da dependência mental, intencional, dos artefactos. Essas discussões demonstraram que a dependência mental não pode ser avaliada sem clarificar a comunicação. Pode assim objetar-se aos autores exclusivamente preocupados com o tema restrito da intencionalidade da dependência mental o esquecimento da orientação comunicativa da produção, manual ou industrial, e do seu destino social. Com o presente estudo pretende mostrar-se como a herança platónica da mimésis, exemplificada com as “três camas” de República X, 597 b e ss., embora supondo uma dimensão comunitária, restritiva, do fazer técnico, está presente nos pressupostos de algumas versões teóricas modernas da técnica, da produção industrial e da arte. Clarificam-se as noções do artífice como produtor para a comunidade, do artefacto e da máquina na indústria para identificar os contrastes entre formas históricas distintas de compreender o fazer técnico e as correspondentes ressonâncias semânticas e teóricas. Seguidamente, caracteriza-se o discurso da crítica cultural, representado em alguns textos de Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno e Herbert Marcuse, como uma orientação teórica conservadora frente à autonomia da comunicação na modernidade, à expansão da produção industrial automatizada segundo diagramas e a sua aplicação aos produtos da arte. À luz de um escrutínio dos transmorfos da arte modernista, particularmente no DADA, revela-se como a arte explorou as colisões morfológicas resultantes da combinação entre motivos orgânicos, artísticos tradicionais e industriais para pôr a comunicação no centro do fazer artístico, desafiar a intencionalidade do autor e potenciar novas situações estéticas. O alcance das atitudes reativas perante o moderno, que o descrevem como unidimensional e redutor, fica assim limitado. Indo ao encontro das várias dimensões da remarcação do mercantil e do artístico nos transmorfos da arte conceptual, conclui-se este trabalho com a tese de que a comunicação artística, como sobrecodificação de vários media, tem a faculdade de redimensionar os emissores, destinatários e mensagens, mesmo quando tem lugar em meios de difusão estandardizados ou mercantilizados. (shrink)

Economic value additions to knowledge and demand provide practical, embedded and extensible meaning to philosophizing cognitive systems. Evaluation of a cognitive system is an empirical matter. Thinking of science in terms of distributed cognition (interactionism) enlarges the domain of cognition. Anything that actually contributes to the specific quality of output of a cognitive system is part of the system in time and/or space. Cognitive science studies behaviour and knowledge structures of experts and categorized structures based on underlying structures. Knowledge representation (...) through understanding of ‘epistemic cultures’ is an evolutionary stage. But cognition goes beyond knowledge representation. Notwithstanding the importance of epistemology of phenomena, the practicability cum philosophical aspects of machine learning needs to be seen in dynamic behaviour in socio-economic-technical value additions if human machine interaction processes that are context specific are incorporated into strong artificial intelligent systems. Cognitive Science is also studied from both computational and biological angles. Evolution of interactive forms of reasoning through understanding of meta-language of computations or biological learning processes is possible. But the limitation of historical cultures predefines the role of interactive processes in user-networks beyond technology networks. Despite this limitation, inclusive development notions of a heterogeneous national society such as India or Europe can be tested and incorporated. (shrink)

This paper will analyze Marcuse’s theorizations about a new sensibility. While many of Marcuse’s commentators have correctly emphasized the importance of aesthetics as a foundation of the new sensibility, this concept is strong because it is also tied to arguments for a new democracy. The democratic foundation of the new sensibility is crucial because the technological foundation of a new society will not, according to Marcuse, satisfy all of the wants and desires that were promised in repressive societies. Rather, a (...) new sensibility is meant to allow for radically democratic processes that question what, in fact, true needs are. (shrink)

According to a recent survey by the HR Research Institute, as the presence of artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly common in the workplace, HR professionals are worried that the use of recruitment algorithms will lead to a “dehumanization” of the hiring process. Our main goals in this paper are threefold: i) to bring attention to this neglected issue, ii) to clarify what exactly this concern about dehumanization might amount to, and iii) to sketch an argument for why dehumanizing the hiring (...) process is ethically suspect. After distinguishing the use of the term “dehumanization” in this context (i.e., removing the human presence) from its more common meaning in the interdisciplinary field of dehumanization studies (i.e., conceiving of other humans as subhuman), we argue that the use of hiring algorithms may negatively impact the employee-employer relationship. We argue that there are good independent reasons to accept a substantive employee-employer relationship, as well as an applicant-employer relationship, both of which are consistent with a stakeholder theory of corporate obligations. We further argue that dehumanizing the hiring process may negatively impact these relationships because of the difference between the values of human recruiters and the values embedded in recruitment algorithms. Drawing on Nguyen’s (2021) critique of how Twitter “gamifies communication”, we argue that replacing human recruiters with algorithms imports artificial values into the hiring process. We close by briefly considering some ways to potentially mitigate the problems posed by recruitment algorithms, along with the possibility that some difficult trade-offs will need to be made. (shrink)