Recently, some scholars have sought to cast Marx and other socialists as participants in the republican tradition, expanding ideas such as non-domination and self-rule beyond what they had been typically conceived of as by many of the instigators of the revival of republican thought in recent decades. The ramifications of such an expansion, however, have not yet been fully grappled with in the area of rights. This article aims to remedy this by building a theory of social republican rights by (...) drawing on both prongs of this framework. I argue that (1) rights ought to function primarily as instruments to overcome domination and that Marxist and socialist analysis identifies novel forms of domination missed by other republicans, (2) certain liberal rights are themselves vectors of domination, (3) rights are realised through active will formation in politics and the public sphere rather than being pre-political claims against these things, (4) rights should be based on a social ontology that is relational rather than individualist and (5) rights are powers that are struggled for and operate as zones of contestation rather than trans-historical principles. (shrink)

Este libro promete ser una contribución para el estudio de la teoría crítica en general y para el análisis de la historia de la Escuela de Frankfurt en particular. Todos los trabajos que están contenidos en este volumen hacen parte del amplio marco teórico de la teoría crítica de la sociedad. Muchos siguen las huellas de los fundadores de esta tendencia, mientras que otros se presentan como críticos de la misma y unos cuantos más tratan de vincular problemas y contextos (...) de relevancia a los conceptos más destacados que se empezaron a construir hace cien años en Frankfurt. Encontramos como buena excusa para su publicación precisamente el año centenario del Instituto de Investigación Social. Además, hemos creído conveniente organizar los materiales en secciones que van desde la historia de la Escuela de Frankfurt hasta la consideración de algunos interrogantes de actualidad motivados por el desarrollo de la teoría crítica. No obstante, con esto no pretendemos establecer límites absolutos de clasificación. Confesamos que nuestra forma de organizar los ensayos responde simplemente a criterios editoriales más que a cuestiones teóricas y conceptuales. Claramente las intersecciones entre los estudios aquí presentados son amplias y hacen que cada una de las propuestas pueda dialogar con las otras en función de sus evidentes parecidos de familia. (shrink)

Communist discourses are resurging in various disciplines across the globe. Philosophy has its share of this resurgence especially after the global financial crisis of 2008 made a number of its thinkers convene in various conferences and intellectually meet in a host of publications. In these intellectual engagements, the idea of communism is once again interrogated as the moribund capitalist system failed humanity its promise. Alain Badiou is among the leading figures in the philosophical task of (re)interrogating the idea of communism. (...) Badiou raised the urgency of reformulating what he calls as the communist hypothesis for it to both reconsider its supposed failures of the past and better suit the current conditions. Badiou is particularly guided by the lessons of the May ’68 of France, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of China, and various contemporary popular uprisings to develop a reformulation of the communist hypothesis. In advancing a laborious task of reformulation, Badiou inevitably rejected a core category of the Marxist-Leninist tradition: the party. The rejection is supported by a view of the party that reduced it to its supposed fusion with the State, i.e., the party-State fusion. Such a fusion is characterized by either parliamentarian or insurrectionary politics. In this politics, Badiou argues that the party is obstructed from advancing further the proletarian revolution as it is tied to a Statist procedure. This work develops a Maoist reformulation of the communist hypothesis. Along the course of the socialist constructions of Russia and China, certain moments of what can be called as indigenized and mobilizational politics characterized periods that escape what Badiou reduced the party into, i.e., the party-State fusion. The Maoist notions of the mass line and protractedness come out as indispensable requisites in developing the concepts of indigenized and mobilizational politics. These moments depicted what can be called as the party-masses fusion and provided practical resources not only for the rectification of the supposed failures of the past but also for a reformulation of the communist hypothesis. Through the development and employment of the category of the party-masses fusion and the politics that determine it, the reformulation of the communist hypothesis is supported by a discourse of success rather than of defeat. (shrink)

From the time of Confucius and Aristotle up until the present day, theorists have argued that the individual self exists only as an aspect of social structures. The claim is not merely that the self is causally affected by social structures; but that the self is just social structure. The most recent iteration of this claim comes in book-length from Brian Lowery, though the argument was made more completely by Charles Taylor and Kenneth Gergen in the preceding decades. The most (...) rigorous version of the argument draws on Wittgenstein, claiming that thought itself is impossible without socially constructed meanings. Wittgenstein argued that a “private language” would be incoherent because the person using the language could not have any criteria by which to judge the correctness of the symbols used. However, this reasoning fails as an argument against individualized thought because it applies equally well to the use of public languages. So this paper argues that eliminative social constructivism has never made any sense, least of all in its latest form. (shrink)

When we participate in political debate or protests, we are judged by how we look, which clothes we wear, by our skin colour, gender and body language. This results in exclusions and limits our freedom of expression. The Politics of Becoming explores radical democratic acts of disidentification to counter this problem. Anonymity in masked protest, graffiti, and online de-bate interrupts our everyday identities. This allows us to live our multiple selves. In the digital age, anonymity becomes an inherent part of (...) everyday communication. Through our smart devices we express our selves differently. As cyborgs, our identities are disrupted and reassembled. We curate self-representations on social media, create avatars, share selfies and choose the skin colour of our emojis. The Politics of Becoming encourages us to engage in a revolution of the self. Democratic pluralism is not only a matter of institutional design but also about how we express our identities. Inner revolutions change our personal realities and plant a seed for democratic futures. (shrink)

“Ideal theorists” in contemporary liberal political theory argue that we can only arrive at a conception of what our most important political values require by reference to an imagined ideal state of affairs and that we must therefore, to some extent, engage in utopian thinking. Critical theorists, from Marx and the Frankfurt School, have traditionally been highly skeptical towards using idealizations in this way. This skepticism is mirrored by contemporary authors, such as Charles Mills. I argue that most of their (...) critical arguments make a principled case only against ahistorical, decontextualized projects of utopian idealization, but not against ideal theorizing as such. Critical theories do not need to reject ideal theorizing. On the contrary: The method of immanent critique that is specific to critical theory allows for a conception of an ideal state of affairs that emerges from its diagnosis of social contradictions. I conclude that critical theories can (and should) incorporate some aspects of ideal theorizing and its utopian reference to a better society. (shrink)

The emergence of a new generation of antiracist activists and theorists seeking to advance an anticapitalist agenda creates a new vantage point for re-examining how racism relates to the logic of capital. This essay explores sources in the work of Marx, twentieth-century Marxists, and Frantz Fanon that can provide direction for overcoming the binary of class and race.

Artistic activism intervenes in, and through, culture to animate ideas with emotions—charge them with affect—to motivate action, and change material conditions. Artistic activism also animates lived experience through emotions and, through its representation, gives rise to ideas and ideals. Yet we have no theory of change for how this might work. This article provides a model to think through and reflect upon “artistic activism,” or whatever name it goes by, as a complex practice that combines the affective power of the (...) arts with the effective aims of activism. This gives us a wide-angle lens with which to see how artistic activism might create change. The model is then applied to a real-world creative activism example: the Undocubus, an intervention by young undocumented immigrants in the southern United States. The model’s macro view aids with thinking through and assessing more specific and necessarily contextual micro theories of change that are applied, consciously or unconsciously, by artistic activists and those they work with. The applied micro-view tests out its alignment with an example of practice. Most importantly, a comprehensive theory of change for artistic activism can provide clarity and direction as to where to intervene to maximize change. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that ideal theories in political philosophy are a form of ideology. This article examines arguments building on the work of Charles Mills and Raymond Geuss for the claim that ideal theories are cognitively distorting belief systems that have the effect of stabilizing unjust social arrangements. I argue that Mills and Geuss neither succeed in establishing that the content of ideal theories is necessarily cognitively defective in the way characteristic for ideologies, nor can they make plausible which (...) mechanisms ensure the alleged negative effects of the widespread acceptance of ideal theorizing. This does not mean that all hope is lost for the ideology objection, however. By turning to a second Marxian model of ideology, I argue that the ideological character of ideal theories is not so much a matter of their content, but rather of their form. Ideal theories falsely present the normative concepts that they use as semantically practice-independent and thereby block potential challenges from subordinate groups to dominant ideologies. It is therefore not the normative content of ideal theories which proves to be objectionable, but the particular role their concepts play in wider political discourse. (shrink)

Feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon and Sally Haslanger argue that the ruling class’s beliefs create reality. Once these beliefs have created reality, they correspond to it, which is to say, they are true. It is therefore unclear how they constitute an ideology and hence how ideology critique might proceed. Feminists have responded to this by trying to show that the ruling class’s beliefs are nevertheless an ideology in some sense. In this paper, I attempt to convince them otherwise.

In this book, Jana S. Ros̆ker offers the first comprehensive overview and exegesis of the work of Li Zehou, who is one of the most significant and influential Chinese philosophers of our time. Ros̆ker shows us how Li's complex system of thought seeks to revive various Chinese traditions, and at the same time attempts to harmonize or reconcile this cultural heritage with the demands of the dominant economic, political, and axiological structures of our globalized world. Variously characterized as 'neo-traditional,' 'neo-Kantian,' (...) 'post-Marxist,' 'Marxist-Confucian,' 'pragmatist,' 'instrumentalist,' 'romantic,' and more, Li's work was central to the period known as the Chinese Enlightenment in the 1980s and has helped modify and transform antiquated patterns of Chinese intellectual discourse. He is one of the rare Chinese thinkers whose work has had not only had a deep and lasting impact on Chinese intellectuals, but has acquired a broad readership outside of China as well. Seen from a broader intercultural perspective, Li's unique and imaginative approach to a wide range of basic theoretical problems has created new styles of intellectual investigation, while reminding us of our belonging to a common humanity, regardless of differences in our individual cultures, languages, preferences, and traditions. (shrink)

The essay proposes to use alienation as a heuristic and conceptual tool for the analysis of the impact of digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) on users. It follows a historical materialist understanding, according to which data can be considered as things produced in an industrial fashion. A representational interpretation, according to which data would merely reflect a given reality, is untenable. It will be argued instead to understand data as an additional layer which has a transformative impact on reality (...) as a whole. The analysis follows the early Marx in thinking of alienation as a structural condition which holds even if it is not experienced psychologically by users. Alienation means that the desire to express oneself and achieve social recognition, self-realization, and participation through the use of ICTs is incongruent to the inherent purposes and functions of these technologies. Digital platforms create the ideological illusion that users contribute to the production of data solely for their own gratification. Users, in turn, react to structural alienation either by internalizing it, in which case they may become enthusiastic data producers, or by imposing alienating conditions on other users. Finally, it will be shown that a strong notion of privacy is less suited to articulate concerns about the impact of ICTs because it expresses a desire for privilege and individual control which has become unfulfillable in the environment of data industries. The essay closes by showing some of the changes in institutional structures and behavior that could follow from the focus on alienation. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the concepts of social position and social status, the types of social position, as well as the determinedness of social statuses by the given positions in a new approach. In the first, introductory part of the article, I emphasize that the institutional sociological conception of social position in my approach is relatively closest to the structuralist position conception. In the second part, I introduce two different concepts, labelled social position and social status, and briefly review (...) the social determinedness of social status. In the third part, social positions are typified from the point of view of the two components of social position: on the one hand, from that of social power relations and on the other from that of interest relations. I point out that the different social positions promote the realization of interests to different degrees, that is, they make it possible to attain different social statuses. In a related article, I illustrate the concepts and connections in question with a case study carried out on an industrial shop floor. (shrink)

According to many accounts, propaganda is a variety of politically significant signal with a distinctive connection to irrationality. This irrationality may be theoretical, or practical; it may be supposed that propaganda characteristically elicits this irrationality anew, or else that it exploits its prior existence. The view that encompasses such accounts we will call irrationalism. This essay presents two classes of propaganda that do not bear the sort of connection to irrationality posited by the irrationalist: hard propaganda and propaganda by the (...) deed. Faced with these counterexamples, some irrationalists will offer their account of propaganda as a refinement of the folk concept rather than as an attempt to capture all of its applications. The author argues that any refinement of the concept of propaganda must allow the concept to remain essentially political, and that the irrationalist refinement fails to meet this condition. (shrink)

In his famous ‘Integrity Objection’, Bernard Williams condemns utilitarianism for requiring us to regard our projects as dispensable, and thus precluding us from being properly committed to them. In this paper, I argue against commitment as Williams defines it, drawing upon insights from the socialist tradition as well as mainstream analytic moral philosophy. I show that given the mutual interdependence of individuals (a phenomenon emphasised by socialists) several appealing non-utilitarian moral principles also require us to regard our projects as dispensable. (...) This means that those who endorse those principles cannot appeal to Williams’s argument against utilitarianism. It also puts pressure on his thought that moral theories ought to permit commitment – in fact, it suggests that they ought not. Regarding one’s projects as dispensable may be alienating, and this may motivate us to hang onto commitment and reject these non-utilitarian principles along with utilitarianism. However, commitment also threatens a kind of alienation – from other people. Drawing upon the socialist tradition again, I argue that avoiding this form of alienation is necessary for proper engagement with our projects, and thereby with ourselves. (shrink)

This essay aims to provide an account of the differences between what I call the “Classical Marxist” conception of science which was adhered to by Marx and Engels and further developed by Boris Hessen and others on the one hand, and the conception of science which characterizes “Western Marxism” as it developed through the work of the theorists of the Frankfurt School on the other hand. I argue that Western Marxists such as Herbert Marcuse and Max Horkheimer did not in (...) fact successfully criticize the logical positivist account of the modern natural sciences. Instead I argue that they implicitly accepted the positivists’ characterization of the modern natural sciences (as they interpreted it) and then proceeded to devalue the modern natural sciences on this basis. I also show that Marcuse and Horkheimer, even though they presented themselves as revolting against the alleged “economism” of Classical Marxism, ended up endorsing a view of science which is functionally equivalent to a reductive economistic conception of science. I argue that the Classical Marxists’ conception of science is far richer and far more interesting than either a stereotyped “economistic” conception of science or the Western Marxist conception of modern science as merely an element in a historical process centered on the oppressive universalization of instrumental reasoning. (shrink)

Knowledge is inextricably bound to power in the context of settler colonialism where apprehension of the Other is a tool of domination. Tracing the development of the “settler colonial” paradigm, this article deconstructs Zionist and Israeli dispossession of Palestinian land and sovereignty, applying the sociology of knowledge production to the study of the Israeli-Palestinian case. The settler colonial paradigm, linked to Israeli critical sociology, post-Zionism, and postcolonialism, reemerged following changes in the political landscape from the mid-1990s that reframed the history (...) of the Nakba as enduring, challenged the Jewish definition of the state, and legitimated Palestinians as agents of history. Palestinian scholars in Israel lead the paradigm’s reformulation. This article offers a phenomenology of Palestinian positionality, a critical potential for decolonizing the settler colonial structure and exclusive Jewish sovereignty, to consolidate a field of study that shapes not only research into the Israeli-Palestinian case but approaches to decolonization and liberation. (shrink)

It is well-known that Gilles Deleuze (and Félix Guattari) are critical of the notion of ideology. However, it is not very clear why they seem to be so dismissive of it. In what follows, I will begin my discussion by showing what Deleuze means by ideology and reconstructing why Deleuze thinks that ideology is a misused concept and that the misuse of the concept warrants its dismissal. In Anti-Oedipus, the insufficiency or inadequacy of the concept of ideology can be understood (...) in light of the opposition between production and representation. Next, I will show that—in A Thousand Plateaus—this very opposition between production and representation is relaxed in favor of the notion of assemblage. By looking at Althusser’s theory of ideology, I will argue that ideology is not merely a cognitive representation in the sense that it can be considered as having its own material existence. If so, the concept of ideology does not have to be too narrowly conceived. Rather, I propose that Deleuze and Guattari offer a different kind of ideology critique through noology and the critical analysis of microfascism. Finally, I will conclude by arguing that Deleuze is still enacting a novel form of ideology critique despite his dismissal of the very terminology. (shrink)

This article explains and defends a novel idea about how people can be misled by a discussion topic, even if the discussion itself does not explicitly involve the making of false claims. The crucial aspect of this idea is that people are liable to infer, from the fact that a particular topic is being discussed, that this topic is important. As a result, they may then be led to accept certain beliefs about the state of the world they consider necessary (...) for the topic’s importance. What the article calls “importance misrepresentation” occurs when these beliefs about the state of the world are false or otherwise mistaken. The article explores different ways in which importance misrepresentation can occur, and it uses this idea to help clarify and strengthen some well‐known criticisms of the topic choices of academic philosophers. (shrink)

This paper argues that the relative stability of ancient Egyptian society during the Middle Kingdom (c.2055 – 1650 BC) can in part be explained by referring to the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice, i.e., the manner in which imbalances in socio‐economic power are causally correlated with imbalances in the conceptual scheme through which people attempt to interpret their social reality and assert their interests in light of their interpretations. The court literature of the Middle Kingdom is analyzed using the concepts of (...) hermeneutical injustice and ideology. It is argued that while it is true that there was room for maneuver and for internal critique, the efficacy of internal critique was hindered by the structure of the intellectual discourse of Middle Kingdom Egypt. This intellectual discourse was suitable for the interpretation of social reality in a way that allowed the elites to assert their interests, but it was not suitable for the interpretation of social reality in a way that accorded with the interests of the exploited peasantry. (shrink)

Illusion is a significant concept in philosophy, art history, literary theory and aesthetics. It has a concrete scientific basis in the perspective of modern cognitive neuroscience. Historically, it has been critically discussed by many philosophers, including Plato, Bacon, Descartes, Kant, and Nietzsche, who considered it to be a distortion of reality. Yet illusion is connected with so many basic aesthetic issues -- such as ambiguity, imagination, and imagery -- that it remains an indispensable concept in modern aesthetics. In the different (...) art media communication of creators with appreciators involves illusory imagery. Its importance is emphasized by Ernst Gombrich in his Art and Illusion, one of the most influential art history texts in the English-speaking world. The concept of illusion becomes the crossing point of classical philosophy and contemporary aesthetics. In this article, the philosophical, psychological and aesthetic bases of illusion will be introduced. In different fields, illusion has different content, but depends on the same psychological mechanisms. The neural mechanisms that underpin aesthetic illusion in contemporary artistic production also function in the modern ideology described by Adorno, Eagleton, and Williams. Not all aesthetic illusions have positive functions, which sometimes leads to distorted cognition and emotional complexity. When it deviates too far from reality, aesthetic illusion contains particular cognitive emotional qualities that conflict with artistic imagery in classical arts. As a bearer of modern aesthetic emotion, it is also shaped by special economic and political situations and always has a kind of ideological character. Thus aesthetic illusion often promotes new configurations of aesthetics and art history. (shrink)

Current radical democratic politics is characterized by new participatory spaces for citizens’ engagement, which aim at facilitating the democratic ideals of freedom and equality. These spaces are, however, situated in the context of deep societal inequalities. Modes of discrimination are carried over into participatory interaction. The democratic subject is judged by its physically embodied appearance, which replicates external hierarchies and impedes the freedom of self-expression. To tackle this problem, this article seeks to identify ways to increase the freedom of the (...) subject to explore its multiple self. Understanding the self as inherently fugitive, the article investigates participatory, deliberative and agonistic concepts of self-transformation. As all of them appear limited, it introduces a transformative perspective in democratic thought. Enriching the transformative perspective with queer and gender theory, the article generates the concept of a politics of becoming, which, through radical democratic practices of disidentification, advances the freedom of the subject to change. (shrink)

Good luck isn’t just chance—it can be learned and leveraged—and The Serendipity Mindset explains how you can use serendipity to make life better at work, at home—everywhere. Many of us believe that the great turning points and opportunities in our lives happen by chance, that they’re out of our control. Often we think that successful people—and successful companies and organizations—are simply luckier than the rest of us. Good fortune—serendipity—just seems to happen to them. Is that true? Or are some people (...) better at creating the conditions for coincidences to arise and taking advantage of them when they do? How can we connect the dots of seemingly random events to improve our lives? In The Serendipity Mindset, Christian Busch explains that serendipity isn’t about luck in the sense of simple randomness. It’s about seeing links that others don’t, combining these observations in unexpected and strategic ways, and learning how to detect the moments when apparently random or unconnected ideas merge to form new opportunities. Busch explores serendipity from a rational and scientific perspective and argues that there are identifiable approaches we can use to foster the conditions to let serendipity grow. Drawing from biology, chemistry, management, and information systems, and using examples of people from all walks of life, Busch illustrates how serendipity works and explains how we can train our own serendipity muscle and use it to turn the unexpected into opportunity. Once we understand serendipity, Busch says, we become curators of it, and luck becomes something that no longer just happens to us—it becomes a force that we can grasp, shape, and hone. Full of exciting ideas and strategies, The Serendipity Mindset offers a clear blueprint for how we can cultivate serendipity to increase innovation, influence, and opportunity in every aspect of our lives. (shrink)

Breaking Down the Barriers to Serendipity Life is what happens to us while we are making other plans. ALLEN SAUNDERS, AMERICAN WRITER, JOURNALIST, AND CARTOONIST.

The aim of the article is to further assess and develop feminist standpoint theory by introducing the notion of the `situated imagination' as constituting an important part of this theory as well as that of `situated knowledge'. The article argues that the faculty of the imagination constructs as well as transforms, challenges and supersedes both existing knowledge and social reality. However, like knowledge, it is crucial to theorize the imagination as situated, that is, as shaped and conditioned (although not determined) (...) by social positioning. (shrink)

This article evaluates the usefulness of the concept of hegemony in theorizing men. The discussion is located within the framework of ‘Critical Studies on Men’ (CSM), in which the centrality of power issues is recognized, rather than that of ‘Men’s Studies’, where it is frequently not. Recent uses, as in ‘hegemonic masculinity’ in the analysis of masculinities, are subjected to a qualified critique. Instead a shift is proposed from masculinity to men, to focus on ‘the hegemony of men’. This formulation (...) seeks to address the double complexity that men are both a social category formed by the gender system and collective and individual agents, often dominant collective and individual agents, of social practices. This is explored mainly in relation to substantive studies on men, and briefly the institutional development of CSM. The concluding discussion examines how these arguments connect with debates in feminist theory and social theory. (shrink)

In this chapter I focus on listening as a potentially revolutionary pedagogical activity. I argue that listening should not be understood as an essentially passive state, and focus on pedagogical situations where the educator can be misled by prejudices regarding the abilities, or lack thereof, of the individuals that the educator is interacting with in a pedagogical context. While the claims which I argue for apply to pedagogues in formal classrooms, I will be mostly concerned with pedagogy in the context (...) of political and social movements. In the first section, I argue that there is a direct relationship between the manner in which dominant social groups , especially ruling classes in societies stratified along class lines, accumulate social power in a given society and the manner in which the conceptual tools that are available for the interpretation of social reality make it difficult for members of oppressed social groups to interpret social reality in a way that accords with their interests, either because the adequate conceptual tools are not part of the conceptual repertoire of their society, or because they do not have access to them due to their material conditions (grinding poverty, illiteracy, etc.). I argue that the revolutionary pedagogue must be aware of this structural problem. In the second section, I draw on the methods of participatory action research in an attempt to specify what the revolutionary pedagogue must be like as a listener in order to compensate for the existence of this deficiency in adequate conceptual tools for the analysis of social reality and the identification of objective social interests on the part of members of oppressed social groups. In other words, I specify the qualities that revolutionary pedagogues must possess as listeners in order to fulfill their task. In the third and concluding section, I argue that in order to compensate for the structural problem that I identify in the first section, pedagogues must be willing to identify with the members of the oppressed groups that they are attempting to teach (in a dialogical manner). They must be willing to commit what Amilcar Cabral called class suicide and its analogues in relation to other forms of oppression (Cabral 1979a, 126). (shrink)

Social and political concepts are indispensable yet historically and culturally variable in a way that poses a challenge: how can we reconcile confident commitment to them with awareness of their contingency? In this article, we argue that available responses to this problem—Foundationalism, Ironism, and Right Wittgensteinianism—are unsatisfactory. Instead, we draw on the work of Bernard Williams to tease out and develop a Left Wittgensteinian response. In present-day pluralistic and historically self-conscious societies, mere confidence in our concepts is not enough. For (...) modern individuals who are ineluctably aware of conceptual change, engaged concept-use requires reasonable confidence, and in the absence of rational foundations, the possibility of reasonable confidence is tied to the possibility of critically discriminating between conceptual practices worth endorsing and those worth rejecting. We show that Left Wittgensteinianism offers such a basis for critical discrimination through point-based explanations of conceptual practices which relate them to the needs of concept-users. We end by considering how Left Wittgensteinianism guides our understanding of how conceptual practices can be revised in the face of new needs. (shrink)

This paper draws a distinction between ‘right MacIntyreans’ who are relatively optimistic that MacIntyre’s vision of ethics can be realised in capitalist society, and ‘left MacIntyreans’ who are sceptical about this possibility, and aims to show that the ‘left MacIntyrean’ position is a promising perspective available to business ethicists. It does so by arguing for a distinction between ‘community-focused’ practices and ‘excellence-focused’ practices. The latter concept fulfils the promise of practices to provide us with an understanding of the best work (...) for humankind and highlights the affinities between MacIntyre’s concept of a practice and Marx’s conception of good work as free, creative activity. The paper concludes with a suggestion that we reflect on the best forms of work so that we can strive to ensure the very best activities, those most consonant with our flourishing, one day become available to all. (shrink)

My aims in this essay are two. First (§§1-4), I want to get clear on the very idea of a theory of the history of philosophy, the idea of an overarching account of the evolution of philosophical reflection since the inception of written philosophy. And secondly (§§5-8), I want to actually sketch such a global theory of the history of philosophy, which I call the two-streams theory.

The article considers the problem of the relations between modernity and secularization. The author argues that the discourse on secularization is the most appropriate strategy for modern self-understanding. The discourse itself is not homogeneous. One approach is a classical theory of secularization, which considers the secularization as a universal world-historical process, which passed the stages “modernization – secularization – rationalization.” Other approach is to interpret modern society as a post-secular society, but with relevance to religious ethos. This approach considers Modernity (...) as a unique social reality with a specific type of rationality and a set of behavioral strategies, which were formed as a result of the transformation of religious social reality, the center of which was a Christian myth. Accordingly, modernization becomes the result of secularization, and not vice versa, as the proponents of the first approach assumed. The thematization in the discourse on the secularization of a new type of society, which J. Habermas called post-secular society, demonstrates a crisis of principles constituting the Modernity’s foundations. Predictions of the epoch of an irreligious society did not come true, and secular reason is now forced to reckon with other types of rationality and take them into account, including in public space. This situation suggests that we are witnessing the birth of a new form of social reality. Thus, the article concludes: discourse on secularization is recognized as the most adequate strategy of the comprehension of Modernity; secularization should be viewed as a consistent detranscendentalization of Christian social reality; the emergence of a post-secular society indicates fundamental transformations in the field of the most general ideas about the nature of cultural mind and cultural identities. (shrink)

Social categories play a central role in inquiry. Some authors have argued that social categories can only play this role because they have a particular metaphysical status, such as a connection to natural kinds or to comparatively joint-carving properties. This reflects the broadly realist idea that categories that play important roles in inquiry do so for metaphysical reasons. In this paper I argue that such metaphysical views of social categories cannot accommodate ‘empty’ social categories, cases in which social categories that (...) cannot have the metaphysical features attributed to them by such accounts still play a central role in inquiry. I defend an alternative approach: context-dependent naturalness, an analogue of metaphysical naturalness that concerns context-dependent, rather than metaphysical, structure. (shrink)

Ideology is commonly defined along functional, epistemic, and genetic dimensions. This article advances a reasonably unified account that specifies how they connect and locates the mechanisms at work. I frame the account along a recent distinction between anchoring and grounding, endorse an etiological reading of functional explanations, and draw on current work about the epistemology of delusion, looping effects, and structuring causes to explain how ideologies originate, reproduce, and possibly collapse. This eventually allows articulating how the legitimating function of ideologies (...) relates to the constitutive and causal role they play when embedded into the facts they are originally designed to anchor. (shrink)

The three main non-traditional schools of environmental philosophy - social ecology, feminism and deep ecology - contain divergent views of and claims regarding the universalization of their particular world views. One example of this divergence of views concerns the status of human/non-human relationships. Like many other contemporary non-traditional liberation movements and theories, these three environmental movements and schools of thought have been influenced by the theories of Karl Marx. Therefore, in order to clarify and understand the way in which, and (...) the extent to which, key proponents of each of these environmental movements and philosophies universalize their particular philosophic world views, this thesis compares their theories to those of Karl Marx. Emphasis is placed on Marx's critique of abstract and idealist-based universalizing as applied in the area of human-non-human relationships, as this critique and area of application is a key feature of non-traditional environmental thought. Also, the methodology used in this thesis is a critical analysis of the primary philosophic texts and related commentaries. (shrink)

According to a recent interpretive orthodoxy, Spinoza is a profoundly democratic theorist of state authority. I reject this orthodoxy. To be sure, for Spinoza, a political order succeeds in proportion as it harnesses the power of the people within it. However, Spinoza shows that political inclusion is only one possible strategy to this end; equally if not more useful is political exclusion, so long as it maintains what I call the depoliticised acquiescence of those excluded.

On a certain reading, the respective theories of Freud and Nietzsche might be described as exploring the suffered relational histories of the subject, who is driven by need; these histories might also be understood as histories of language. This suggests a view of language as a complicated mode of identifying-with, which obliges linguistic subjects to identify the non-identical, but also enables them to simultaneously identify with each other in the psychoanalytic sense. This ambivalent space of psychoanalytic identification would be conditioned (...) by relational histories. On one hand, this might lead to conformity within a system of language as a shared, obligatory compromise formation that would defend against the non-identical; magical language, typified in Freud’s critique of animism and in Nietzsche’s critique of “free will” guided by absolute normative signifiers (“Good” and “Evil”), would be symptomatic of this sort of defense. On the other hand, given other relational histories, it may produce the possibility for more transitional modes of identification, and thereby modes of language that can bear its suffered histories, and lead to proliferation of singular compromise formations. It is suggested that while the former is historically dominant, Nietzsche and various psychoanalytic thinkers contribute to conceiving of the possibility of working ourselves towards the latter. (shrink)

Frederick Engels’s Anti-Dühring was the most important theoretical response to the emerging reformist tendencies within European socialism in the 19th century. It also proved to be Engels’s most influential, and controversial work. Because it is, as Hal Draper points out, ‘the only more or less systematic presentation of Marxism’ by either by Marx or Engels, anyone wanting to reinterpret Marx must first detach it from his seal of approval. It is thus around Anti-Dühring and related texts that debates about the (...) relationship of Marx to ‘Engelsian’ Marxism have tended to focus. This essay re-engages with debates about Engels’s mature work with a view to unpicking his contribution to Marxism from caricatured criticisms of his thought. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a new interpretation of Marx’s essay On the Jewish Question which re-states its key ideas but removes unnecessary debates that are not relevant to current political and legal problems. Because OJQ is a demonstration of critique it does not offer positive proscriptions or suggestions for change. Its utility, I argue, lies in the way it can help us think about the limits of resolving deeply entrenched power-relations without a thoroughgoing engaging of how those powers are (...) created and enacted in civil society. With this in mind I read OJQ alongside the recent campaign to legislate for marriage equality in Australia and the movement to recognise environmental human rights. While both movements might ameliorate instances of discrimination and harm, I argue that they cannot resolve those powers that limit certain kinds of access or render people and things subordinate to other interests. (shrink)

The texts before us are relatively early works. They predate the famous Manifesto of the Communist Party of 1848. Their importance lies in this: that here historical materialism is outlined and defended for the first time. This new philosophy is elaborated in the course of Marx and Engels' effort to settle accounts with previous German philosophy—and, perhaps, with philosophy as such. The new outlook is developed, therefore, in the context of polemic against Hegel and Feuerbach, precisely the thinkers that they (...) most admired earlier in fact. (shrink)

Historical materialism I take to be the view expressed in the well-known Preface to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) and exemplified in Capital and in many other writings by Marx and by Marxists. I shall begin with a few introductory remarks, next sketch in the theory, and finally contend that, despite real attractions, it too far limits the scope of legitimate historical enquiry to be ultimately acceptable.

This article considers and criticizes criminal law‘s assumption of the moral autonomy of individuals, showing how that view rests on questionable and obscure Kantian commitments about the self, and proposes a naturalistic alternative developed through a synthetic reading of Adorno‘s and Bhaskar‘s account of the subject in relation to nature and society. As an embodied, emergent, changing subject whose practically rational powers are emergent, polymorphous, and contingent, the subject‘s moral autonomy is dependent on the conditions for experiences of solidarity in (...) four-planar nature. This view makes criminal theory‘s Autonomy Assumption look deeply questionable; autonomy must be a complex, nuanced open question, not an abstract, a priori default assumption. (shrink)

Davis Smith-Brecheisen reviews Annie McClanahan’s Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and Twenty-First-Century Culture.

Teaching at a private, conservative religious institution poses unique challenges for equality, diversity, and inclusivity education (EDI). Given the realities of the student population in the Honors College of a private, religious institution, it is necessary to first introduce students to the contemporary realities of inequality and oppression and thus the need for EDI. This chapter proposes a conceptual framework and pedagogical suggestions for teaching basic concepts of social justice in a team-taught, interdisciplinary social science course. The course integrates four (...) different approaches to justice: theoretical, social scientific, narratological, and experiential. The discussion of the experiential dimension of the course references practical pedagogical strategies for making social justice and inequality real for our students. Understanding the realities of social inequality and its roots can foster a better understanding of the social forces and structures that perpetuate inequality. Furthermore, this approach can plant the intellectual and empathic seeds to challenge in-group bias and hopefully germinate into fruitful interaction with diverse others. Finally, this rich, interdisciplinary encounter with social inequality and justice can prepare students to work for just social structures that will lead to a more inclusive world. (shrink)

In this article I explore a central paradox of contemporary identity politics: why do we look for recognition from the very institutions we reject as oppressive? I argue that neoliberalism’s continued assault on the bases for collectivity has led to a suspicion that ‘the collective’ is an essentialising concept. The assault on the collective coupled with the neoliberal imperative to create an ‘authentic’ self has led to trauma and victimhood becoming the only bases on which people can unite. This manifests (...) discursively and theoretically in the primary trope of contemporary activism: ‘intersectionality’. Mobilising around this analytical concept has led to an analysis of oppression that, even as it claims to be systemic, is totally dematerialised and relentlessly individualised. Instead of building collective power, we are left with a politics of individual demand coming from a coalition of dispersed subject positions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article argues that ‘post-Marxist’ or ‘poststructuralist discourse theory’ represents a complex deconstruction of the Marxist tradition of social and political theory. Focussing on three ontological positions in Marx’s texts – the ontologies of human alienation, praxis, and production – the article shows how this approach repeats and transforms the rich tradition of Marxist thinking so as to elaborate a novel approach to social and political analysis. This claim is built around the idea that discourse is best conceptualized as an (...) ‘articulatory practice’, whose elements are both linguistic and non-linguistic in character, and whose products are finite relational orders, including social institutions and economic processes. The result is a shift away from economic determinism and class reductionism to a relational account of social and political forms; the development of an anti-essentialist and anti-reductionist account of political identities, which emerge in a dialectical tension with incomplete processes of identification, and a particular understanding of the subject and agency in political theory, which grounds a different account of political practices. The article also sets out the methodological implications of post-Marxist discourse theory, which is focussed on the articulation of different logics of critical explanation, before exploring the role of critique and normativity in this approach, which are conceptualized as continuous, immanent and complex. (shrink)